Narrative:

On approach to palwaukee at approximately XA10 on jul/sun/98, winds were reported by the tower to be 250 degrees at 13 ts. The temperature was about 90 degrees F. Runways 16 and 24 were in use. Because of the 90 degree crosswind on runway 16, I requested runway 24 and was cleared to land. I was flying a 1978 C182RG (model right). I had 1 passenger. Though runway 6/24 is 3652 ft long, the displaced threshold on runway 24 provides a usable length of 2401 ft. Wanting to land as close to the threshold as possible, I descended to a relatively low level above the runway at about 65-70 KTS, with 20 degrees of flaps, and held some power until just before the numbers, when I pulled back to idle power, flared and touched down, main gear first. However, soon after my nosewheel touched down, I intersected runway 12/30, which is crowned above the level of surface of runway 24. I was bounced back into the air, and before I could react, landed rather heavily (but not extremely so), probably initially on the nosewheel. I am not positive, but given that the nosewheel fragments were found at the intersection of runway 24 and 16/34, I suspected that this first bounce resulted in the disintegration of the nosewheel. Nevertheless, this bounce resulted in a rebound that lurched the nose of the aircraft rather high. I decided in the second that followed that I may not have had enough speed or runway left to 'go around' and clear the obstacles beyond the end of the runway (particularly since it was a hot afternoon). So, I tried to add enough power to avoid a second bounce and continue to land, concentrating primarily at this point on maintaining directional control. (If my suspicion that the nosewheel disintegrated on the first bounce is correct, this was a lucky decision.) adding power did not avoid a second nose first landing, which I believe occurred past the intersection with runway 16/34. This second landing, probably now without the nosewheel (even though the gear assembly itself remained down and intact and the tire stayed wrapped around the fork assembly), also caused the propeller to strike the runway. (I don't believe that the propeller struck on the first bounce, though I am not positive of this.) the airplane did not bounce again, but continued down the runway. I reduced power to idle and the airplane stopped at the taxiway in front of hangar. There were no injuries. I am not sure if there were additional propeller strikes until the plane came to rest, at which time the propeller struck the runway a couple more times. I reported my propeller strike to the tower and was told that my gear had collapsed (not exactly true) and that I should shut down and wait for help. An FBO employee collected the wheel fragments (probably almost 20 of them) from the area of the intersection of runways 6/24 and 16/34, towed the airplane to the ramp in front of hangar, and placed the wheel fragments in a box which was left next to the airplane. The FBO employee told me he had only seen a disintegrated wheel once before (on a lear) and speculated that metal fatigue could have been the cause. I called the tower and also reported the incident to flying club. The tower employee who answered the phone took my information. I asked him whether bounced lndgs were a common occurrence on runway 24 because of the intersecting runways just past the threshold. He confirmed that they are. The following are my observations based on the foregoing facts: 1) though the event happened at the end of a 3-HR flight, I don't think fatigue was a factor, though the airplane was rather warm during the last 1/2 hour of flight. The flight had been totally uneventful and was flown as planned prior to the landing. The final approach was also exactly as planned, and initial touchdown was at about the intended point on the runway. 2) I was concerned about the length of the runway on approach, particularly due to the hot WX and the obstructions off the far end, and perhaps this caused me to decide against a go around prematurely, but I don't think so. I think instead that I should not have requested runway 24, at least not without asking whether a landing on runway 30 was available (though ATIS reported only runways 24 and 16 in use). I could have easily handled the crosswind component on runway 30 and it has a usable length of 3965 ft. Perhaps my request would have been approved. 3) now knowing the hazardous nature of the intersecting runways, I will not land on runway 24 unless absolutely necessary. In such case I will avoid bouncing off the intersecting runways by landing long of them. I will also execute a missed approach immediately on any irregularity, particularly if using a short runway. 4) the threshold on runway 24 was displaced further down the runway during the past yr or two, evidently to avoid possible short lndgs into the trees across milwaukee avenue. However, it seems to me that it was displaced too far and has merely substituted one hazard for another, since the intersecting runway is now only a few hundred ft past the threshold. This hazard could be lessened by better coordinating the levels of the runways. 5) though the initial bounce off the runway was unexpected, perhaps I should have been able to react more quickly and avoid a landing that placed too much stress on the nosewheel. Because of the nose-heavy characteristics of the airplane, this would not have been easy, but additional landing practice in the airplane may have been able to make such an event easier to correct. Though I already have over 50 hours in the airplane, I had only had four prior flts in it during the past 9 months. I plan on obtaining additional landing training in the airplane prior to future solo flight in it. Though I completed both a BFR and ipc only a few weeks earlier, not many lndgs were attempted. 6) if the nosewheel disintegrated on the first bounce as I believe, the magnitude of such contact did not seem to be hard enough to cause the failure of the wheel. In that case, if metal fatigue was at play, it was only a matter of time before the wheel came apart. I assume this will be determined in the metallurgical tests. I don't know whether retractable nose gear should be checked for cracks or other weakness after a certain number of hours of use. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he was notified by the FAA for re- examination of his pilot competency as a result of this incident. He reiterated that he believed that the rising crown of the runway intersection precipitated the aircraft to unexpectedly bounce back into the air causing his lack of recovery to the runway on the nose gear and aircraft subsequent damage. He further stated that he had not heard if the nosewheel examination revealed faulty parts.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PVT PLT OF A C182RG BOUNCED DURING LNDG ONTO THE NOSE GEAR RESULTING IN FAILURE OF THE NOSE GEAR WHEEL ASSEMBLY AND DAMAGE TO THE PROP WHEN IT STRUCK THE RWY. RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE CROWN RISE IN THE RWY AT THE INTXN OF ANOTHER RWY CAUSED HIS ACFT TO BOUNCE INTO THE AIR AND SUBSEQUENTLY FALL UNCONTROLLABLY ONTO THE NOSE GEAR.

Narrative: ON APCH TO PALWAUKEE AT APPROX XA10 ON JUL/SUN/98, WINDS WERE RPTED BY THE TWR TO BE 250 DEGS AT 13 TS. THE TEMP WAS ABOUT 90 DEGS F. RWYS 16 AND 24 WERE IN USE. BECAUSE OF THE 90 DEG XWIND ON RWY 16, I REQUESTED RWY 24 AND WAS CLRED TO LAND. I WAS FLYING A 1978 C182RG (MODEL R). I HAD 1 PAX. THOUGH RWY 6/24 IS 3652 FT LONG, THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD ON RWY 24 PROVIDES A USABLE LENGTH OF 2401 FT. WANTING TO LAND AS CLOSE TO THE THRESHOLD AS POSSIBLE, I DSNDED TO A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL ABOVE THE RWY AT ABOUT 65-70 KTS, WITH 20 DEGS OF FLAPS, AND HELD SOME PWR UNTIL JUST BEFORE THE NUMBERS, WHEN I PULLED BACK TO IDLE PWR, FLARED AND TOUCHED DOWN, MAIN GEAR FIRST. HOWEVER, SOON AFTER MY NOSEWHEEL TOUCHED DOWN, I INTERSECTED RWY 12/30, WHICH IS CROWNED ABOVE THE LEVEL OF SURFACE OF RWY 24. I WAS BOUNCED BACK INTO THE AIR, AND BEFORE I COULD REACT, LANDED RATHER HEAVILY (BUT NOT EXTREMELY SO), PROBABLY INITIALLY ON THE NOSEWHEEL. I AM NOT POSITIVE, BUT GIVEN THAT THE NOSEWHEEL FRAGMENTS WERE FOUND AT THE INTXN OF RWY 24 AND 16/34, I SUSPECTED THAT THIS FIRST BOUNCE RESULTED IN THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE NOSEWHEEL. NEVERTHELESS, THIS BOUNCE RESULTED IN A REBOUND THAT LURCHED THE NOSE OF THE ACFT RATHER HIGH. I DECIDED IN THE SECOND THAT FOLLOWED THAT I MAY NOT HAVE HAD ENOUGH SPD OR RWY LEFT TO 'GAR' AND CLR THE OBSTACLES BEYOND THE END OF THE RWY (PARTICULARLY SINCE IT WAS A HOT AFTERNOON). SO, I TRIED TO ADD ENOUGH PWR TO AVOID A SECOND BOUNCE AND CONTINUE TO LAND, CONCENTRATING PRIMARILY AT THIS POINT ON MAINTAINING DIRECTIONAL CTL. (IF MY SUSPICION THAT THE NOSEWHEEL DISINTEGRATED ON THE FIRST BOUNCE IS CORRECT, THIS WAS A LUCKY DECISION.) ADDING PWR DID NOT AVOID A SECOND NOSE FIRST LNDG, WHICH I BELIEVE OCCURRED PAST THE INTXN WITH RWY 16/34. THIS SECOND LNDG, PROBABLY NOW WITHOUT THE NOSEWHEEL (EVEN THOUGH THE GEAR ASSEMBLY ITSELF REMAINED DOWN AND INTACT AND THE TIRE STAYED WRAPPED AROUND THE FORK ASSEMBLY), ALSO CAUSED THE PROP TO STRIKE THE RWY. (I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE PROP STRUCK ON THE FIRST BOUNCE, THOUGH I AM NOT POSITIVE OF THIS.) THE AIRPLANE DID NOT BOUNCE AGAIN, BUT CONTINUED DOWN THE RWY. I REDUCED PWR TO IDLE AND THE AIRPLANE STOPPED AT THE TXWY IN FRONT OF HANGAR. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. I AM NOT SURE IF THERE WERE ADDITIONAL PROP STRIKES UNTIL THE PLANE CAME TO REST, AT WHICH TIME THE PROP STRUCK THE RWY A COUPLE MORE TIMES. I RPTED MY PROP STRIKE TO THE TWR AND WAS TOLD THAT MY GEAR HAD COLLAPSED (NOT EXACTLY TRUE) AND THAT I SHOULD SHUT DOWN AND WAIT FOR HELP. AN FBO EMPLOYEE COLLECTED THE WHEEL FRAGMENTS (PROBABLY ALMOST 20 OF THEM) FROM THE AREA OF THE INTXN OF RWYS 6/24 AND 16/34, TOWED THE AIRPLANE TO THE RAMP IN FRONT OF HANGAR, AND PLACED THE WHEEL FRAGMENTS IN A BOX WHICH WAS LEFT NEXT TO THE AIRPLANE. THE FBO EMPLOYEE TOLD ME HE HAD ONLY SEEN A DISINTEGRATED WHEEL ONCE BEFORE (ON A LEAR) AND SPECULATED THAT METAL FATIGUE COULD HAVE BEEN THE CAUSE. I CALLED THE TWR AND ALSO RPTED THE INCIDENT TO FLYING CLUB. THE TWR EMPLOYEE WHO ANSWERED THE PHONE TOOK MY INFO. I ASKED HIM WHETHER BOUNCED LNDGS WERE A COMMON OCCURRENCE ON RWY 24 BECAUSE OF THE INTERSECTING RWYS JUST PAST THE THRESHOLD. HE CONFIRMED THAT THEY ARE. THE FOLLOWING ARE MY OBSERVATIONS BASED ON THE FOREGOING FACTS: 1) THOUGH THE EVENT HAPPENED AT THE END OF A 3-HR FLT, I DON'T THINK FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR, THOUGH THE AIRPLANE WAS RATHER WARM DURING THE LAST 1/2 HR OF FLT. THE FLT HAD BEEN TOTALLY UNEVENTFUL AND WAS FLOWN AS PLANNED PRIOR TO THE LNDG. THE FINAL APCH WAS ALSO EXACTLY AS PLANNED, AND INITIAL TOUCHDOWN WAS AT ABOUT THE INTENDED POINT ON THE RWY. 2) I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE RWY ON APCH, PARTICULARLY DUE TO THE HOT WX AND THE OBSTRUCTIONS OFF THE FAR END, AND PERHAPS THIS CAUSED ME TO DECIDE AGAINST A GAR PREMATURELY, BUT I DON'T THINK SO. I THINK INSTEAD THAT I SHOULD NOT HAVE REQUESTED RWY 24, AT LEAST NOT WITHOUT ASKING WHETHER A LNDG ON RWY 30 WAS AVAILABLE (THOUGH ATIS RPTED ONLY RWYS 24 AND 16 IN USE). I COULD HAVE EASILY HANDLED THE XWIND COMPONENT ON RWY 30 AND IT HAS A USABLE LENGTH OF 3965 FT. PERHAPS MY REQUEST WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROVED. 3) NOW KNOWING THE HAZARDOUS NATURE OF THE INTERSECTING RWYS, I WILL NOT LAND ON RWY 24 UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. IN SUCH CASE I WILL AVOID BOUNCING OFF THE INTERSECTING RWYS BY LNDG LONG OF THEM. I WILL ALSO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH IMMEDIATELY ON ANY IRREGULARITY, PARTICULARLY IF USING A SHORT RWY. 4) THE THRESHOLD ON RWY 24 WAS DISPLACED FURTHER DOWN THE RWY DURING THE PAST YR OR TWO, EVIDENTLY TO AVOID POSSIBLE SHORT LNDGS INTO THE TREES ACROSS MILWAUKEE AVENUE. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT WAS DISPLACED TOO FAR AND HAS MERELY SUBSTITUTED ONE HAZARD FOR ANOTHER, SINCE THE INTERSECTING RWY IS NOW ONLY A FEW HUNDRED FT PAST THE THRESHOLD. THIS HAZARD COULD BE LESSENED BY BETTER COORDINATING THE LEVELS OF THE RWYS. 5) THOUGH THE INITIAL BOUNCE OFF THE RWY WAS UNEXPECTED, PERHAPS I SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REACT MORE QUICKLY AND AVOID A LNDG THAT PLACED TOO MUCH STRESS ON THE NOSEWHEEL. BECAUSE OF THE NOSE-HVY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AIRPLANE, THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EASY, BUT ADDITIONAL LNDG PRACTICE IN THE AIRPLANE MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE SUCH AN EVENT EASIER TO CORRECT. THOUGH I ALREADY HAVE OVER 50 HRS IN THE AIRPLANE, I HAD ONLY HAD FOUR PRIOR FLTS IN IT DURING THE PAST 9 MONTHS. I PLAN ON OBTAINING ADDITIONAL LNDG TRAINING IN THE AIRPLANE PRIOR TO FUTURE SOLO FLT IN IT. THOUGH I COMPLETED BOTH A BFR AND IPC ONLY A FEW WKS EARLIER, NOT MANY LNDGS WERE ATTEMPTED. 6) IF THE NOSEWHEEL DISINTEGRATED ON THE FIRST BOUNCE AS I BELIEVE, THE MAGNITUDE OF SUCH CONTACT DID NOT SEEM TO BE HARD ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE FAILURE OF THE WHEEL. IN THAT CASE, IF METAL FATIGUE WAS AT PLAY, IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE WHEEL CAME APART. I ASSUME THIS WILL BE DETERMINED IN THE METALLURGICAL TESTS. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER RETRACTABLE NOSE GEAR SHOULD BE CHKED FOR CRACKS OR OTHER WEAKNESS AFTER A CERTAIN NUMBER OF HRS OF USE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE WAS NOTIFIED BY THE FAA FOR RE- EXAMINATION OF HIS PLT COMPETENCY AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT. HE REITERATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE RISING CROWN OF THE RWY INTXN PRECIPITATED THE ACFT TO UNEXPECTEDLY BOUNCE BACK INTO THE AIR CAUSING HIS LACK OF RECOVERY TO THE RWY ON THE NOSE GEAR AND ACFT SUBSEQUENT DAMAGE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD IF THE NOSEWHEEL EXAMINATION REVEALED FAULTY PARTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.