Narrative:

On feb/fri/98, I was the PIC of a lear 35/a and was on approach to chicago's midway field, runway 4R. I was told to wait and contact tower upon turning final and cleared for the visual approach. Before reaching final I experienced a spoileron failure, and a binding in the controls for the ailerons. The copilot and myself began to follow the checklist and abnormal procedures checklist to correct the problem. In the process of correcting the problem the sic failed to switch over the transmitter and contact tower. He accidentally broadcasted on company radio and received a response. We both heard the response and felt we were cleared to land. Not until after touchdown did I notice the mistake and contact tower. I feel the long hours and repetition of flying in and out of midway all night added to this problem. As PIC I claim the ultimate responsibility for the aircraft and crew. I do feel the workload and concentration of last min handoffs by controllers in this area has led to problems like this, and the possibility of more serious ones in the future. We constantly feel rushed and pushed into dangerous sits like the forementioned and would do anything to see the current situation corrected.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF LEAR 35A ON APCH AND CLRED FOR VISUAL TO CONTACT TWR ON TURNING FINAL. THEY EXPERIENCE A SPOILERON FAILURE AND BINDING OF THE AILERON CTLS. ACCOMPLISHING CHKLIST ITEMS THEY NEGLECT TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ AND LAND WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: ON FEB/FRI/98, I WAS THE PIC OF A LEAR 35/A AND WAS ON APCH TO CHICAGO'S MIDWAY FIELD, RWY 4R. I WAS TOLD TO WAIT AND CONTACT TWR UPON TURNING FINAL AND CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH. BEFORE REACHING FINAL I EXPERIENCED A SPOILERON FAILURE, AND A BINDING IN THE CTLS FOR THE AILERONS. THE COPLT AND MYSELF BEGAN TO FOLLOW THE CHKLIST AND ABNORMAL PROCS CHKLIST TO CORRECT THE PROB. IN THE PROCESS OF CORRECTING THE PROB THE SIC FAILED TO SWITCH OVER THE XMITTER AND CONTACT TWR. HE ACCIDENTALLY BROADCASTED ON COMPANY RADIO AND RECEIVED A RESPONSE. WE BOTH HEARD THE RESPONSE AND FELT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. NOT UNTIL AFTER TOUCHDOWN DID I NOTICE THE MISTAKE AND CONTACT TWR. I FEEL THE LONG HRS AND REPETITION OF FLYING IN AND OUT OF MIDWAY ALL NIGHT ADDED TO THIS PROB. AS PIC I CLAIM THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACFT AND CREW. I DO FEEL THE WORKLOAD AND CONCENTRATION OF LAST MIN HDOFS BY CTLRS IN THIS AREA HAS LED TO PROBS LIKE THIS, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE SERIOUS ONES IN THE FUTURE. WE CONSTANTLY FEEL RUSHED AND PUSHED INTO DANGEROUS SITS LIKE THE FOREMENTIONED AND WOULD DO ANYTHING TO SEE THE CURRENT SIT CORRECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.