Narrative:

We flew an ILS to runway 35R and circled to land on runway 28. I briefed the landing and stated we only had 4900 ft for landing. On left base to runway 28, there were several aircraft east of us, and one in front of us, and one behind us. We were cleared to land on runway 28 before the aircraft ahead of us had touched down. At 300 ft, the student pilot brought up the possibility of going around, because the aircraft had not yet cleared the runway. At that time, the cessna on the runway cleared, and we continued for landing. The student pilot was approximately 15- 20 KTS fast on the approach, and only had 10 degree flaps. I noticed this, and pointed it out to the student. He acknowledged, and I elected to continue the landing. At approximately halfway down the runway, we touched down at approximately 70 KTS. At this point, the student pilot retracted the flaps. I determined we could not safely stop the aircraft on the remaining runway, however, before I could call for a go around, the student pilot added power. We were never below around 60 KTS, and we lifted off quickly. As we lifted off, I noticed a king air taking off on runway 17L ahead and to our 2 O'clock position either on, or just off the runway. I called this traffic to the student pilot, and he acknowledged, and I called out a cessna on runway 17R, as well as a cessna ahead and to our 1 O'clock position above us. We did not need to take any evasive action at this point. We continued our climb out. The frequency was congested, and we could not make a radio call. At this point, the tower contacted us and advised us to 'call them when we make a go around.' the student pilot, who had access to the radio at this time, replied with confusion to the tower controller. The student pilot and I discussed the fact that we are always cleared to go around, or make a touch and go, if we cannot land the aircraft safely. We were given vectors for a landing, and I decided we should return to ftg where we departed, and debrief the incident. We were then asked to call the tower when we got on the ground. Contributing factors were the lack of a push to talk switch on the right (instructor's) station. The large amount of traffic in the pattern at apa. The controller having cleared the aircraft on the cross runways, before we had made a safe landing. Several human factors issues may be present. The student pilot had not yet made a full stop landing in the aircraft, and therefore approached at a high rate of speed. Accommodation had occurred because the crew was used to higher speeds for the instrument approachs. The controller had been trying to get as many aircraft in and out of the airport, and may have decided too soon to clear the other aircraft on the opposing runway. We experienced task saturation while configuring the aircraft for climb, as well as avoiding the 3 aircraft immediately ahead of us. Supplemental information from acn 393694: after flying the ILS to runway 35 and on about a 2 mi final, just before executing missed approach procedures due to opposite direction traffic, we were directed to circle to runway 28. I commenced the circling procedure east with continued intentions for repeated touch and goes. I made a tight left turn to final after directed by tower and began the final approach. Earlier I may have inadvertently said 'circle to land' to tower but do not recall. My mindset due to our training plan and near go around was not full stop but touch and go or go around.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AC112 PLT ON CHK OUT FLT MAKES A TOUCH AND GO AT APA, CO. HE WAS EXPECTED TO MAKE A FULL STOP ON RWY 28. HE AND HIS CFI SUFFER A POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH 2 OTHER ACFT OFF RWYS 17L AND 17R.

Narrative: WE FLEW AN ILS TO RWY 35R AND CIRCLED TO LAND ON RWY 28. I BRIEFED THE LNDG AND STATED WE ONLY HAD 4900 FT FOR LNDG. ON L BASE TO RWY 28, THERE WERE SEVERAL ACFT E OF US, AND ONE IN FRONT OF US, AND ONE BEHIND US. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 28 BEFORE THE ACFT AHEAD OF US HAD TOUCHED DOWN. AT 300 FT, THE STUDENT PLT BROUGHT UP THE POSSIBILITY OF GOING AROUND, BECAUSE THE ACFT HAD NOT YET CLRED THE RWY. AT THAT TIME, THE CESSNA ON THE RWY CLRED, AND WE CONTINUED FOR LNDG. THE STUDENT PLT WAS APPROX 15- 20 KTS FAST ON THE APCH, AND ONLY HAD 10 DEG FLAPS. I NOTICED THIS, AND POINTED IT OUT TO THE STUDENT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, AND I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE LNDG. AT APPROX HALFWAY DOWN THE RWY, WE TOUCHED DOWN AT APPROX 70 KTS. AT THIS POINT, THE STUDENT PLT RETRACTED THE FLAPS. I DETERMINED WE COULD NOT SAFELY STOP THE ACFT ON THE REMAINING RWY, HOWEVER, BEFORE I COULD CALL FOR A GAR, THE STUDENT PLT ADDED PWR. WE WERE NEVER BELOW AROUND 60 KTS, AND WE LIFTED OFF QUICKLY. AS WE LIFTED OFF, I NOTICED A KING AIR TAKING OFF ON RWY 17L AHEAD AND TO OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS EITHER ON, OR JUST OFF THE RWY. I CALLED THIS TFC TO THE STUDENT PLT, AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED, AND I CALLED OUT A CESSNA ON RWY 17R, AS WELL AS A CESSNA AHEAD AND TO OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS ABOVE US. WE DID NOT NEED TO TAKE ANY EVASIVE ACTION AT THIS POINT. WE CONTINUED OUR CLBOUT. THE FREQ WAS CONGESTED, AND WE COULD NOT MAKE A RADIO CALL. AT THIS POINT, THE TWR CONTACTED US AND ADVISED US TO 'CALL THEM WHEN WE MAKE A GAR.' THE STUDENT PLT, WHO HAD ACCESS TO THE RADIO AT THIS TIME, REPLIED WITH CONFUSION TO THE TWR CTLR. THE STUDENT PLT AND I DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT WE ARE ALWAYS CLRED TO GAR, OR MAKE A TOUCH AND GO, IF WE CANNOT LAND THE ACFT SAFELY. WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS FOR A LNDG, AND I DECIDED WE SHOULD RETURN TO FTG WHERE WE DEPARTED, AND DEBRIEF THE INCIDENT. WE WERE THEN ASKED TO CALL THE TWR WHEN WE GOT ON THE GND. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THE LACK OF A PUSH TO TALK SWITCH ON THE R (INSTRUCTOR'S) STATION. THE LARGE AMOUNT OF TFC IN THE PATTERN AT APA. THE CTLR HAVING CLRED THE ACFT ON THE CROSS RWYS, BEFORE WE HAD MADE A SAFE LNDG. SEVERAL HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES MAY BE PRESENT. THE STUDENT PLT HAD NOT YET MADE A FULL STOP LNDG IN THE ACFT, AND THEREFORE APCHED AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD. ACCOMMODATION HAD OCCURRED BECAUSE THE CREW WAS USED TO HIGHER SPDS FOR THE INST APCHS. THE CTLR HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET AS MANY ACFT IN AND OUT OF THE ARPT, AND MAY HAVE DECIDED TOO SOON TO CLR THE OTHER ACFT ON THE OPPOSING RWY. WE EXPERIENCED TASK SATURATION WHILE CONFIGURING THE ACFT FOR CLB, AS WELL AS AVOIDING THE 3 ACFT IMMEDIATELY AHEAD OF US. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 393694: AFTER FLYING THE ILS TO RWY 35 AND ON ABOUT A 2 MI FINAL, JUST BEFORE EXECUTING MISSED APCH PROCS DUE TO OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC, WE WERE DIRECTED TO CIRCLE TO RWY 28. I COMMENCED THE CIRCLING PROC E WITH CONTINUED INTENTIONS FOR REPEATED TOUCH AND GOES. I MADE A TIGHT L TURN TO FINAL AFTER DIRECTED BY TWR AND BEGAN THE FINAL APCH. EARLIER I MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY SAID 'CIRCLE TO LAND' TO TWR BUT DO NOT RECALL. MY MINDSET DUE TO OUR TRAINING PLAN AND NEAR GAR WAS NOT FULL STOP BUT TOUCH AND GO OR GAR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.