Narrative:

While crossing hoagi intersection on the cugar 6 arrival into iah operating as a flight for an air carrier we received a master warning message 'engine #2 low N1.' we ran the emergency checklist and determined this was a result of a flameout. Our checklist called for an air start and we regained power on our #2 engine. The captain complied with all ATC instructions while all checklists were accomplished in a timely fashion. However, no emergency was declared because of the successful restart. The aircraft was less than 6 months old and there have been several engine complications involving the EMB145 jet from its entry into service. It is my opinion the FAA needs to take a more active role in resolving the maintenance problems from embraer concerning the allison engines on the EMB145. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the engine shutdown was caused by the instantaneous tailpipe temperature sensor erroneously sending an overtemp signal to the full authority/authorized digital engine control and it shut down the engine in order to save it from damage. The first officer questions this philosophy. He said that there is a chance of this system shutting off both engines in a critical phase of flight and, regardless of the reason for the shutdown, the crew would be helpless to recover. He feels that this system removes the option of operating the engines as necessary for the survival of the people and instead places the emphasis on the survival of a piece of equipment. This first officer was flying an embraer EMB145ER equipped with the allison AE3007-A1 engine and he states that all of the engine failures that he knows about have occurred with this model. Recently he flew an EMB145LR equipped with the allison AE3007-A3 engine with a different full authority/authorized digital engine control system with no trouble. He said if the new system proves more reliable, he would advocate retrofitting it to the older aircraft. The reporter said that he knows of several engine failures in the older aircraft including one that occurred last week. He said that the manufacturer and the company have for an interim fix adopted a complex engine start procedure that exercises and rechks all of the engine control system after each start to assure that all these system are reset from their taxi-in settings. The crew involved in the most recent engine failure allegedly did not follow the new procedure and have been critiqued. He has never been involved in the introduction of a new type of aircraft and admits that he finds it disconcerting to have to continuously modify procedures as the equipment is modified or more is learned about its characteristics. He said the new procedure leaves one of the full authority/authorized digital engine control system in the standby mode after it has been checked for proper operation. He hopes that this works.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR E145 FLC HAD THE #2 ENG FLAME OUT WHILE PERFORMING A STAR. THEY WERE ABLE TO GET A RELIGHT AFTER COMPLETING THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS. THE RPTR COMPLAINS THAT THE ALLISON AE3007A ENG PROBS HAVE BEEN EXCESSIVE. IN THIS CASE, THE PROB WAS A FAULTY INSTANTANEOUS TAILPIPE TEMP SENSOR.

Narrative: WHILE XING HOAGI INTXN ON THE CUGAR 6 ARR INTO IAH OPERATING AS A FLT FOR AN ACR WE RECEIVED A MASTER WARNING MESSAGE 'ENG #2 LOW N1.' WE RAN THE EMER CHKLIST AND DETERMINED THIS WAS A RESULT OF A FLAMEOUT. OUR CHKLIST CALLED FOR AN AIR START AND WE REGAINED PWR ON OUR #2 ENG. THE CAPT COMPLIED WITH ALL ATC INSTRUCTIONS WHILE ALL CHKLISTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN A TIMELY FASHION. HOWEVER, NO EMER WAS DECLARED BECAUSE OF THE SUCCESSFUL RESTART. THE ACFT WAS LESS THAN 6 MONTHS OLD AND THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ENG COMPLICATIONS INVOLVING THE EMB145 JET FROM ITS ENTRY INTO SVC. IT IS MY OPINION THE FAA NEEDS TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN RESOLVING THE MAINT PROBS FROM EMBRAER CONCERNING THE ALLISON ENGS ON THE EMB145. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ENG SHUTDOWN WAS CAUSED BY THE INSTANTANEOUS TAILPIPE TEMP SENSOR ERRONEOUSLY SENDING AN OVERTEMP SIGNAL TO THE FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL AND IT SHUT DOWN THE ENG IN ORDER TO SAVE IT FROM DAMAGE. THE FO QUESTIONS THIS PHILOSOPHY. HE SAID THAT THERE IS A CHANCE OF THIS SYS SHUTTING OFF BOTH ENGS IN A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT AND, REGARDLESS OF THE REASON FOR THE SHUTDOWN, THE CREW WOULD BE HELPLESS TO RECOVER. HE FEELS THAT THIS SYS REMOVES THE OPTION OF OPERATING THE ENGS AS NECESSARY FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE PEOPLE AND INSTEAD PLACES THE EMPHASIS ON THE SURVIVAL OF A PIECE OF EQUIP. THIS FO WAS FLYING AN EMBRAER EMB145ER EQUIPPED WITH THE ALLISON AE3007-A1 ENG AND HE STATES THAT ALL OF THE ENG FAILURES THAT HE KNOWS ABOUT HAVE OCCURRED WITH THIS MODEL. RECENTLY HE FLEW AN EMB145LR EQUIPPED WITH THE ALLISON AE3007-A3 ENG WITH A DIFFERENT FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL SYS WITH NO TROUBLE. HE SAID IF THE NEW SYS PROVES MORE RELIABLE, HE WOULD ADVOCATE RETROFITTING IT TO THE OLDER ACFT. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE KNOWS OF SEVERAL ENG FAILURES IN THE OLDER ACFT INCLUDING ONE THAT OCCURRED LAST WK. HE SAID THAT THE MANUFACTURER AND THE COMPANY HAVE FOR AN INTERIM FIX ADOPTED A COMPLEX ENG START PROC THAT EXERCISES AND RECHKS ALL OF THE ENG CTL SYS AFTER EACH START TO ASSURE THAT ALL THESE SYS ARE RESET FROM THEIR TAXI-IN SETTINGS. THE CREW INVOLVED IN THE MOST RECENT ENG FAILURE ALLEGEDLY DID NOT FOLLOW THE NEW PROC AND HAVE BEEN CRITIQUED. HE HAS NEVER BEEN INVOLVED IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW TYPE OF ACFT AND ADMITS THAT HE FINDS IT DISCONCERTING TO HAVE TO CONTINUOUSLY MODIFY PROCS AS THE EQUIP IS MODIFIED OR MORE IS LEARNED ABOUT ITS CHARACTERISTICS. HE SAID THE NEW PROC LEAVES ONE OF THE FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL SYS IN THE STANDBY MODE AFTER IT HAS BEEN CHKED FOR PROPER OP. HE HOPES THAT THIS WORKS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.