Narrative:

I departed in an unfamiliar aircraft for a round robin flight. The aircraft was topped off at the departing airport for a 1 1/2 hour flight. Received a good rate of climb to FL350 and a visual approach at the arriving airport. The next leg was to be 50 mins. The WX was MVFR on departure and good VFR on arrival. The fuel gauges indicated +2 hours of fuel. Departure was delayed 10- 15 mins trying to receive an IFR clearance, unable, departed VFR. Next I was unable to make radio contact with the center controller. When I did they were unable to give me a clearance due to a 'hot MOA.' I was at 10500 ft for an additional 35 NM. When I got the clearance it was a step climb to FL270. I was given a STAR into the arrival airport with a lower altitude and an expect to cross altitude of 160 ft, 65 NM from the airport. The controller then asked me to turn 90 degrees off course for 2-3 mins. When I turned back he gave me a descent to 70 ft, 30 NM from the airport. I had calculated the fuel when I began the STAR and while the fuel, would be tight it would have been enough to complete the flight, but I had not calculated or anticipated the heading change or lower altitude. Furthermore did not communicate my situation or needs with the controller. I had the airport 10 NM away and was given a vector for a downwind. Abeam the numbers, I got a low fuel light (the gauges indicated higher). I asked the controller how much longer on this heading and a turn back to the airport. He indicated '8 NM.' this is when I first told them (controllers) of my getting fuel critical. He asked if I was declaring an emergency. When I received the second low fuel light, while I probably had enough fuel not to my better judgement finally took over and I indicated 'yes.' I was given priority handling and landed safely. I spoke with the tower supervisor and we discussed these chain of events and how communication could have been better. Human performance: 1) unfamiliar aircraft, not be familiar with particular fuel flows, gauges, etc. 2) rushed. Time from between 1ST and 2ND airport. 3) poor judgement -- not receiving IFR clearance prior to departure. 4) not admitting fuel situation with controllers. 5) ultimately all of these events were brought about by my concentrating more on personal problem than the task at hand!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF A SINGLE PLT (SP) CESSNA CITATION I-SP, (C501), DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO HIS LOW FUEL STATE DURING A VISUAL APCH. ATC RESPONDED WITH PRIORITY HANDLING AND A SUCCESSFUL LNDG WAS MADE.

Narrative: I DEPARTED IN AN UNFAMILIAR ACFT FOR A ROUND ROBIN FLT. THE ACFT WAS TOPPED OFF AT THE DEPARTING ARPT FOR A 1 1/2 HR FLT. RECEIVED A GOOD RATE OF CLB TO FL350 AND A VISUAL APCH AT THE ARRIVING ARPT. THE NEXT LEG WAS TO BE 50 MINS. THE WX WAS MVFR ON DEP AND GOOD VFR ON ARR. THE FUEL GAUGES INDICATED +2 HRS OF FUEL. DEP WAS DELAYED 10- 15 MINS TRYING TO RECEIVE AN IFR CLRNC, UNABLE, DEPARTED VFR. NEXT I WAS UNABLE TO MAKE RADIO CONTACT WITH THE CTR CTLR. WHEN I DID THEY WERE UNABLE TO GIVE ME A CLRNC DUE TO A 'HOT MOA.' I WAS AT 10500 FT FOR AN ADDITIONAL 35 NM. WHEN I GOT THE CLRNC IT WAS A STEP CLB TO FL270. I WAS GIVEN A STAR INTO THE ARR ARPT WITH A LOWER ALT AND AN EXPECT TO CROSS ALT OF 160 FT, 65 NM FROM THE ARPT. THE CTLR THEN ASKED ME TO TURN 90 DEGS OFF COURSE FOR 2-3 MINS. WHEN I TURNED BACK HE GAVE ME A DSCNT TO 70 FT, 30 NM FROM THE ARPT. I HAD CALCULATED THE FUEL WHEN I BEGAN THE STAR AND WHILE THE FUEL, WOULD BE TIGHT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO COMPLETE THE FLT, BUT I HAD NOT CALCULATED OR ANTICIPATED THE HEADING CHANGE OR LOWER ALT. FURTHERMORE DID NOT COMMUNICATE MY SIT OR NEEDS WITH THE CTLR. I HAD THE ARPT 10 NM AWAY AND WAS GIVEN A VECTOR FOR A DOWNWIND. ABEAM THE NUMBERS, I GOT A LOW FUEL LIGHT (THE GAUGES INDICATED HIGHER). I ASKED THE CTLR HOW MUCH LONGER ON THIS HEADING AND A TURN BACK TO THE ARPT. HE INDICATED '8 NM.' THIS IS WHEN I FIRST TOLD THEM (CTLRS) OF MY GETTING FUEL CRITICAL. HE ASKED IF I WAS DECLARING AN EMER. WHEN I RECEIVED THE SECOND LOW FUEL LIGHT, WHILE I PROBABLY HAD ENOUGH FUEL NOT TO MY BETTER JUDGEMENT FINALLY TOOK OVER AND I INDICATED 'YES.' I WAS GIVEN PRIORITY HANDLING AND LANDED SAFELY. I SPOKE WITH THE TWR SUPVR AND WE DISCUSSED THESE CHAIN OF EVENTS AND HOW COM COULD HAVE BEEN BETTER. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: 1) UNFAMILIAR ACFT, NOT BE FAMILIAR WITH PARTICULAR FUEL FLOWS, GAUGES, ETC. 2) RUSHED. TIME FROM BTWN 1ST AND 2ND ARPT. 3) POOR JUDGEMENT -- NOT RECEIVING IFR CLRNC PRIOR TO DEP. 4) NOT ADMITTING FUEL SIT WITH CTLRS. 5) ULTIMATELY ALL OF THESE EVENTS WERE BROUGHT ABOUT BY MY CONCENTRATING MORE ON PERSONAL PROB THAN THE TASK AT HAND!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.