Narrative:

Crew scheduling called to ask me to fly an extra trip. I had deadheaded to memphis from paris the previous night and was tired. The trip was from mem to mke and then mke to atw. I told the crew that I was tired and stressed that if they saw anything unusual or that made them uncomfortable, to tell me so we could correct it. I flew the mem-mke leg. The first officer flew from mke. ZMP cleared us to 14000 ft, heading 330 degrees, direct osh VOR. Approximately 30 NM south of osh, center cleared us to 4000 ft, then 3000 ft. We were still under center control because local approach control and airport towers were not yet open. During descent we agreed to request a visual approach to runway 3 (wind was no factor) to expedite landing. The first officer and I were both navigating off osh VOR. The last DME I remember was approximately 15 NM. By now I think I must have been severely debilitated by fatigue. Center cleared us for a visual approach to atw and I got clearance for the visual approach to runway 3. Center told us to report the runway in sight and then gave us some unicom frequencys for closing our flight plan. Everything seemed to be happening at once and I thought that we must be close to the airport. By now I had totally lost situational awareness. As I looked outside to clear for other aircraft, I saw an airport slightly left of the nose, approximately 8-10 NM away. My fatigue, resulting in loss of situational awareness, caused me to lock onto the first airport (oshkosh) I saw, without using appropriate navaids to identify it. Neither the first officer, who was navigating off the osh VOR, nor the so voiced any concern that the airport was not atw. I called 'runway in sight' to center and was cleared to land. During taxi we discovered that we were not at atw. I believe that this incident was primarily caused by my acute fatigue. Neither the first officer nor the so apparently realized that the airport I called in sight was not our intended destination. Their lack of situational awareness was a contributing factor. I stopped on the ramp in osh and we had a short crew self-critique to try to establish why we landed at oshkosh. Following the critique, I asked the crew if they were comfortable with proceeding on to atw. We got in contact via telephone relay with ZMP, and obtained an IFR clearance from osh to atw. Atw tower was not operational when we landed. I knew I was very tired, but I thought my performance was acceptable. Fatigue is a real danger for all of us. Supplemental information from acn 406717: approach and landing were uneventful. On taxi in, we determined that we had landed at the wrong airport. We could have done several things to prevent this incident. We could have entered holding to allow him time to catch up and ensure that he was in the loop and helping us monitor approach progress. We should have flown a full instrument procedure until we were certain that we were aimed at the right airport. Also we could have done a better job of backing each other up, rather than each crew member becoming distraction with his own task. Supplemental information from acn 406974: because of the descent coming sooner than we had anticipated the cockpit was very busy and I tried to keep my focus on the checklists so nothing was missed. Once configured and ready for the landing, nothing seemed out of the ordinary until on rollout and taxi the first officer noticed that we were crossing a second crossing runway and appleton only has 2. At this point we discovered we were at oshkosh.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CARGO B727 FLC ARE VECTORED TO ATW FINAL APCH, RPT ARPT IN SIGHT AND ARE CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH. ON TAXI, FLC RECOGNIZES THEY HAVE LANDED AT OSH. COORD IS EFFECTED WITH ATC FOR CLRNC TO FILED ARPT. CAPT ACKNOWLEDGES FATIGUE. OTHER FLC CONCERNED WITH TASKS, NOT RECOGNIZING THEY ARE LNDG AT WRONG ARPT.

Narrative: CREW SCHEDULING CALLED TO ASK ME TO FLY AN EXTRA TRIP. I HAD DEADHEADED TO MEMPHIS FROM PARIS THE PREVIOUS NIGHT AND WAS TIRED. THE TRIP WAS FROM MEM TO MKE AND THEN MKE TO ATW. I TOLD THE CREW THAT I WAS TIRED AND STRESSED THAT IF THEY SAW ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR THAT MADE THEM UNCOMFORTABLE, TO TELL ME SO WE COULD CORRECT IT. I FLEW THE MEM-MKE LEG. THE FO FLEW FROM MKE. ZMP CLRED US TO 14000 FT, HDG 330 DEGS, DIRECT OSH VOR. APPROX 30 NM S OF OSH, CTR CLRED US TO 4000 FT, THEN 3000 FT. WE WERE STILL UNDER CTR CTL BECAUSE LCL APCH CTL AND ARPT TWRS WERE NOT YET OPEN. DURING DSCNT WE AGREED TO REQUEST A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 3 (WIND WAS NO FACTOR) TO EXPEDITE LNDG. THE FO AND I WERE BOTH NAVING OFF OSH VOR. THE LAST DME I REMEMBER WAS APPROX 15 NM. BY NOW I THINK I MUST HAVE BEEN SEVERELY DEBILITATED BY FATIGUE. CTR CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO ATW AND I GOT CLRNC FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 3. CTR TOLD US TO RPT THE RWY IN SIGHT AND THEN GAVE US SOME UNICOM FREQS FOR CLOSING OUR FLT PLAN. EVERYTHING SEEMED TO BE HAPPENING AT ONCE AND I THOUGHT THAT WE MUST BE CLOSE TO THE ARPT. BY NOW I HAD TOTALLY LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. AS I LOOKED OUTSIDE TO CLR FOR OTHER ACFT, I SAW AN ARPT SLIGHTLY L OF THE NOSE, APPROX 8-10 NM AWAY. MY FATIGUE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, CAUSED ME TO LOCK ONTO THE FIRST ARPT (OSHKOSH) I SAW, WITHOUT USING APPROPRIATE NAVAIDS TO IDENT IT. NEITHER THE FO, WHO WAS NAVING OFF THE OSH VOR, NOR THE SO VOICED ANY CONCERN THAT THE ARPT WAS NOT ATW. I CALLED 'RWY IN SIGHT' TO CTR AND WAS CLRED TO LAND. DURING TAXI WE DISCOVERED THAT WE WERE NOT AT ATW. I BELIEVE THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS PRIMARILY CAUSED BY MY ACUTE FATIGUE. NEITHER THE FO NOR THE SO APPARENTLY REALIZED THAT THE ARPT I CALLED IN SIGHT WAS NOT OUR INTENDED DEST. THEIR LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. I STOPPED ON THE RAMP IN OSH AND WE HAD A SHORT CREW SELF-CRITIQUE TO TRY TO ESTABLISH WHY WE LANDED AT OSHKOSH. FOLLOWING THE CRITIQUE, I ASKED THE CREW IF THEY WERE COMFORTABLE WITH PROCEEDING ON TO ATW. WE GOT IN CONTACT VIA TELEPHONE RELAY WITH ZMP, AND OBTAINED AN IFR CLRNC FROM OSH TO ATW. ATW TWR WAS NOT OPERATIONAL WHEN WE LANDED. I KNEW I WAS VERY TIRED, BUT I THOUGHT MY PERFORMANCE WAS ACCEPTABLE. FATIGUE IS A REAL DANGER FOR ALL OF US. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 406717: APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. ON TAXI IN, WE DETERMINED THAT WE HAD LANDED AT THE WRONG ARPT. WE COULD HAVE DONE SEVERAL THINGS TO PREVENT THIS INCIDENT. WE COULD HAVE ENTERED HOLDING TO ALLOW HIM TIME TO CATCH UP AND ENSURE THAT HE WAS IN THE LOOP AND HELPING US MONITOR APCH PROGRESS. WE SHOULD HAVE FLOWN A FULL INST PROC UNTIL WE WERE CERTAIN THAT WE WERE AIMED AT THE RIGHT ARPT. ALSO WE COULD HAVE DONE A BETTER JOB OF BACKING EACH OTHER UP, RATHER THAN EACH CREW MEMBER BECOMING DISTR WITH HIS OWN TASK. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 406974: BECAUSE OF THE DSCNT COMING SOONER THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED THE COCKPIT WAS VERY BUSY AND I TRIED TO KEEP MY FOCUS ON THE CHKLISTS SO NOTHING WAS MISSED. ONCE CONFIGURED AND READY FOR THE LNDG, NOTHING SEEMED OUT OF THE ORDINARY UNTIL ON ROLLOUT AND TAXI THE FO NOTICED THAT WE WERE XING A SECOND XING RWY AND APPLETON ONLY HAS 2. AT THIS POINT WE DISCOVERED WE WERE AT OSHKOSH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.