Narrative:

We taxied out late and thunderstorms were approaching from the west. We were assigned runway 18L. Our radar showed a small cell 8 mi southwest of the field, painted yellow less than 5 mi in diameter. I had instructed the first officer to get out the laptop computer and change takeoff power to maximum. I got the new V1 speed, including a windshear speed of 143 KTS. When issued takeoff clearance, I asked first officer to inquire if LLWAS was indicating a shear. The controller said no, but a few aircraft had reported a loss of 10 KTS airspeed on climb out. A company B727 departed runway 18L less than 1 min before us, and did not report an airspeed loss. We asked for the wind readout. I heard the controller say 200 degrees at 25 KTS gusting to 34 KTS. A quick calculation and I determined ready to go. The cell was now 5 mi southwest of the field. With that we took off. I briefed windshear speed and to watch for any sign of shear. On climb out, we took an immediate turn at 400 ft to 140 degree heading. We had slight airspeed bumping. No detectable shear. We climbed out normally. The next company aircraft was told to taxi into position and hold. They said the wind exceeded their limits. They were a B727. I asked the first officer what their winds were. He said 250 degrees at 25 KTS. I said, ours were 200 degrees at 25 KTS gusting to 34 KTS. He said, 'no they were 250 degrees at 25 KTS.' we had a company check airman aboard and he said, 'the winds were 250 degrees at 25 KTS gusting to 34 KTS.' I then asked the first officer to plug those numbers into the laptop. The gust made runway 18L unacceptable for our 25 KT maximum crosswind for the A310. I would not have taken off if I knew the winds were from 250 degrees instead of the 200 degrees I thought I heard. The first officer a few mins later said he had not heard the gust report. Neither first officer nor check airman express concern about the takeoff. I don't believe our actual winds on takeoff roll were in exceedence of the aircraft's ability since it was (luckily) uneventful. I believe it was close to limits, however. There was a certain amount of anxiety in the decision because departures continued on runway 18R and runway 18L and I was under pressure from the late departure, and additional pressure of a check airman, and the fatigue of XA30 morning departure, combined with my previous night's trip helped make a marginal decision to take off with inaccurate information. At no time did my first officer express concern, nor the check airman. This helped make the decision to go, since my first officer apparently felt comfortable with the WX.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR A310 FLC PIC BELIEVES WX CONDITIONS EXIST FOR TKOF WITH APCHING TSTM. WHEN AIRBORNE ON ICB, FLC RE-EVALUATES WIND CONDITIONS AS THEY OVERHEAR NEXT DEP ACFT REFUSE DEP DUE TO WINDS. FLC CHK PLT AND FO DO NOT CHALLENGE CAPT DECISION FOR DEP.

Narrative: WE TAXIED OUT LATE AND TSTMS WERE APCHING FROM THE W. WE WERE ASSIGNED RWY 18L. OUR RADAR SHOWED A SMALL CELL 8 MI SW OF THE FIELD, PAINTED YELLOW LESS THAN 5 MI IN DIAMETER. I HAD INSTRUCTED THE FO TO GET OUT THE LAPTOP COMPUTER AND CHANGE TKOF PWR TO MAX. I GOT THE NEW V1 SPD, INCLUDING A WINDSHEAR SPD OF 143 KTS. WHEN ISSUED TKOF CLRNC, I ASKED FO TO INQUIRE IF LLWAS WAS INDICATING A SHEAR. THE CTLR SAID NO, BUT A FEW ACFT HAD RPTED A LOSS OF 10 KTS AIRSPD ON CLBOUT. A COMPANY B727 DEPARTED RWY 18L LESS THAN 1 MIN BEFORE US, AND DID NOT RPT AN AIRSPD LOSS. WE ASKED FOR THE WIND READOUT. I HEARD THE CTLR SAY 200 DEGS AT 25 KTS GUSTING TO 34 KTS. A QUICK CALCULATION AND I DETERMINED READY TO GO. THE CELL WAS NOW 5 MI SW OF THE FIELD. WITH THAT WE TOOK OFF. I BRIEFED WINDSHEAR SPD AND TO WATCH FOR ANY SIGN OF SHEAR. ON CLBOUT, WE TOOK AN IMMEDIATE TURN AT 400 FT TO 140 DEG HDG. WE HAD SLIGHT AIRSPD BUMPING. NO DETECTABLE SHEAR. WE CLBED OUT NORMALLY. THE NEXT COMPANY ACFT WAS TOLD TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD. THEY SAID THE WIND EXCEEDED THEIR LIMITS. THEY WERE A B727. I ASKED THE FO WHAT THEIR WINDS WERE. HE SAID 250 DEGS AT 25 KTS. I SAID, OURS WERE 200 DEGS AT 25 KTS GUSTING TO 34 KTS. HE SAID, 'NO THEY WERE 250 DEGS AT 25 KTS.' WE HAD A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN ABOARD AND HE SAID, 'THE WINDS WERE 250 DEGS AT 25 KTS GUSTING TO 34 KTS.' I THEN ASKED THE FO TO PLUG THOSE NUMBERS INTO THE LAPTOP. THE GUST MADE RWY 18L UNACCEPTABLE FOR OUR 25 KT MAX XWIND FOR THE A310. I WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN OFF IF I KNEW THE WINDS WERE FROM 250 DEGS INSTEAD OF THE 200 DEGS I THOUGHT I HEARD. THE FO A FEW MINS LATER SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD THE GUST RPT. NEITHER FO NOR CHK AIRMAN EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE TKOF. I DON'T BELIEVE OUR ACTUAL WINDS ON TKOF ROLL WERE IN EXCEEDENCE OF THE ACFT'S ABILITY SINCE IT WAS (LUCKILY) UNEVENTFUL. I BELIEVE IT WAS CLOSE TO LIMITS, HOWEVER. THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ANXIETY IN THE DECISION BECAUSE DEPS CONTINUED ON RWY 18R AND RWY 18L AND I WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE LATE DEP, AND ADDITIONAL PRESSURE OF A CHK AIRMAN, AND THE FATIGUE OF XA30 MORNING DEP, COMBINED WITH MY PREVIOUS NIGHT'S TRIP HELPED MAKE A MARGINAL DECISION TO TAKE OFF WITH INACCURATE INFO. AT NO TIME DID MY FO EXPRESS CONCERN, NOR THE CHK AIRMAN. THIS HELPED MAKE THE DECISION TO GO, SINCE MY FO APPARENTLY FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE WX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.