Narrative:

On feb/wed/98, at XA54L EST I participated as the flight engineer on a B727-100. As previously described in my initial NASA report submitted dec/thu/97, I preflted the aircraft as required by flight engineer preflight checklist in the B727 flight handbook ('essential and standby power...check'). I observed that the standby attitude indicator 'power interruption warning flag' came into view while simulating the loss of all generator power. Per far 121.305(K)(4). It was clearly obvious that this aircraft is in violation with far 121.305(K)(4). As a result of the same concerns which precipitated my initial NASA report of an incident on dec/thu/97, and follow-up contact with the indianapolis FSDO, where an inspector told me on feb/thu/98, that this standby attitude indicator confign had been determined by the principal maintenance inspector, not to be in compliance with the far 121.305(K)(4), and that there was no authority/authorized for it to be configured in violation of far 121.305(K)(4). Considering that I had not yet had the opportunity to confirm the correct status of this standby attitude indicator confign with air carrier maintenance, and knowing that refusing to participate on this flight as the flight engineer would have resulted in my dismissal from employment from my company, I departed as scheduled. To date, I am still not clear whether or not the standby attitude indicator confign on this aircraft is legal. I do know that this confign is unsafe because a complete loss of all aircraft generators could very well result in the loss of all attitude and bank references, the very condition justifying the requirement of far 121.305(K)(4). In night and/or IMC conditions this situation can easily be disastrous. I have still yet to receive any documentation that this standby attitude indicator confign is legal. Further, I am requesting that your office request the FAA to initiate an investigation into this matter since this condition still exists and continues to create the potential for an in-flight disaster. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter, an so on the B727-100, said that the company has agreed to correct their modification to the power supply for the standby attitude indicator in the future. In the meantime, the company has mentioned that the essential power selector must be selected to a powered source if the main electrical supply fails. The so said that this really does not satisfy the far requirements, even if the selector is left in the standby power position or the emergency power position because of the possible failure of the system if continuously operated in these position. The essential power system was never designated to be operated continuously, he alleged, and the company alludes to this in their statements to the crews. The reporter said that since he has brought this problem to the attention of his air carrier's management his fellow crew members have grown concerned that they will face some sort of retribution. The reporter assumes that they will and he said that he will attempt to accept all of the blame.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B727 FLC RPTS THAT THEIR COMPANY HAS MODIFIED THEIR B727-100 FLEET SO THAT THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATORS WILL NOT BE AUTOMATICALLY POWERED WHEN THE MAIN ELECTRICAL PWR FAILS. IN ORDER TO SUPPLY PWR FOR THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR ON THESE MODIFIED ACFT THE FLC MUST SWITCH THE ESSENTIAL PWR SELECTOR TO A POWERED SELECTION. A FURTHER COMPLICATION IS THAT THIS SELECTION IS DIFFERENT FOR DIFFERENT ACFT.

Narrative: ON FEB/WED/98, AT XA54L EST I PARTICIPATED AS THE FE ON A B727-100. AS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED IN MY INITIAL NASA RPT SUBMITTED DEC/THU/97, I PREFLTED THE ACFT AS REQUIRED BY FE PREFLT CHKLIST IN THE B727 FLT HANDBOOK ('ESSENTIAL AND STANDBY PWR...CHK'). I OBSERVED THAT THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR 'PWR INTERRUPTION WARNING FLAG' CAME INTO VIEW WHILE SIMULATING THE LOSS OF ALL GENERATOR PWR. PER FAR 121.305(K)(4). IT WAS CLRLY OBVIOUS THAT THIS ACFT IS IN VIOLATION WITH FAR 121.305(K)(4). AS A RESULT OF THE SAME CONCERNS WHICH PRECIPITATED MY INITIAL NASA RPT OF AN INCIDENT ON DEC/THU/97, AND FOLLOW-UP CONTACT WITH THE INDIANAPOLIS FSDO, WHERE AN INSPECTOR TOLD ME ON FEB/THU/98, THAT THIS STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR CONFIGN HAD BEEN DETERMINED BY THE PRINCIPAL MAINT INSPECTOR, NOT TO BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAR 121.305(K)(4), AND THAT THERE WAS NO AUTH FOR IT TO BE CONFIGURED IN VIOLATION OF FAR 121.305(K)(4). CONSIDERING THAT I HAD NOT YET HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFIRM THE CORRECT STATUS OF THIS STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR CONFIGN WITH ACR MAINT, AND KNOWING THAT REFUSING TO PARTICIPATE ON THIS FLT AS THE FE WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN MY DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT FROM MY COMPANY, I DEPARTED AS SCHEDULED. TO DATE, I AM STILL NOT CLR WHETHER OR NOT THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR CONFIGN ON THIS ACFT IS LEGAL. I DO KNOW THAT THIS CONFIGN IS UNSAFE BECAUSE A COMPLETE LOSS OF ALL ACFT GENERATORS COULD VERY WELL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ALL ATTITUDE AND BANK REFS, THE VERY CONDITION JUSTIFYING THE REQUIREMENT OF FAR 121.305(K)(4). IN NIGHT AND/OR IMC CONDITIONS THIS SIT CAN EASILY BE DISASTROUS. I HAVE STILL YET TO RECEIVE ANY DOCUMENTATION THAT THIS STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR CONFIGN IS LEGAL. FURTHER, I AM REQUESTING THAT YOUR OFFICE REQUEST THE FAA TO INITIATE AN INVESTIGATION INTO THIS MATTER SINCE THIS CONDITION STILL EXISTS AND CONTINUES TO CREATE THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INFLT DISASTER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR, AN SO ON THE B727-100, SAID THAT THE COMPANY HAS AGREED TO CORRECT THEIR MODIFICATION TO THE PWR SUPPLY FOR THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR IN THE FUTURE. IN THE MEANTIME, THE COMPANY HAS MENTIONED THAT THE ESSENTIAL PWR SELECTOR MUST BE SELECTED TO A POWERED SOURCE IF THE MAIN ELECTRICAL SUPPLY FAILS. THE SO SAID THAT THIS REALLY DOES NOT SATISFY THE FAR REQUIREMENTS, EVEN IF THE SELECTOR IS LEFT IN THE STANDBY PWR POS OR THE EMER PWR POS BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE FAILURE OF THE SYS IF CONTINUOUSLY OPERATED IN THESE POS. THE ESSENTIAL PWR SYS WAS NEVER DESIGNATED TO BE OPERATED CONTINUOUSLY, HE ALLEGED, AND THE COMPANY ALLUDES TO THIS IN THEIR STATEMENTS TO THE CREWS. THE RPTR SAID THAT SINCE HE HAS BROUGHT THIS PROB TO THE ATTN OF HIS ACR'S MGMNT HIS FELLOW CREW MEMBERS HAVE GROWN CONCERNED THAT THEY WILL FACE SOME SORT OF RETRIBUTION. THE RPTR ASSUMES THAT THEY WILL AND HE SAID THAT HE WILL ATTEMPT TO ACCEPT ALL OF THE BLAME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.