Narrative:

On sep/xz/97, aircraft xyz fokker F100 was scheduled to complete a 'Q' check. Morning flts were scheduled on that day. Maintenance operational checks and required test flts were completed. The air carrier routine paperwork for emergency and standby lighting checks had been completed and signed off on a previous shift. During the maintenance inspector's final walkaround inspection on our shift, noted 6 volt emergency lights not operational for four overhead aisle lights and both aft overwing exits. This work area at the overwing exits had a major structural repair/modification completed during the 'Q' check. Disassembly of the interior for access was required. Light assemblies were removed. However, emergency power supplies and wiring remained attached to the airframe. The aisle overhead emergency lights were relamped. Operational check was ok. The remaining inoperative lights shared a common wire to battery pack #5. It was suspected that the common wire was damaged during the structural repair, and was now not accessible due to interior panels, ducting and overhead bins being installed. I talked with the production foreman about access to the wire. Due to time limitations, we sought out a temporary repair which would make the emergency light system completely operational and defer the wire repair until the next 'C' check. Since there were 3 emergency power supplies within close proximity, we elected to use the other power supplies as a 6 volt source. To the best of my knowledge, this temporary repair would not threaten airworthiness or passenger/crew safety. The use of this system is designed for a limited duty cycle and is protected by primary circuit breakers in the cockpit and internal fuses for each power distribution line within each emergency power supply. Emergency power supply #4 was spliced to operate the right hand light, and emergency power supply #6 was spliced to operate the left hand light. An operational check of 6 volt lighting was completed ok in accordance with fokker's maintenance manual. The aircraft was then dispatched with an operational 6 volt emergency lighting system. Due to the fact that this repair was temporary and the paperwork was clearly documented for deferral within the company's accepted maintenance policies and procedures, the production foreman and I were both under the impression that no other supporting documentation was required. The mechanic which repaired the original fault idented that this temporary repair was done without engineering support. No damage to the aircraft occurred due to this repair.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FOKKER 100 WAS DISPATCHED WITH AN UNAPPROVED INTERIM REPAIR TO THE ACFT OVERWING EMER EXIT LIGHTS.

Narrative: ON SEP/XZ/97, ACFT XYZ FOKKER F100 WAS SCHEDULED TO COMPLETE A 'Q' CHK. MORNING FLTS WERE SCHEDULED ON THAT DAY. MAINT OPERATIONAL CHKS AND REQUIRED TEST FLTS WERE COMPLETED. THE ACR ROUTINE PAPERWORK FOR EMER AND STANDBY LIGHTING CHKS HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND SIGNED OFF ON A PREVIOUS SHIFT. DURING THE MAINT INSPECTOR'S FINAL WALKAROUND INSPECTION ON OUR SHIFT, NOTED 6 VOLT EMER LIGHTS NOT OPERATIONAL FOR FOUR OVERHEAD AISLE LIGHTS AND BOTH AFT OVERWING EXITS. THIS WORK AREA AT THE OVERWING EXITS HAD A MAJOR STRUCTURAL REPAIR/MODIFICATION COMPLETED DURING THE 'Q' CHK. DISASSEMBLY OF THE INTERIOR FOR ACCESS WAS REQUIRED. LIGHT ASSEMBLIES WERE REMOVED. HOWEVER, EMER PWR SUPPLIES AND WIRING REMAINED ATTACHED TO THE AIRFRAME. THE AISLE OVERHEAD EMER LIGHTS WERE RELAMPED. OPERATIONAL CHK WAS OK. THE REMAINING INOP LIGHTS SHARED A COMMON WIRE TO BATTERY PACK #5. IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THE COMMON WIRE WAS DAMAGED DURING THE STRUCTURAL REPAIR, AND WAS NOW NOT ACCESSIBLE DUE TO INTERIOR PANELS, DUCTING AND OVERHEAD BINS BEING INSTALLED. I TALKED WITH THE PRODUCTION FOREMAN ABOUT ACCESS TO THE WIRE. DUE TO TIME LIMITATIONS, WE SOUGHT OUT A TEMPORARY REPAIR WHICH WOULD MAKE THE EMER LIGHT SYS COMPLETELY OPERATIONAL AND DEFER THE WIRE REPAIR UNTIL THE NEXT 'C' CHK. SINCE THERE WERE 3 EMER PWR SUPPLIES WITHIN CLOSE PROX, WE ELECTED TO USE THE OTHER PWR SUPPLIES AS A 6 VOLT SOURCE. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, THIS TEMPORARY REPAIR WOULD NOT THREATEN AIRWORTHINESS OR PAX/CREW SAFETY. THE USE OF THIS SYS IS DESIGNED FOR A LIMITED DUTY CYCLE AND IS PROTECTED BY PRIMARY CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN THE COCKPIT AND INTERNAL FUSES FOR EACH PWR DISTRIBUTION LINE WITHIN EACH EMER PWR SUPPLY. EMER PWR SUPPLY #4 WAS SPLICED TO OPERATE THE R HAND LIGHT, AND EMER PWR SUPPLY #6 WAS SPLICED TO OPERATE THE L HAND LIGHT. AN OPERATIONAL CHK OF 6 VOLT LIGHTING WAS COMPLETED OK IN ACCORDANCE WITH FOKKER'S MAINT MANUAL. THE ACFT WAS THEN DISPATCHED WITH AN OPERATIONAL 6 VOLT EMER LIGHTING SYS. DUE TO THE FACT THAT THIS REPAIR WAS TEMPORARY AND THE PAPERWORK WAS CLRLY DOCUMENTED FOR DEFERRAL WITHIN THE COMPANY'S ACCEPTED MAINT POLICIES AND PROCS, THE PRODUCTION FOREMAN AND I WERE BOTH UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NO OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION WAS REQUIRED. THE MECH WHICH REPAIRED THE ORIGINAL FAULT IDENTED THAT THIS TEMPORARY REPAIR WAS DONE WITHOUT ENGINEERING SUPPORT. NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT OCCURRED DUE TO THIS REPAIR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.