Narrative:

During a directed go around, 5 mi from landing at sfo, we executed a gentle climb from 2000 ft to 3000 ft. Shortly after gear retraction, we noticed a sharp jolt accompanied by a bang. There were no other non instrument cues. I continued to fly while my copilot attempted to discover any abnormal instrument readings. We found that the right engine was not running efficiently so we minimized its use by retarding it to idle. All the while we were executing the go around, following ATC instructions to a relatively short return to the airport, running the normal checklists, apprising the flight attendants and passenger of the missed approach, checking for airworthiness and preparing to land. After landing, the right engine was shut down and taxi to the gate was uneventful. A check with maintenance a few days later showed that a turbine in the exhaust section of the right engine had failed. No cause had been attributed to that point. Perceptions, judgements, decisions: a combination of an engine failure during a go around is difficult, even though we are trained well in the simulator. The indications and cues were not as clear- cut, however. We did not know if we had hit something, a bomb exploded, or simply lost an air conditioner. With the engine at idle, within normal parameters and a relatively short pattern, we elected to land with 2 engines running using a single engine confign. Isolating the engine after landing was a precaution to eliminate that area of concern. We were still not completely sure what all had gone wrong. Inspection at the blocks confirmed that the right engine needed to be changed. Actions: we elected the short pattern and landing since the aircraft seemed to be flyable. We chose to have the troubleshooting take place on the ground by competent maintenance personnel who could better examine the aircraft exterior. Factors affecting human performance: abnormal sits requiring many actions in a short time period is difficult. ATC, crew, operations and passenger all need to be informed. The pilots need to safely return the aircraft to the ground. We elected to 'slow the process down' as much as possible during a short return. The result was no hasty decisions, a focus on returning a flyable aircraft, maintaining cockpit crew coordination, and certainly no loss of life. My only regret was not being able to inform the flight attendants better before landing. I feel there was no need for evacuate/evacuation but it would have helped to know that so they could mentally prepare for that non event. After landing, we did apprise the passenger and debriefed the crew. Once we knew the results of the ground inspection, only then did I inform them of what had actually gone wrong.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF MD80 ON A DIRECTED GAR EXPERIENCES A SHARP JOLT AND A BANG. NO OTHER INST CUES. THEY COMPLETE THE GAR AND LAND.

Narrative: DURING A DIRECTED GAR, 5 MI FROM LNDG AT SFO, WE EXECUTED A GENTLE CLB FROM 2000 FT TO 3000 FT. SHORTLY AFTER GEAR RETRACTION, WE NOTICED A SHARP JOLT ACCOMPANIED BY A BANG. THERE WERE NO OTHER NON INST CUES. I CONTINUED TO FLY WHILE MY COPLT ATTEMPTED TO DISCOVER ANY ABNORMAL INST READINGS. WE FOUND THAT THE R ENG WAS NOT RUNNING EFFICIENTLY SO WE MINIMIZED ITS USE BY RETARDING IT TO IDLE. ALL THE WHILE WE WERE EXECUTING THE GAR, FOLLOWING ATC INSTRUCTIONS TO A RELATIVELY SHORT RETURN TO THE ARPT, RUNNING THE NORMAL CHKLISTS, APPRISING THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX OF THE MISSED APCH, CHKING FOR AIRWORTHINESS AND PREPARING TO LAND. AFTER LNDG, THE R ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AND TAXI TO THE GATE WAS UNEVENTFUL. A CHK WITH MAINT A FEW DAYS LATER SHOWED THAT A TURBINE IN THE EXHAUST SECTION OF THE R ENG HAD FAILED. NO CAUSE HAD BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO THAT POINT. PERCEPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS: A COMBINATION OF AN ENG FAILURE DURING A GAR IS DIFFICULT, EVEN THOUGH WE ARE TRAINED WELL IN THE SIMULATOR. THE INDICATIONS AND CUES WERE NOT AS CLEAR- CUT, HOWEVER. WE DID NOT KNOW IF WE HAD HIT SOMETHING, A BOMB EXPLODED, OR SIMPLY LOST AN AIR CONDITIONER. WITH THE ENG AT IDLE, WITHIN NORMAL PARAMETERS AND A RELATIVELY SHORT PATTERN, WE ELECTED TO LAND WITH 2 ENGS RUNNING USING A SINGLE ENG CONFIGN. ISOLATING THE ENG AFTER LNDG WAS A PRECAUTION TO ELIMINATE THAT AREA OF CONCERN. WE WERE STILL NOT COMPLETELY SURE WHAT ALL HAD GONE WRONG. INSPECTION AT THE BLOCKS CONFIRMED THAT THE R ENG NEEDED TO BE CHANGED. ACTIONS: WE ELECTED THE SHORT PATTERN AND LNDG SINCE THE ACFT SEEMED TO BE FLYABLE. WE CHOSE TO HAVE THE TROUBLESHOOTING TAKE PLACE ON THE GND BY COMPETENT MAINT PERSONNEL WHO COULD BETTER EXAMINE THE ACFT EXTERIOR. FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN PERFORMANCE: ABNORMAL SITS REQUIRING MANY ACTIONS IN A SHORT TIME PERIOD IS DIFFICULT. ATC, CREW, OPS AND PAX ALL NEED TO BE INFORMED. THE PLTS NEED TO SAFELY RETURN THE ACFT TO THE GND. WE ELECTED TO 'SLOW THE PROCESS DOWN' AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE DURING A SHORT RETURN. THE RESULT WAS NO HASTY DECISIONS, A FOCUS ON RETURNING A FLYABLE ACFT, MAINTAINING COCKPIT CREW COORD, AND CERTAINLY NO LOSS OF LIFE. MY ONLY REGRET WAS NOT BEING ABLE TO INFORM THE FLT ATTENDANTS BETTER BEFORE LNDG. I FEEL THERE WAS NO NEED FOR EVAC BUT IT WOULD HAVE HELPED TO KNOW THAT SO THEY COULD MENTALLY PREPARE FOR THAT NON EVENT. AFTER LNDG, WE DID APPRISE THE PAX AND DEBRIEFED THE CREW. ONCE WE KNEW THE RESULTS OF THE GND INSPECTION, ONLY THEN DID I INFORM THEM OF WHAT HAD ACTUALLY GONE WRONG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.