Narrative:

At approximately XX05, local time, flight departed runway 23. Upon attempting to retract the landing gear, the nosewheel remained down. The captain asked me to verify the gear pin was in the storage box, I replied it was not. I initiated a visual left traffic pattern, the captain informed the tower we would return for landing and inspection. The tower asked if we needed assistance, we replied 'no' and the tower said they would send the trucks as a precaution. I landed the aircraft without further incident. The captain taxied to the gate, we shut down, removed the nose gear pin, inspected, and resumed the trip. The chain of events can be traced to my former airline experience where it was a policy to never install the nose pin and they did not hangar the aircraft at out stations. Additionally, during the preflight inspection, as I bent down to remove the chocks, I struck my head on the pitot tube and cut my forehead. I cursed, kicked the chocks and looked for the gear pin flag. The flag was not visible and I completed the preflight. When I checked for the gear pin on board I simply read the item and checked for the bag key not the gear pin. I believe contributing factors were the differences and lack of difference training. Additionally, the distraction of being bumped on the head, rushing through checklists to meet on time performance, and pairing items together on the checklist, like bag key and gear pin even though they are not co- located. While there was never any compromise to safety, I know that attention to detail and checklist content can be the first step in a larger chain of events.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: JETSTREAM 32 ACFT TOOK OFF WITH NOSE GEAR PIN STILL IN AND FLC RETURNED, LANDED, REMOVED PIN AND DEPARTED AGAIN. RPTR FO WAS DISTRACTED DURING PREFLT BY HITTING HIS HEAD ON THE PITOT TUBE CUTTING HIS HEAD.

Narrative: AT APPROX XX05, LCL TIME, FLT DEPARTED RWY 23. UPON ATTEMPTING TO RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR, THE NOSEWHEEL REMAINED DOWN. THE CAPT ASKED ME TO VERIFY THE GEAR PIN WAS IN THE STORAGE BOX, I REPLIED IT WAS NOT. I INITIATED A VISUAL L TFC PATTERN, THE CAPT INFORMED THE TWR WE WOULD RETURN FOR LNDG AND INSPECTION. THE TWR ASKED IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE, WE REPLIED 'NO' AND THE TWR SAID THEY WOULD SEND THE TRUCKS AS A PRECAUTION. I LANDED THE ACFT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE CAPT TAXIED TO THE GATE, WE SHUT DOWN, REMOVED THE NOSE GEAR PIN, INSPECTED, AND RESUMED THE TRIP. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS CAN BE TRACED TO MY FORMER AIRLINE EXPERIENCE WHERE IT WAS A POLICY TO NEVER INSTALL THE NOSE PIN AND THEY DID NOT HANGAR THE ACFT AT OUT STATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, DURING THE PREFLT INSPECTION, AS I BENT DOWN TO REMOVE THE CHOCKS, I STRUCK MY HEAD ON THE PITOT TUBE AND CUT MY FOREHEAD. I CURSED, KICKED THE CHOCKS AND LOOKED FOR THE GEAR PIN FLAG. THE FLAG WAS NOT VISIBLE AND I COMPLETED THE PREFLT. WHEN I CHKED FOR THE GEAR PIN ON BOARD I SIMPLY READ THE ITEM AND CHKED FOR THE BAG KEY NOT THE GEAR PIN. I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THE DIFFERENCES AND LACK OF DIFFERENCE TRAINING. ADDITIONALLY, THE DISTR OF BEING BUMPED ON THE HEAD, RUSHING THROUGH CHKLISTS TO MEET ON TIME PERFORMANCE, AND PAIRING ITEMS TOGETHER ON THE CHKLIST, LIKE BAG KEY AND GEAR PIN EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NOT CO- LOCATED. WHILE THERE WAS NEVER ANY COMPROMISE TO SAFETY, I KNOW THAT ATTN TO DETAIL AND CHKLIST CONTENT CAN BE THE FIRST STEP IN A LARGER CHAIN OF EVENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.