Narrative:

It was my leg, so I made the takeoff and flew the leg from sjc to den. After leveloff we rechked the WX in den and found that the winds had become gusty and there was turbulence in the area. We received a message from dispatch over ACARS that mentioned of aircraft going around at denver because of airspeed losses and gains on final. The ATIS at this time was 040 degrees 10 KTS gusting to 16 KTS, variable 360 degrees to 160 degrees. We talked about the captain needing to make the landing because I was under 100 hours, and the possibility of reported windshear. After checking the ATIS at denver several times in route, the winds had decreased to 090 degrees at 8 KTS, so we determined that I would make the landing. We were cleared to powder intersection to arrive there at FL190 and 250 KTS. Shortly after arriving at powder we were slowed to 230 KTS and told by ATC that they were going to keep us high because of the possibility of turbulence for another 15 mi. I immediately said this is going to make us high noting that there was a wind from the south and we were landing on runway 35L. We preceded as assigned and were given 13000 ft after the 15 mi and what appeared to be a base to final for runway 35L. We were later told to descend to 9000 ft. ATC announced that there was a DC10 turning final in front of us, which we had in sight, and cleared us for a visual behind that aircraft. We had 5 mi spacing on the DC10. We were told to keep 170 KTS to the marker behind the DC10. I immediately called for gear at 15 mi and configured to flaps 3 degrees to lose as much altitude as possible. I immediately announced that we were real high for the runway with the left quartering tailwind of 25 KTS. Thinking that this would push us in closer to the DC10, I asked for flaps full and went to managed speed. After putting the flaps to full, the captain replied to continue and mentioned that we could do some 'south' turns to get down with the possibility of changing runways to 35R for additional spacing, which the captain discussed at that time with the tower. Throughout the descent we were in light tomoderate turbulence, which made the airspeed very erratic. After my initial turn to the west to try to lose some altitude (ie, a controled 'south' turn), the captain took the aircraft explaining that there might be a better way to do it to get us down. The captain immediately dropped the nose at which time I mentioned to watch the airspeed. I then announced to watch the flap overspd and the captain pulled back on the stick to catch the airspeed increase. I recall that the airspeed was close to the overspd indicator (red barber pole). The captain later asked if we went over it and I said that I wasn't sure, but we had come very close to it. I mentioned one more time that we were very high and didn't think we could make it and the captain keyed the microphone button and asked if we could get runway 35R. Tower replied that we could transition to runway 35R, at which time I cleared the flight path to the right. The captain again lowered the nose of the aircraft to lose altitude and we heard 'whoop, whoop pull up' because we were in an excessive rate of descent. I looked down and the vertical descent was amber at 2100 FPM. The captain immediately corrected and from that point on I called her vertical descent rate. The captain then said we would look at how we were at 500 ft and determine if we should go around from that point. At 560 ft I announce that we looked real high and that we were approaching 500 ft. The captain asked if it looked ok and if I thought we could make the landing from there and I said I think we should go around, so the captain commenced the go around. I announced the go around to the tower and they told us to climb to 8000 ft, turn to heading 120 degrees, and to contact departure on 123.85. I missed the frequency because I was concentrating on the go around at that point. We went togo and I announced flaps 3 degrees, of which the captain echoed, and then flew the remainder of the go around, cleaning up the aircraft on schedule. I then tuned in the wrong frequency and was unable to correspond with anyone. I then told the captain I had tuned in the wrong frequency. I was hoping the captain had remembered it. The captain told me to go back to tower and ask for the frequency again. I did as requested and tuned to the right frequency and contacted departure. They told us to turn to 170 degrees and to slow to 170 KTS. I noticed the airspeed dropping down to the orange bar and said watch your airspeed twice, before I took the throttles and advanced them to the cruise detent. Almost simultaneously I notice that we were at 8350 ft, at which time the captain said let's put the autoplt on (we actually didn't engage the autoplt at this time) and the plane began to descend to 8000 ft. The captain then asked for flaps 1 degree and I put the flaps to 1 degree noting that we were 10 KTS below flap speed. The turbulence was moderate at the time and the airspeed was bouncing around by about 10 KTS. The captain then asked for flaps 2 degrees, again I noted that the airspeed now was about 12 KTS below maximum speed for the flaps and lowered the flaps to 2 degrees. Immediately the airspeed jumped right up to maximum flap speed. I mentioned that the airspeed had jumped to maximum flap speed and went back down immediately and the captain asked if we had gone through the maximum flap speed. I said I didn't think so, but it was very close. I asked if the captain wanted me to fly the approach from that point on and did not get a reply. We had not engaged the autoplt from before and the captain said let's go autoplt so I reached up and engaged the #2 autoplt. I assumed that the captain wanted me to fly the plane at that point. I put runway 35R in the mcdu for guidance and found the runway 35R approach plate. While the captain was on the PA we were told to turn to a heading of 260 degrees and asked if we had the airport in sight. I read back the heading and said that we had runway 35R in sight, and selected 260 degrees for our heading. The captain came off the PA and I explained that we were given the heading of 260 degrees and asked if we had the runway. I then said I was going to take us off autoplt and clicked the autoplt off. I asked for flaps 3 degrees and mentioned that our airspeed still seemed a little high but we were on glide path. I then asked for flaps full and the captain put them to full. The tower cleared us to land runway 35R and the captain acknowledged that. At 750 ft AGL the gear not down warning alarm went off and the captain reached over and put the gear down and reached for the final descent checklist and read it after the gear was green. The gear indicated down and locked before 500 ft AGL. The captain then said, 'I have never done that before,' and asked if I had, at which time I replied, 'no.' I came in and landed. While taxiing in I asked if the captain thought that we should talk to someone about the last part of the flight and the captain said no. While turning into the gate for the lead-in line, we encountered a master caution of a ws pred caution. I went to the checklist, which said spurious inputs while on the ground could cause this master caution. It even mentioned to reset circuit breakers to clear the input. The captain told me to not reset the circuit breakers. The captain waited at the bottom of the jetway to talk to a mechanic about the master caution and we said our good-byes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN AIRBUS A320 EXCEEDED MAX FLAP SPD DURING FINAL APCH, EXCEEDED GAR ALT ASSIGNMENT, AND FAILED TO PUT THE GEAR DOWN UNTIL HEARING THE WARNING HORN ON SHORT FINAL. IN ADDITION, THE GPWS CALLED FOR PULL UP DUE TO HIGH SINK RATE ON FINAL APCH.

Narrative: IT WAS MY LEG, SO I MADE THE TKOF AND FLEW THE LEG FROM SJC TO DEN. AFTER LEVELOFF WE RECHKED THE WX IN DEN AND FOUND THAT THE WINDS HAD BECOME GUSTY AND THERE WAS TURB IN THE AREA. WE RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM DISPATCH OVER ACARS THAT MENTIONED OF ACFT GOING AROUND AT DENVER BECAUSE OF AIRSPD LOSSES AND GAINS ON FINAL. THE ATIS AT THIS TIME WAS 040 DEGS 10 KTS GUSTING TO 16 KTS, VARIABLE 360 DEGS TO 160 DEGS. WE TALKED ABOUT THE CAPT NEEDING TO MAKE THE LNDG BECAUSE I WAS UNDER 100 HRS, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RPTED WINDSHEAR. AFTER CHKING THE ATIS AT DENVER SEVERAL TIMES IN RTE, THE WINDS HAD DECREASED TO 090 DEGS AT 8 KTS, SO WE DETERMINED THAT I WOULD MAKE THE LNDG. WE WERE CLRED TO POWDER INTXN TO ARRIVE THERE AT FL190 AND 250 KTS. SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVING AT POWDER WE WERE SLOWED TO 230 KTS AND TOLD BY ATC THAT THEY WERE GOING TO KEEP US HIGH BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TURB FOR ANOTHER 15 MI. I IMMEDIATELY SAID THIS IS GOING TO MAKE US HIGH NOTING THAT THERE WAS A WIND FROM THE S AND WE WERE LNDG ON RWY 35L. WE PRECEDED AS ASSIGNED AND WERE GIVEN 13000 FT AFTER THE 15 MI AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BASE TO FINAL FOR RWY 35L. WE WERE LATER TOLD TO DSND TO 9000 FT. ATC ANNOUNCED THAT THERE WAS A DC10 TURNING FINAL IN FRONT OF US, WHICH WE HAD IN SIGHT, AND CLRED US FOR A VISUAL BEHIND THAT ACFT. WE HAD 5 MI SPACING ON THE DC10. WE WERE TOLD TO KEEP 170 KTS TO THE MARKER BEHIND THE DC10. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR GEAR AT 15 MI AND CONFIGURED TO FLAPS 3 DEGS TO LOSE AS MUCH ALT AS POSSIBLE. I IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED THAT WE WERE REAL HIGH FOR THE RWY WITH THE L QUARTERING TAILWIND OF 25 KTS. THINKING THAT THIS WOULD PUSH US IN CLOSER TO THE DC10, I ASKED FOR FLAPS FULL AND WENT TO MANAGED SPD. AFTER PUTTING THE FLAPS TO FULL, THE CAPT REPLIED TO CONTINUE AND MENTIONED THAT WE COULD DO SOME 'S' TURNS TO GET DOWN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING RWYS TO 35R FOR ADDITIONAL SPACING, WHICH THE CAPT DISCUSSED AT THAT TIME WITH THE TWR. THROUGHOUT THE DSCNT WE WERE IN LIGHT TOMODERATE TURB, WHICH MADE THE AIRSPD VERY ERRATIC. AFTER MY INITIAL TURN TO THE W TO TRY TO LOSE SOME ALT (IE, A CTLED 'S' TURN), THE CAPT TOOK THE ACFT EXPLAINING THAT THERE MIGHT BE A BETTER WAY TO DO IT TO GET US DOWN. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY DROPPED THE NOSE AT WHICH TIME I MENTIONED TO WATCH THE AIRSPD. I THEN ANNOUNCED TO WATCH THE FLAP OVERSPD AND THE CAPT PULLED BACK ON THE STICK TO CATCH THE AIRSPD INCREASE. I RECALL THAT THE AIRSPD WAS CLOSE TO THE OVERSPD INDICATOR (RED BARBER POLE). THE CAPT LATER ASKED IF WE WENT OVER IT AND I SAID THAT I WASN'T SURE, BUT WE HAD COME VERY CLOSE TO IT. I MENTIONED ONE MORE TIME THAT WE WERE VERY HIGH AND DIDN'T THINK WE COULD MAKE IT AND THE CAPT KEYED THE MIKE BUTTON AND ASKED IF WE COULD GET RWY 35R. TWR REPLIED THAT WE COULD TRANSITION TO RWY 35R, AT WHICH TIME I CLRED THE FLT PATH TO THE R. THE CAPT AGAIN LOWERED THE NOSE OF THE ACFT TO LOSE ALT AND WE HEARD 'WHOOP, WHOOP PULL UP' BECAUSE WE WERE IN AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF DSCNT. I LOOKED DOWN AND THE VERT DSCNT WAS AMBER AT 2100 FPM. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED AND FROM THAT POINT ON I CALLED HER VERT DSCNT RATE. THE CAPT THEN SAID WE WOULD LOOK AT HOW WE WERE AT 500 FT AND DETERMINE IF WE SHOULD GAR FROM THAT POINT. AT 560 FT I ANNOUNCE THAT WE LOOKED REAL HIGH AND THAT WE WERE APCHING 500 FT. THE CAPT ASKED IF IT LOOKED OK AND IF I THOUGHT WE COULD MAKE THE LNDG FROM THERE AND I SAID I THINK WE SHOULD GAR, SO THE CAPT COMMENCED THE GAR. I ANNOUNCED THE GAR TO THE TWR AND THEY TOLD US TO CLB TO 8000 FT, TURN TO HDG 120 DEGS, AND TO CONTACT DEP ON 123.85. I MISSED THE FREQ BECAUSE I WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE GAR AT THAT POINT. WE WENT TOGO AND I ANNOUNCED FLAPS 3 DEGS, OF WHICH THE CAPT ECHOED, AND THEN FLEW THE REMAINDER OF THE GAR, CLEANING UP THE ACFT ON SCHEDULE. I THEN TUNED IN THE WRONG FREQ AND WAS UNABLE TO CORRESPOND WITH ANYONE. I THEN TOLD THE CAPT I HAD TUNED IN THE WRONG FREQ. I WAS HOPING THE CAPT HAD REMEMBERED IT. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO GO BACK TO TWR AND ASK FOR THE FREQ AGAIN. I DID AS REQUESTED AND TUNED TO THE RIGHT FREQ AND CONTACTED DEP. THEY TOLD US TO TURN TO 170 DEGS AND TO SLOW TO 170 KTS. I NOTICED THE AIRSPD DROPPING DOWN TO THE ORANGE BAR AND SAID WATCH YOUR AIRSPD TWICE, BEFORE I TOOK THE THROTTLES AND ADVANCED THEM TO THE CRUISE DETENT. ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY I NOTICE THAT WE WERE AT 8350 FT, AT WHICH TIME THE CAPT SAID LET'S PUT THE AUTOPLT ON (WE ACTUALLY DIDN'T ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT AT THIS TIME) AND THE PLANE BEGAN TO DSND TO 8000 FT. THE CAPT THEN ASKED FOR FLAPS 1 DEG AND I PUT THE FLAPS TO 1 DEG NOTING THAT WE WERE 10 KTS BELOW FLAP SPD. THE TURB WAS MODERATE AT THE TIME AND THE AIRSPD WAS BOUNCING AROUND BY ABOUT 10 KTS. THE CAPT THEN ASKED FOR FLAPS 2 DEGS, AGAIN I NOTED THAT THE AIRSPD NOW WAS ABOUT 12 KTS BELOW MAX SPD FOR THE FLAPS AND LOWERED THE FLAPS TO 2 DEGS. IMMEDIATELY THE AIRSPD JUMPED RIGHT UP TO MAX FLAP SPD. I MENTIONED THAT THE AIRSPD HAD JUMPED TO MAX FLAP SPD AND WENT BACK DOWN IMMEDIATELY AND THE CAPT ASKED IF WE HAD GONE THROUGH THE MAX FLAP SPD. I SAID I DIDN'T THINK SO, BUT IT WAS VERY CLOSE. I ASKED IF THE CAPT WANTED ME TO FLY THE APCH FROM THAT POINT ON AND DID NOT GET A REPLY. WE HAD NOT ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT FROM BEFORE AND THE CAPT SAID LET'S GO AUTOPLT SO I REACHED UP AND ENGAGED THE #2 AUTOPLT. I ASSUMED THAT THE CAPT WANTED ME TO FLY THE PLANE AT THAT POINT. I PUT RWY 35R IN THE MCDU FOR GUIDANCE AND FOUND THE RWY 35R APCH PLATE. WHILE THE CAPT WAS ON THE PA WE WERE TOLD TO TURN TO A HDG OF 260 DEGS AND ASKED IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I READ BACK THE HEADING AND SAID THAT WE HAD RWY 35R IN SIGHT, AND SELECTED 260 DEGS FOR OUR HDG. THE CAPT CAME OFF THE PA AND I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE GIVEN THE HDG OF 260 DEGS AND ASKED IF WE HAD THE RWY. I THEN SAID I WAS GOING TO TAKE US OFF AUTOPLT AND CLICKED THE AUTOPLT OFF. I ASKED FOR FLAPS 3 DEGS AND MENTIONED THAT OUR AIRSPD STILL SEEMED A LITTLE HIGH BUT WE WERE ON GLIDE PATH. I THEN ASKED FOR FLAPS FULL AND THE CAPT PUT THEM TO FULL. THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND RWY 35R AND THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT. AT 750 FT AGL THE GEAR NOT DOWN WARNING ALARM WENT OFF AND THE CAPT REACHED OVER AND PUT THE GEAR DOWN AND REACHED FOR THE FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST AND READ IT AFTER THE GEAR WAS GREEN. THE GEAR INDICATED DOWN AND LOCKED BEFORE 500 FT AGL. THE CAPT THEN SAID, 'I HAVE NEVER DONE THAT BEFORE,' AND ASKED IF I HAD, AT WHICH TIME I REPLIED, 'NO.' I CAME IN AND LANDED. WHILE TAXIING IN I ASKED IF THE CAPT THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD TALK TO SOMEONE ABOUT THE LAST PART OF THE FLT AND THE CAPT SAID NO. WHILE TURNING INTO THE GATE FOR THE LEAD-IN LINE, WE ENCOUNTERED A MASTER CAUTION OF A WS PRED CAUTION. I WENT TO THE CHKLIST, WHICH SAID SPURIOUS INPUTS WHILE ON THE GND COULD CAUSE THIS MASTER CAUTION. IT EVEN MENTIONED TO RESET CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO CLR THE INPUT. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO NOT RESET THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. THE CAPT WAITED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE JETWAY TO TALK TO A MECH ABOUT THE MASTER CAUTION AND WE SAID OUR GOOD-BYES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.