Narrative:

I was copilot on gulfstream XXXX en route VFR from rno to O04 (carson city, nv). No flight plan was filed as this was a quick repos while in contact with reno departure (IFR plan was on file for subsequent return to bjc). I am filing this form to document that I was the copilot and not flying the aircraft. Please see separate incident form filed for another incident on same trip, which also resulted from lack of CRM skills by the captain. I file this not to initiate action against the captain, but to protect myself and to document the events. The captain made an appropriate 45 degree right downwind entry to runway 9 at carson city. However, I noticed he was drifting a bit below pattern altitude and I mentioned to him he was getting low. He continued the approach and on right base I called to him that he was low and 'at reference.' these calls were followed by my somewhat adamant calls of 'minus 5' then 'airspeed minus 10, power, go around.' at that point we were at about 300-400 ft AGL. Simultaneously with the last call the stick shaker activated. As I put my hand up to push forward the power levers, the captain finally started adding power for what I thought was a go around. Instead, he turned to a (bank) 40 degree right turn as he overshot final and said (stick shaker still going) 'these gulfstreams will fly through anything.' he then kept the power in, got back to a better airspeed. (Note: his bug was at 121, which was V1 for takeoff out of reno, even though twice on the before landing checklists I had confirmed vref was 139, and both times he acknowledged this and said 'bug set.' I can't see his airspeed bug very well from where I situation.) once it was apparent he was going to continue to fly the approach, I again confirmed vref at 139, and he again acknowledged this. Next I noticed on final that he had kept the extra power in and was now getting high. I told him 'you're getting high, go around.' I felt a go around was needed since we were landing at maximum weight for the conditions to a 5900 ft runway at 4600 ft AGL. The captain then, as we were nearly at the approach threshold fully 250 ft above ground, retarded the power levers to idle and said 'we can make it.' the rate of descent was alarming and I shouted 'sink rate' followed by 'flare!' the impact was impressive and it's a testimonial to grumman/gulfstream that we didn't drive the main gear right through the wings. Any airline would have grounded the plane until a thorough hard landing inspection was completed. I personally spent a full 1/2 hour looking it over. Without question, the approach was careless and reckless operation, and in case any observers reported it to the FAA I want to document the events. It seems the captain is almost bragging about the hard landing, with the disclaimer that it was due to 'my' miscom about reference speed. First off, that is not the case. Second, a go around should have been initiated twice. Short of wrestling the captain for control, I did the best I could to coach him through the approach and landing. As I mentioned in the other incident reported from this trip, I have terminated my relationship with this flight department. Again, my intent with both reports is to document the events and not to initiate any action against the captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GULFSTREAM IS FLOWN IN A RECKLESS MANNER DURING APCH INTO CARSON CITY, NV (O04). ACFT CONSISTENTLY FLOWN BELOW LNDG TARGET SPD RESULTING IN A HARD LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS COPLT ON GULFSTREAM XXXX ENRTE VFR FROM RNO TO O04 (CARSON CITY, NV). NO FLT PLAN WAS FILED AS THIS WAS A QUICK REPOS WHILE IN CONTACT WITH RENO DEP (IFR PLAN WAS ON FILE FOR SUBSEQUENT RETURN TO BJC). I AM FILING THIS FORM TO DOCUMENT THAT I WAS THE COPLT AND NOT FLYING THE ACFT. PLEASE SEE SEPARATE INCIDENT FORM FILED FOR ANOTHER INCIDENT ON SAME TRIP, WHICH ALSO RESULTED FROM LACK OF CRM SKILLS BY THE CAPT. I FILE THIS NOT TO INITIATE ACTION AGAINST THE CAPT, BUT TO PROTECT MYSELF AND TO DOCUMENT THE EVENTS. THE CAPT MADE AN APPROPRIATE 45 DEG R DOWNWIND ENTRY TO RWY 9 AT CARSON CITY. HOWEVER, I NOTICED HE WAS DRIFTING A BIT BELOW PATTERN ALT AND I MENTIONED TO HIM HE WAS GETTING LOW. HE CONTINUED THE APCH AND ON R BASE I CALLED TO HIM THAT HE WAS LOW AND 'AT REF.' THESE CALLS WERE FOLLOWED BY MY SOMEWHAT ADAMANT CALLS OF 'MINUS 5' THEN 'AIRSPD MINUS 10, PWR, GAR.' AT THAT POINT WE WERE AT ABOUT 300-400 FT AGL. SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE LAST CALL THE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED. AS I PUT MY HAND UP TO PUSH FORWARD THE PWR LEVERS, THE CAPT FINALLY STARTED ADDING PWR FOR WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A GAR. INSTEAD, HE TURNED TO A (BANK) 40 DEG R TURN AS HE OVERSHOT FINAL AND SAID (STICK SHAKER STILL GOING) 'THESE GULFSTREAMS WILL FLY THROUGH ANYTHING.' HE THEN KEPT THE PWR IN, GOT BACK TO A BETTER AIRSPD. (NOTE: HIS BUG WAS AT 121, WHICH WAS V1 FOR TKOF OUT OF RENO, EVEN THOUGH TWICE ON THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLISTS I HAD CONFIRMED VREF WAS 139, AND BOTH TIMES HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND SAID 'BUG SET.' I CAN'T SEE HIS AIRSPD BUG VERY WELL FROM WHERE I SIT.) ONCE IT WAS APPARENT HE WAS GOING TO CONTINUE TO FLY THE APCH, I AGAIN CONFIRMED VREF AT 139, AND HE AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED THIS. NEXT I NOTICED ON FINAL THAT HE HAD KEPT THE EXTRA PWR IN AND WAS NOW GETTING HIGH. I TOLD HIM 'YOU'RE GETTING HIGH, GAR.' I FELT A GAR WAS NEEDED SINCE WE WERE LNDG AT MAX WT FOR THE CONDITIONS TO A 5900 FT RWY AT 4600 FT AGL. THE CAPT THEN, AS WE WERE NEARLY AT THE APCH THRESHOLD FULLY 250 FT ABOVE GND, RETARDED THE PWR LEVERS TO IDLE AND SAID 'WE CAN MAKE IT.' THE RATE OF DSCNT WAS ALARMING AND I SHOUTED 'SINK RATE' FOLLOWED BY 'FLARE!' THE IMPACT WAS IMPRESSIVE AND IT'S A TESTIMONIAL TO GRUMMAN/GULFSTREAM THAT WE DIDN'T DRIVE THE MAIN GEAR RIGHT THROUGH THE WINGS. ANY AIRLINE WOULD HAVE GNDED THE PLANE UNTIL A THOROUGH HARD LNDG INSPECTION WAS COMPLETED. I PERSONALLY SPENT A FULL 1/2 HR LOOKING IT OVER. WITHOUT QUESTION, THE APCH WAS CARELESS AND RECKLESS OP, AND IN CASE ANY OBSERVERS RPTED IT TO THE FAA I WANT TO DOCUMENT THE EVENTS. IT SEEMS THE CAPT IS ALMOST BRAGGING ABOUT THE HARD LNDG, WITH THE DISCLAIMER THAT IT WAS DUE TO 'MY' MISCOM ABOUT REF SPD. FIRST OFF, THAT IS NOT THE CASE. SECOND, A GAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN INITIATED TWICE. SHORT OF WRESTLING THE CAPT FOR CTL, I DID THE BEST I COULD TO COACH HIM THROUGH THE APCH AND LNDG. AS I MENTIONED IN THE OTHER INCIDENT RPTED FROM THIS TRIP, I HAVE TERMINATED MY RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS FLT DEPT. AGAIN, MY INTENT WITH BOTH RPTS IS TO DOCUMENT THE EVENTS AND NOT TO INITIATE ANY ACTION AGAINST THE CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.