Narrative:

Pit tower cleared us to land and hold short of runway 14/32. I refused this clearance by stating we were unable to hold short of runway 14/32. We were then cleared to land and managed to turn off early. While turning off, we were told to hurry up as other aircraft were waiting and to call the tower on the landline. After calling tower supervisor he wanted to know why we refused the lahso. I stated that it was a clearance with the captain's discretion. He was of the impression that a lahso clearance was mandatory. Our flight route manual clearly states 'the acceptance of a lahso clearance is at the captain's discretion.' this is obviously the case due to numerous possible flight limitations, ie, mels or aircraft performance, or the fact that the approach would be uncomfortable from a safety standpoint. Tower personnel should be aware of these fundamental policies and if unsure should look them up prior to contacting pilots. This supervisor was more concerned with the speed of departure operations than safety. Additionally, I found the tables depicting the authority/authorized for lahso operations for various runways difficult to quickly interpretation. In addition the pit 3 lahso information is in error and in conflict with NOTAM for runway 10C lahso. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain said that his F100 performance manual contained a prohibition against lahso's during wet conditions on runway 10C. He added that he had operated in and out of pit several times that day and it had rained. He had assumed that the runway was still wet since he could not see it at night. He found that the performance data was more difficult to use than it should have been to determine if he could land and hold short. He also felt that the hold short data was incorrect in his commercial chart manual. He has forwarded this information to his company. The reporter said that he called the tower at their request and the supervisor was rather unpleasant and threatening toward him. He determined that the supervisor was under the impression that he was required to hold short if ordered on landing. The reporter told him that this type of clearance would be accepted at pilot's discretion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FK10 FLC RPTS THAT A TWR CTLR ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE THEM TO ACCEPT A LAHSO CLRNC ON A RWY THAT THE FLC CONSIDERED WET. THE FLC BELIEVES THAT THE CTLR THOUGHT THAT HIS HOLD SHORT CLRNC WAS MANDATORY.

Narrative: PIT TWR CLRED US TO LAND AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 14/32. I REFUSED THIS CLRNC BY STATING WE WERE UNABLE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 14/32. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO LAND AND MANAGED TO TURN OFF EARLY. WHILE TURNING OFF, WE WERE TOLD TO HURRY UP AS OTHER ACFT WERE WAITING AND TO CALL THE TWR ON THE LANDLINE. AFTER CALLING TWR SUPVR HE WANTED TO KNOW WHY WE REFUSED THE LAHSO. I STATED THAT IT WAS A CLRNC WITH THE CAPT'S DISCRETION. HE WAS OF THE IMPRESSION THAT A LAHSO CLRNC WAS MANDATORY. OUR FLT RTE MANUAL CLRLY STATES 'THE ACCEPTANCE OF A LAHSO CLRNC IS AT THE CAPT'S DISCRETION.' THIS IS OBVIOUSLY THE CASE DUE TO NUMEROUS POSSIBLE FLT LIMITATIONS, IE, MELS OR ACFT PERFORMANCE, OR THE FACT THAT THE APCH WOULD BE UNCOMFORTABLE FROM A SAFETY STANDPOINT. TWR PERSONNEL SHOULD BE AWARE OF THESE FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES AND IF UNSURE SHOULD LOOK THEM UP PRIOR TO CONTACTING PLTS. THIS SUPVR WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH THE SPD OF DEP OPS THAN SAFETY. ADDITIONALLY, I FOUND THE TABLES DEPICTING THE AUTH FOR LAHSO OPS FOR VARIOUS RWYS DIFFICULT TO QUICKLY INTERP. IN ADDITION THE PIT 3 LAHSO INFO IS IN ERROR AND IN CONFLICT WITH NOTAM FOR RWY 10C LAHSO. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT SAID THAT HIS F100 PERFORMANCE MANUAL CONTAINED A PROHIBITION AGAINST LAHSO'S DURING WET CONDITIONS ON RWY 10C. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD OPERATED IN AND OUT OF PIT SEVERAL TIMES THAT DAY AND IT HAD RAINED. HE HAD ASSUMED THAT THE RWY WAS STILL WET SINCE HE COULD NOT SEE IT AT NIGHT. HE FOUND THAT THE PERFORMANCE DATA WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO USE THAN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO DETERMINE IF HE COULD LAND AND HOLD SHORT. HE ALSO FELT THAT THE HOLD SHORT DATA WAS INCORRECT IN HIS COMMERCIAL CHART MANUAL. HE HAS FORWARDED THIS INFO TO HIS COMPANY. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE CALLED THE TWR AT THEIR REQUEST AND THE SUPVR WAS RATHER UNPLEASANT AND THREATENING TOWARD HIM. HE DETERMINED THAT THE SUPVR WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS REQUIRED TO HOLD SHORT IF ORDERED ON LNDG. THE RPTR TOLD HIM THAT THIS TYPE OF CLRNC WOULD BE ACCEPTED AT PLT'S DISCRETION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.