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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 409232 |
Time | |
Date | 199807 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mci |
State Reference | MO |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 2000 msl bound upper : 2000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : mci tracon : atl |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | DC-10 40 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude other other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 80 flight time total : 8600 flight time type : 5500 |
ASRS Report | 409232 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical inflight encounter : weather |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : declared emergency other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
On takeoff the right generator failed. Previous flight had a galley leak which leaked into the electrical compartment. We also had WX deviation on departure and became IMC. Our checklist calls to reset the generator and leaving it in the off position. The first officer was the PF. When this was done we lost all of the right side electrics including the first officer's flight instruments. At this point I became the PF and my first officer ran the checklist for our new situation, a '4 light generator trip.' at this time I discovered that my microphone went bad. I had to use my first officer's until I was able to swap with our spare. We are still IMC. My first officer inadvertently started the APU too soon in the procedure. The APU was unable to power the aircraft's right side. We declared a precautionary emergency and diverted to dsm (for the reasons of our generator problem, the previous galley leak in our east&east compartment and the possible overweight landing). We made a normal underwt landing in dsm. During postflt review the first officer felt that he may have followed the wrong column and should have been able to power the right side electrical. After evaluating our condition, and the APU was not capable of powering the right electrical system, we made the proper decision to land. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: captain reporter stated that the aircraft was a DC9-40 aircraft. The basic problem as noted in the text of a galley leak was detected initially by the first officer during the preflight of the aircraft. There was coffee and soda standing in the galley area. This drain shares the same plumbing as the forward lavatory drain system and drains into the aft portion of the east&east compartment. The maintenance department was called. They closed the drain, inspected the avionics compartment and gave a clean bill of health, stating that there was '...no moisture' and signed off the log. The '4 light generator trip' as referred in the text meant that the aircraft now displayed a CSD fail light, an AC fail light, a dc fail light and a generator fail light. There was an associated problem with a 'locked out dc cross tie relay' that was manually selected to the closed position. This could not however, restore the lost AC power to the right side. It is not known at this time why the left generator of the APU could not provide the right side of the aircraft with AC power. The captain indicated some disappointment with the first officer's turning on the APU too soon, prior to their giving the right generator a second chance to operate the right side AC power. Procedure calls for that choice first, then the APU, after the bus is isolated so as to provide protection to the APU from any down line faults. He stated that there were two reasons the first officer was premature in his actions. One, that the company is in the process of 'cleaning up' that checklist as it is too wordy. The second, that the first officer had just 1 yr with the company and he was overly anxious to restore his flight instruments as he was the PF.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A DC9-40 FLC EXPERIENCES THE LOSS OF THEIR R SIDE ELECTRICAL PLUS THE FO'S FLT INSTS AFTER THE R GENERATOR FAILED. THE USE OF THE APU FAILED TO RESTORE THESE LOSSES.
Narrative: ON TKOF THE R GENERATOR FAILED. PREVIOUS FLT HAD A GALLEY LEAK WHICH LEAKED INTO THE ELECTRICAL COMPARTMENT. WE ALSO HAD WX DEV ON DEP AND BECAME IMC. OUR CHKLIST CALLS TO RESET THE GENERATOR AND LEAVING IT IN THE OFF POS. THE FO WAS THE PF. WHEN THIS WAS DONE WE LOST ALL OF THE R SIDE ELECTRICS INCLUDING THE FO'S FLT INSTS. AT THIS POINT I BECAME THE PF AND MY FO RAN THE CHKLIST FOR OUR NEW SIT, A '4 LIGHT GENERATOR TRIP.' AT THIS TIME I DISCOVERED THAT MY MIKE WENT BAD. I HAD TO USE MY FO'S UNTIL I WAS ABLE TO SWAP WITH OUR SPARE. WE ARE STILL IMC. MY FO INADVERTENTLY STARTED THE APU TOO SOON IN THE PROC. THE APU WAS UNABLE TO PWR THE ACFT'S R SIDE. WE DECLARED A PRECAUTIONARY EMER AND DIVERTED TO DSM (FOR THE REASONS OF OUR GENERATOR PROB, THE PREVIOUS GALLEY LEAK IN OUR E&E COMPARTMENT AND THE POSSIBLE OVERWT LNDG). WE MADE A NORMAL UNDERWT LNDG IN DSM. DURING POSTFLT REVIEW THE FO FELT THAT HE MAY HAVE FOLLOWED THE WRONG COLUMN AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PWR THE R SIDE ELECTRICAL. AFTER EVALUATING OUR CONDITION, AND THE APU WAS NOT CAPABLE OF POWERING THE R ELECTRICAL SYS, WE MADE THE PROPER DECISION TO LAND. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CAPT RPTR STATED THAT THE ACFT WAS A DC9-40 ACFT. THE BASIC PROB AS NOTED IN THE TEXT OF A GALLEY LEAK WAS DETECTED INITIALLY BY THE FO DURING THE PREFLT OF THE ACFT. THERE WAS COFFEE AND SODA STANDING IN THE GALLEY AREA. THIS DRAIN SHARES THE SAME PLUMBING AS THE FORWARD LAVATORY DRAIN SYS AND DRAINS INTO THE AFT PORTION OF THE E&E COMPARTMENT. THE MAINT DEPT WAS CALLED. THEY CLOSED THE DRAIN, INSPECTED THE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT AND GAVE A CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH, STATING THAT THERE WAS '...NO MOISTURE' AND SIGNED OFF THE LOG. THE '4 LIGHT GENERATOR TRIP' AS REFERRED IN THE TEXT MEANT THAT THE ACFT NOW DISPLAYED A CSD FAIL LIGHT, AN AC FAIL LIGHT, A DC FAIL LIGHT AND A GENERATOR FAIL LIGHT. THERE WAS AN ASSOCIATED PROB WITH A 'LOCKED OUT DC CROSS TIE RELAY' THAT WAS MANUALLY SELECTED TO THE CLOSED POS. THIS COULD NOT HOWEVER, RESTORE THE LOST AC PWR TO THE R SIDE. IT IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME WHY THE L GENERATOR OF THE APU COULD NOT PROVIDE THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT WITH AC PWR. THE CAPT INDICATED SOME DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE FO'S TURNING ON THE APU TOO SOON, PRIOR TO THEIR GIVING THE R GENERATOR A SECOND CHANCE TO OPERATE THE R SIDE AC PWR. PROC CALLS FOR THAT CHOICE FIRST, THEN THE APU, AFTER THE BUS IS ISOLATED SO AS TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO THE APU FROM ANY DOWN LINE FAULTS. HE STATED THAT THERE WERE TWO REASONS THE FO WAS PREMATURE IN HIS ACTIONS. ONE, THAT THE COMPANY IS IN THE PROCESS OF 'CLEANING UP' THAT CHKLIST AS IT IS TOO WORDY. THE SECOND, THAT THE FO HAD JUST 1 YR WITH THE COMPANY AND HE WAS OVERLY ANXIOUS TO RESTORE HIS FLT INSTS AS HE WAS THE PF.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.