Narrative:

This flight was in a B727-200 from iah to tol where approximately 40-45 B727 and DC8 aircraft arrive at a cargo sort hub over a short period of time. The crew consisted of a captain, relief captain who is flight engineer qualified, first officer and flight engineer. We brought the airplane from mexico to iah where we picked up the relief captain. He was to fly to tol and return to iah on another flight. The relief captain was the PF for the approach and landing at tol. Approximately 140 mi southwest of tol, ATC asked if we would maintain maximum forward speed to sequence the flight for arrival. With the captain's approval I responded that we could. The captain then told ATC he would remain high so as to maintain mach .85 on descent. ATC then began stepping us down for the arrival. Each time I would acknowledge a lower altitude to ATC the captain would dial the altitude into the altitude alerter. Our SOP is for the PNF to enter the new altitude and the PF to point and acknowledge the change. At approximately FL180 the airspeed was approximately 340 KTS. ATC then requested we slow to 280 KTS. This caused us to be high on the descent profile and we were turned over to approach control where we were assigned an altitude of 11000 ft and a heading of 070 degrees. This placed us on a left downwind for a visual approach to runway 25. We entered downwind at approximately 13000 ft and 250 KTS with the speed brakes extended. ATC then cleared us to descend to 6000 ft and indicated that we were #4 for the approach. Again, the captain entered the altitude in the alerter window. The captain then asked me to confirm our sequence and requested I try to locate the other traffic visually out the right side of the airplane. He then decided to make a rapid descent and asked for the gear to be extended. With the gear and speed brakes extended, the rate of descent was in excess of 4000 FPM. I was looking for the other traffic when I heard the altitude alert horn a second time. I looked at the altimeter as the captain was retracting the speed brakes and leveling the airplane at 5000 ft, 1000 ft below our assigned altitude. ATC then asked what our assigned altitude was. I responded that it was 6000 ft. We were then told to maintain 5000 ft and to slow to 180 KTS. The captain then extended the speed brakes and pitched the nose up so rapidly that the stick shaker was activated momentarily. At 200 KTS the gear was retracted, flaps extended and we slowed to 180 KTS. Approximately 10-12 mi northwest of the airport, we were told to turn to a heading of 160 degrees (base leg). Each time ATC assigned us a heading or altitude the captain would have me ask them what our sequence or traffic was. We were then told to turn to a heading of 210 degrees, descend to 3000 ft, intercept the localizer and follow other traffic to the airport. The captain continued this turn through 210 degrees to a heading of approximately 280 degrees before the flight engineer and I could convince him the assigned heading was 210 degrees. Finally he made a left turn back to 210 degrees and continued this heading through the localizer. The flight engineer and I began trying to convince the captain that we were to turn on the localizer. The captain stated that he understood we were to fly the heading of 210 degrees and continued to a point where it would be impossible to turn back to the right and intercept. ATC again asked what our assigned altitude was and where we were going. I then looked at the altitude alerter which had been reset by the captain to 2400 ft. The airplane was by now descending through 2700 ft. ATC told us to maintain whatever altitude we were at and to fly a heading of 160 degrees. We were then brought around to a left downwind and left base and asked to make a visual approach behind another aircraft. I was again instructed to ask what kind of aircraft we were following. I may have sounded a bit sarcastic to the controller who then stated that we were not to be smart with him since we were the one who busted an altitude. On final approach, we were constantly warned that we were 70-80 KTS faster than the aircraft we were following. Finally the captain did slow, however, this caused us to make a steeper than normal final approach. The aircraft in front of us cleared the runway when we were on about a 1/2 mi final. I had flown with this captain once before and found him to be an experienced and competent pilot. After the airplane was parked and shut down, weboarded a crew bus to a crew lounge where we were to remain for approximately 3 hours. We, the other captain, flight engineer, and myself, fully expected to discuss this situation with the relief captain upon our arrival. However, after we left the bus the relief captain disappeared and we were unable to find him prior to our departure. The relief captain did not follow SOP when he, as PF, set the altitude alerter. At times he chose to reply himself to ATC instructions. His constant insistence on questioning approach control concerning our sequence, type and location of non conflicting traffic, needlessly interrupted a busy controller who was trying to sequence 6 or 7 large aircraft for a visual approach. Additionally, he constantly requested I visually locate traffic that was not a factor. This directed my attention outside the airplane. I believe the problem began when the decision was made to keep the airplane high and make an idle thrust high speed descent. In my experience if one controller requests you to keep your speed up, the next will surely slow you down. A normal descent profile with speed controled by thrust would insure arrival at a more manageable altitude. I can only speculate that maybe this captain either did not feel well or did not have adequate rest prior to the flight. There is also the possibility that the initial altitude bust so rattled him that it was impossible to do anything right. Supplemental information from acn 409832: a 'senior' captain was scheduled to fly with my crew and me from iah-tol due to a possible '8 in 24' conflict. As a courtesy, I offered him that leg. He accepted and I was relegated to the aft 'crew rest' jump seat. On downwind, I heard the altitude alerter sound, saw 6000 ft in the alert window and saw the aircraft descending through 5500 ft. I jumped up and asked the captain if he'd been cleared below 6000 ft. He tersely said 'no' and was climbing back to 6000 ft. I had noted that his aggressive 'a' type personality was doing more to harm CRM than help it. I don't have the answer to such aggressive behavior. I am simply recording that as the 4TH crew member in the aft jump seat, I could not prevent this excursion. Callback conversation with reporter acn 409691 revealed the following information: the captain, who was PIC and signed the dispatch release, replaced the captain of record. The auxiliary captain occupied the aircraft left seat for the flight. The auxiliary captain was placed on the flight to satisfy FARS regarding flight time, duty time requirements. Seat swapping is acceptable at this company. Both the captain of record and the first officer called the air carrier chief pilot about this incident. They do not know what action, if any, the chief pilot has taken. The captain indicated that he would not fly with the auxiliary pilot the next day, and that the company would need to find a replacement if the trip was to operate with him as a crew member. Reporter indicated that he quit this air carrier because of their personnel policies, and said he was unable to continue with a company with so little regard for safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727. AUX CAPT, WHO SIGNED FLT RELEASE AND WAS PIC, OCCUPIED THE L SEAT, HAD NUMEROUS ALT EXCURSIONS AND HDG DEVS ON APCH AT TOL.

Narrative: THIS FLT WAS IN A B727-200 FROM IAH TO TOL WHERE APPROX 40-45 B727 AND DC8 ACFT ARRIVE AT A CARGO SORT HUB OVER A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. THE CREW CONSISTED OF A CAPT, RELIEF CAPT WHO IS FE QUALIFIED, FO AND FE. WE BROUGHT THE AIRPLANE FROM MEXICO TO IAH WHERE WE PICKED UP THE RELIEF CAPT. HE WAS TO FLY TO TOL AND RETURN TO IAH ON ANOTHER FLT. THE RELIEF CAPT WAS THE PF FOR THE APCH AND LNDG AT TOL. APPROX 140 MI SW OF TOL, ATC ASKED IF WE WOULD MAINTAIN MAX FORWARD SPD TO SEQUENCE THE FLT FOR ARR. WITH THE CAPT'S APPROVAL I RESPONDED THAT WE COULD. THE CAPT THEN TOLD ATC HE WOULD REMAIN HIGH SO AS TO MAINTAIN MACH .85 ON DSCNT. ATC THEN BEGAN STEPPING US DOWN FOR THE ARR. EACH TIME I WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE A LOWER ALT TO ATC THE CAPT WOULD DIAL THE ALT INTO THE ALT ALERTER. OUR SOP IS FOR THE PNF TO ENTER THE NEW ALT AND THE PF TO POINT AND ACKNOWLEDGE THE CHANGE. AT APPROX FL180 THE AIRSPD WAS APPROX 340 KTS. ATC THEN REQUESTED WE SLOW TO 280 KTS. THIS CAUSED US TO BE HIGH ON THE DSCNT PROFILE AND WE WERE TURNED OVER TO APCH CTL WHERE WE WERE ASSIGNED AN ALT OF 11000 FT AND A HDG OF 070 DEGS. THIS PLACED US ON A L DOWNWIND FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25. WE ENTERED DOWNWIND AT APPROX 13000 FT AND 250 KTS WITH THE SPD BRAKES EXTENDED. ATC THEN CLRED US TO DSND TO 6000 FT AND INDICATED THAT WE WERE #4 FOR THE APCH. AGAIN, THE CAPT ENTERED THE ALT IN THE ALERTER WINDOW. THE CAPT THEN ASKED ME TO CONFIRM OUR SEQUENCE AND REQUESTED I TRY TO LOCATE THE OTHER TFC VISUALLY OUT THE R SIDE OF THE AIRPLANE. HE THEN DECIDED TO MAKE A RAPID DSCNT AND ASKED FOR THE GEAR TO BE EXTENDED. WITH THE GEAR AND SPD BRAKES EXTENDED, THE RATE OF DSCNT WAS IN EXCESS OF 4000 FPM. I WAS LOOKING FOR THE OTHER TFC WHEN I HEARD THE ALT ALERT HORN A SECOND TIME. I LOOKED AT THE ALTIMETER AS THE CAPT WAS RETRACTING THE SPD BRAKES AND LEVELING THE AIRPLANE AT 5000 FT, 1000 FT BELOW OUR ASSIGNED ALT. ATC THEN ASKED WHAT OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS. I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS 6000 FT. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO MAINTAIN 5000 FT AND TO SLOW TO 180 KTS. THE CAPT THEN EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES AND PITCHED THE NOSE UP SO RAPIDLY THAT THE STICK SHAKER WAS ACTIVATED MOMENTARILY. AT 200 KTS THE GEAR WAS RETRACTED, FLAPS EXTENDED AND WE SLOWED TO 180 KTS. APPROX 10-12 MI NW OF THE ARPT, WE WERE TOLD TO TURN TO A HDG OF 160 DEGS (BASE LEG). EACH TIME ATC ASSIGNED US A HDG OR ALT THE CAPT WOULD HAVE ME ASK THEM WHAT OUR SEQUENCE OR TFC WAS. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO TURN TO A HDG OF 210 DEGS, DSND TO 3000 FT, INTERCEPT THE LOC AND FOLLOW OTHER TFC TO THE ARPT. THE CAPT CONTINUED THIS TURN THROUGH 210 DEGS TO A HDG OF APPROX 280 DEGS BEFORE THE FE AND I COULD CONVINCE HIM THE ASSIGNED HDG WAS 210 DEGS. FINALLY HE MADE A L TURN BACK TO 210 DEGS AND CONTINUED THIS HDG THROUGH THE LOC. THE FE AND I BEGAN TRYING TO CONVINCE THE CAPT THAT WE WERE TO TURN ON THE LOC. THE CAPT STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WE WERE TO FLY THE HDG OF 210 DEGS AND CONTINUED TO A POINT WHERE IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO TURN BACK TO THE R AND INTERCEPT. ATC AGAIN ASKED WHAT OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS AND WHERE WE WERE GOING. I THEN LOOKED AT THE ALT ALERTER WHICH HAD BEEN RESET BY THE CAPT TO 2400 FT. THE AIRPLANE WAS BY NOW DSNDING THROUGH 2700 FT. ATC TOLD US TO MAINTAIN WHATEVER ALT WE WERE AT AND TO FLY A HDG OF 160 DEGS. WE WERE THEN BROUGHT AROUND TO A L DOWNWIND AND L BASE AND ASKED TO MAKE A VISUAL APCH BEHIND ANOTHER ACFT. I WAS AGAIN INSTRUCTED TO ASK WHAT KIND OF ACFT WE WERE FOLLOWING. I MAY HAVE SOUNDED A BIT SARCASTIC TO THE CTLR WHO THEN STATED THAT WE WERE NOT TO BE SMART WITH HIM SINCE WE WERE THE ONE WHO BUSTED AN ALT. ON FINAL APCH, WE WERE CONSTANTLY WARNED THAT WE WERE 70-80 KTS FASTER THAN THE ACFT WE WERE FOLLOWING. FINALLY THE CAPT DID SLOW, HOWEVER, THIS CAUSED US TO MAKE A STEEPER THAN NORMAL FINAL APCH. THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US CLRED THE RWY WHEN WE WERE ON ABOUT A 1/2 MI FINAL. I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT ONCE BEFORE AND FOUND HIM TO BE AN EXPERIENCED AND COMPETENT PLT. AFTER THE AIRPLANE WAS PARKED AND SHUT DOWN, WEBOARDED A CREW BUS TO A CREW LOUNGE WHERE WE WERE TO REMAIN FOR APPROX 3 HRS. WE, THE OTHER CAPT, FE, AND MYSELF, FULLY EXPECTED TO DISCUSS THIS SIT WITH THE RELIEF CAPT UPON OUR ARR. HOWEVER, AFTER WE LEFT THE BUS THE RELIEF CAPT DISAPPEARED AND WE WERE UNABLE TO FIND HIM PRIOR TO OUR DEP. THE RELIEF CAPT DID NOT FOLLOW SOP WHEN HE, AS PF, SET THE ALT ALERTER. AT TIMES HE CHOSE TO REPLY HIMSELF TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS. HIS CONSTANT INSISTENCE ON QUESTIONING APCH CTL CONCERNING OUR SEQUENCE, TYPE AND LOCATION OF NON CONFLICTING TFC, NEEDLESSLY INTERRUPTED A BUSY CTLR WHO WAS TRYING TO SEQUENCE 6 OR 7 LARGE ACFT FOR A VISUAL APCH. ADDITIONALLY, HE CONSTANTLY REQUESTED I VISUALLY LOCATE TFC THAT WAS NOT A FACTOR. THIS DIRECTED MY ATTN OUTSIDE THE AIRPLANE. I BELIEVE THE PROB BEGAN WHEN THE DECISION WAS MADE TO KEEP THE AIRPLANE HIGH AND MAKE AN IDLE THRUST HIGH SPD DSCNT. IN MY EXPERIENCE IF ONE CTLR REQUESTS YOU TO KEEP YOUR SPD UP, THE NEXT WILL SURELY SLOW YOU DOWN. A NORMAL DSCNT PROFILE WITH SPD CTLED BY THRUST WOULD INSURE ARR AT A MORE MANAGEABLE ALT. I CAN ONLY SPECULATE THAT MAYBE THIS CAPT EITHER DID NOT FEEL WELL OR DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE REST PRIOR TO THE FLT. THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE INITIAL ALT BUST SO RATTLED HIM THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO ANYTHING RIGHT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 409832: A 'SENIOR' CAPT WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY WITH MY CREW AND ME FROM IAH-TOL DUE TO A POSSIBLE '8 IN 24' CONFLICT. AS A COURTESY, I OFFERED HIM THAT LEG. HE ACCEPTED AND I WAS RELEGATED TO THE AFT 'CREW REST' JUMP SEAT. ON DOWNWIND, I HEARD THE ALT ALERTER SOUND, SAW 6000 FT IN THE ALERT WINDOW AND SAW THE ACFT DSNDING THROUGH 5500 FT. I JUMPED UP AND ASKED THE CAPT IF HE'D BEEN CLRED BELOW 6000 FT. HE TERSELY SAID 'NO' AND WAS CLBING BACK TO 6000 FT. I HAD NOTED THAT HIS AGGRESSIVE 'A' TYPE PERSONALITY WAS DOING MORE TO HARM CRM THAN HELP IT. I DON'T HAVE THE ANSWER TO SUCH AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR. I AM SIMPLY RECORDING THAT AS THE 4TH CREW MEMBER IN THE AFT JUMP SEAT, I COULD NOT PREVENT THIS EXCURSION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 409691 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT, WHO WAS PIC AND SIGNED THE DISPATCH RELEASE, REPLACED THE CAPT OF RECORD. THE AUX CAPT OCCUPIED THE ACFT L SEAT FOR THE FLT. THE AUX CAPT WAS PLACED ON THE FLT TO SATISFY FARS REGARDING FLT TIME, DUTY TIME REQUIREMENTS. SEAT SWAPPING IS ACCEPTABLE AT THIS COMPANY. BOTH THE CAPT OF RECORD AND THE FO CALLED THE ACR CHIEF PLT ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. THEY DO NOT KNOW WHAT ACTION, IF ANY, THE CHIEF PLT HAS TAKEN. THE CAPT INDICATED THAT HE WOULD NOT FLY WITH THE AUX PLT THE NEXT DAY, AND THAT THE COMPANY WOULD NEED TO FIND A REPLACEMENT IF THE TRIP WAS TO OPERATE WITH HIM AS A CREW MEMBER. RPTR INDICATED THAT HE QUIT THIS ACR BECAUSE OF THEIR PERSONNEL POLICIES, AND SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO CONTINUE WITH A COMPANY WITH SO LITTLE REGARD FOR SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.