Narrative:

Conditions: sod runway with one area of standing water. Although a CFI, I was in the aircraft in the capacity of a passenger only, with no intention of giving flight instruction. Chain of events: after normal preflight preparation, the takeoff roll was commenced with a rolling start from the run-up area at the end of the runway. Good soft-field procedures were used and maintained throughout the takeoff roll. At one point during the takeoff roll, the main tires began to leave the ground and back pressure was relaxed in anticipation of flying in ground effect to build speed. At that point, the left main tire contacted standing water on the runway reducing the airspeed, and caused the aircraft to settle back on the runway. The nosewheel also descended into the water further slowing the aircraft. At this point the possibility of aborting the takeoff was discussed between the PIC and myself. After we considered aborting the takeoff, speed started to build, the nose came up again, and it appeared we would achieve takeoff speed in the remaining distance. The decision to abort was discarded and the takeoff roll continued. The speed did not build in time due to a slight incline to the runway just after the area of standing water. By the time the decision to abort was finally made, there was not enough runway remaining to stop. The aircraft continued off the end of the runway into a muddy plowed field. The only damage to the aircraft was a nick in one blade of the propeller caused by a small stone. Contributing factors: the standing water on the runway was the main cause for loss of flying speed. The plan was to stay to the side of the runway avoiding the standing water. During the takeoff roll however, the aircraft drifted toward the center of the runway allowing the left main tire to contact the standing water. The next physical factor was the incline in the runway immediately after the standing water. The incline did not allow the speed to increase as anticipated. However, the single factor that could have prevented this mishap was the lack of a decisive plan. It was never determined before beginning the takeoff, at what point the takeoff should be aborted. It was also not determined who would make that decision before beginning the takeoff. As a flight instructor I am sure the PIC was expecting my input. I, on the other hand, had made no plans whatsoever. My thoughts were on what I had to accomplish upon our return from the flight. Corrective actions: when flying larger aircraft with several passenger and/or more than 1 pilot, formal training dictates that division of tasks and clarification of duties is accomplished prior to every flight. When I begin a trip in a small private plane with no passenger, and another pilot at the controls, I find myself neglecting that very important part of the trip. In this case, I should have made sure there was a go/no- go point determined, and that there was no doubt as to whom would make that decision. No matter what the size of the aircraft, predetermined speeds, attitudes, and configns are a very important part of every flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF AN SMA SEL RAN OFF THE END OF THE RWY DURING AN ABORTED TKOF ON A SOD RWY WITH STANDING WATER. A NICK TO THE PROP BLADE WAS THE ONLY DAMAGE TO THE ACFT.

Narrative: CONDITIONS: SOD RWY WITH ONE AREA OF STANDING WATER. ALTHOUGH A CFI, I WAS IN THE ACFT IN THE CAPACITY OF A PAX ONLY, WITH NO INTENTION OF GIVING FLT INSTRUCTION. CHAIN OF EVENTS: AFTER NORMAL PREFLT PREPARATION, THE TKOF ROLL WAS COMMENCED WITH A ROLLING START FROM THE RUN-UP AREA AT THE END OF THE RWY. GOOD SOFT-FIELD PROCS WERE USED AND MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THE TKOF ROLL. AT ONE POINT DURING THE TKOF ROLL, THE MAIN TIRES BEGAN TO LEAVE THE GND AND BACK PRESSURE WAS RELAXED IN ANTICIPATION OF FLYING IN GND EFFECT TO BUILD SPD. AT THAT POINT, THE L MAIN TIRE CONTACTED STANDING WATER ON THE RWY REDUCING THE AIRSPD, AND CAUSED THE ACFT TO SETTLE BACK ON THE RWY. THE NOSEWHEEL ALSO DSNDED INTO THE WATER FURTHER SLOWING THE ACFT. AT THIS POINT THE POSSIBILITY OF ABORTING THE TKOF WAS DISCUSSED BTWN THE PIC AND MYSELF. AFTER WE CONSIDERED ABORTING THE TKOF, SPD STARTED TO BUILD, THE NOSE CAME UP AGAIN, AND IT APPEARED WE WOULD ACHIEVE TKOF SPD IN THE REMAINING DISTANCE. THE DECISION TO ABORT WAS DISCARDED AND THE TKOF ROLL CONTINUED. THE SPD DID NOT BUILD IN TIME DUE TO A SLIGHT INCLINE TO THE RWY JUST AFTER THE AREA OF STANDING WATER. BY THE TIME THE DECISION TO ABORT WAS FINALLY MADE, THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH RWY REMAINING TO STOP. THE ACFT CONTINUED OFF THE END OF THE RWY INTO A MUDDY PLOWED FIELD. THE ONLY DAMAGE TO THE ACFT WAS A NICK IN ONE BLADE OF THE PROP CAUSED BY A SMALL STONE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE STANDING WATER ON THE RWY WAS THE MAIN CAUSE FOR LOSS OF FLYING SPD. THE PLAN WAS TO STAY TO THE SIDE OF THE RWY AVOIDING THE STANDING WATER. DURING THE TKOF ROLL HOWEVER, THE ACFT DRIFTED TOWARD THE CTR OF THE RWY ALLOWING THE L MAIN TIRE TO CONTACT THE STANDING WATER. THE NEXT PHYSICAL FACTOR WAS THE INCLINE IN THE RWY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE STANDING WATER. THE INCLINE DID NOT ALLOW THE SPD TO INCREASE AS ANTICIPATED. HOWEVER, THE SINGLE FACTOR THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS MISHAP WAS THE LACK OF A DECISIVE PLAN. IT WAS NEVER DETERMINED BEFORE BEGINNING THE TKOF, AT WHAT POINT THE TKOF SHOULD BE ABORTED. IT WAS ALSO NOT DETERMINED WHO WOULD MAKE THAT DECISION BEFORE BEGINNING THE TKOF. AS A FLT INSTRUCTOR I AM SURE THE PIC WAS EXPECTING MY INPUT. I, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD MADE NO PLANS WHATSOEVER. MY THOUGHTS WERE ON WHAT I HAD TO ACCOMPLISH UPON OUR RETURN FROM THE FLT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: WHEN FLYING LARGER ACFT WITH SEVERAL PAX AND/OR MORE THAN 1 PLT, FORMAL TRAINING DICTATES THAT DIVISION OF TASKS AND CLARIFICATION OF DUTIES IS ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO EVERY FLT. WHEN I BEGIN A TRIP IN A SMALL PVT PLANE WITH NO PAX, AND ANOTHER PLT AT THE CTLS, I FIND MYSELF NEGLECTING THAT VERY IMPORTANT PART OF THE TRIP. IN THIS CASE, I SHOULD HAVE MADE SURE THERE WAS A GO/NO- GO POINT DETERMINED, AND THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT AS TO WHOM WOULD MAKE THAT DECISION. NO MATTER WHAT THE SIZE OF THE ACFT, PREDETERMINED SPDS, ATTITUDES, AND CONFIGNS ARE A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF EVERY FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.