Narrative:

On descent into sea, things were normal until time to configure for landing. At that time, we received a trailing edge flaps disagree EICAS and associated light when flaps 5 degrees were selected. The flaps indicated 1 degree. I requested vectors off the intercept heading we were on, so that we could deal with the problem. We executed the procedure in the pom. This called for the use of a bug +30 KTS as the final approach speed. As we were responding to vectors, we subsequently received an intermittent leading edge flaps disagree EICAS and light. This procedure called for the use of trailing edge flaps to 20 degrees. Obviously, this was not our current circumstance, since the trailing edge flaps would not extend. At this point, I called the 'a' line to the cockpit to have her prepare for any eventuality on landing. I told her that I expected no problem during the approach and landing, but considered preparation in the event things didn't go as planned as the only prudent course. I subsequently made a PA to the same effect and cautioned the passenger to respond immediately to the direction of my crew in the event that things did not go as planned. I reassured them of the highly likely positive outcome of this event, but told them that if I were to err, I intended to err on the side of their safety. While attempting to slow to the pre-calculated bug speed (128+30), we received stick shaker. I immediately corrected power and accelerated from 168 to 175 KIAS. To say that this was disconcerting is an understatement. Nothing in the book had prepared us for this eventuality. I elected to fly the approach at 175 KIAS minimum. I advised approach, and subsequently tower, then I believed that we possibly would be landing no flap and gave them our approach speed. Crash fire rescue equipment adjusted their setup on the runway to compensate for our higher approach speed-very sharp tower operators. The approach and landing was conducted with autobrakes set to maximum and reverse used early and vigorously. Passing 100 KIAS with over half the runway to go, I secured the autobrakes and completed an uneventful rollout and taxi to the gate. Note: tire temperatures never exceeded 3's, with the majority of tires at 2. Both the passenger and the crash crew were advised of the successful outcome. Crash fire rescue equipment followed us to the gate, per their SOP. Things to note: 1) ship xyz was just out of a heavy maintenance visit. I suspect that something was not done properly regarding the flaps. Otherwise, there is no explanation for the discrepancies we encountered. I am very curious about the resolution and causes found. It would be comforting to know that some other crew won't have this same experience. 2) it would have been helpful if the book at least indicated the possibility of the aircraft being no flap, given the compound indications we received. The flaps indicator was solidly on #1 throughout this evolution. This gave us the patently false indication of leading edge flap deployment. Stick shaker saved the day. The procedures need to reflect this, stating that if stick shaker activates, respect it, and refer to the no flap landing procedure. When this happens with the body clock on 5 am, it would really help to get tired minds on the right page and procedure, with the right airspeed additives. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was a B767-200 and the trailing edge flaps would not extend and the flap indicator was at a solid '1' and should have indicated that the leading edge devices were extended to the takeoff position. The reporter said the speed was set to landing with the leading edge devices at the position '1' setting until the stall warning stick shaker activated and the speed was increased. The reporter stated there was no reference in the performance and operations manual on no flap operation. The reporter said maintenance reported the cause was possibly a lubrication problem in the leading edge power drive units. The reporter stated lubrication did not appear to be the cause.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-200 ON APCH AT 3000 FT DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO THE TRAILING EDGE FLAP AND LEADING EDGE SLAT FAILURE IN THE RETRACT POS. ACFT LANDED WITH FLAPS RETRACTED.

Narrative: ON DSCNT INTO SEA, THINGS WERE NORMAL UNTIL TIME TO CONFIGURE FOR LNDG. AT THAT TIME, WE RECEIVED A TRAILING EDGE FLAPS DISAGREE EICAS AND ASSOCIATED LIGHT WHEN FLAPS 5 DEGS WERE SELECTED. THE FLAPS INDICATED 1 DEG. I REQUESTED VECTORS OFF THE INTERCEPT HEADING WE WERE ON, SO THAT WE COULD DEAL WITH THE PROB. WE EXECUTED THE PROC IN THE POM. THIS CALLED FOR THE USE OF A BUG +30 KTS AS THE FINAL APCH SPD. AS WE WERE RESPONDING TO VECTORS, WE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED AN INTERMITTENT LEADING EDGE FLAPS DISAGREE EICAS AND LIGHT. THIS PROC CALLED FOR THE USE OF TRAILING EDGE FLAPS TO 20 DEGS. OBVIOUSLY, THIS WAS NOT OUR CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCE, SINCE THE TRAILING EDGE FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND. AT THIS POINT, I CALLED THE 'A' LINE TO THE COCKPIT TO HAVE HER PREPARE FOR ANY EVENTUALITY ON LNDG. I TOLD HER THAT I EXPECTED NO PROB DURING THE APCH AND LNDG, BUT CONSIDERED PREPARATION IN THE EVENT THINGS DIDN'T GO AS PLANNED AS THE ONLY PRUDENT COURSE. I SUBSEQUENTLY MADE A PA TO THE SAME EFFECT AND CAUTIONED THE PAX TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO THE DIRECTION OF MY CREW IN THE EVENT THAT THINGS DID NOT GO AS PLANNED. I REASSURED THEM OF THE HIGHLY LIKELY POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THIS EVENT, BUT TOLD THEM THAT IF I WERE TO ERR, I INTENDED TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF THEIR SAFETY. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO SLOW TO THE PRE-CALCULATED BUG SPD (128+30), WE RECEIVED STICK SHAKER. I IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED PWR AND ACCELERATED FROM 168 TO 175 KIAS. TO SAY THAT THIS WAS DISCONCERTING IS AN UNDERSTATEMENT. NOTHING IN THE BOOK HAD PREPARED US FOR THIS EVENTUALITY. I ELECTED TO FLY THE APCH AT 175 KIAS MINIMUM. I ADVISED APCH, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TWR, THEN I BELIEVED THAT WE POSSIBLY WOULD BE LNDG NO FLAP AND GAVE THEM OUR APCH SPD. CFR ADJUSTED THEIR SETUP ON THE RWY TO COMPENSATE FOR OUR HIGHER APCH SPD-VERY SHARP TWR OPERATORS. THE APCH AND LNDG WAS CONDUCTED WITH AUTOBRAKES SET TO MAX AND REVERSE USED EARLY AND VIGOROUSLY. PASSING 100 KIAS WITH OVER HALF THE RWY TO GO, I SECURED THE AUTOBRAKES AND COMPLETED AN UNEVENTFUL ROLLOUT AND TAXI TO THE GATE. NOTE: TIRE TEMPS NEVER EXCEEDED 3'S, WITH THE MAJORITY OF TIRES AT 2. BOTH THE PAX AND THE CRASH CREW WERE ADVISED OF THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. CFR FOLLOWED US TO THE GATE, PER THEIR SOP. THINGS TO NOTE: 1) SHIP XYZ WAS JUST OUT OF A HVY MAINT VISIT. I SUSPECT THAT SOMETHING WAS NOT DONE PROPERLY REGARDING THE FLAPS. OTHERWISE, THERE IS NO EXPLANATION FOR THE DISCREPANCIES WE ENCOUNTERED. I AM VERY CURIOUS ABOUT THE RESOLUTION AND CAUSES FOUND. IT WOULD BE COMFORTING TO KNOW THAT SOME OTHER CREW WON'T HAVE THIS SAME EXPERIENCE. 2) IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IF THE BOOK AT LEAST INDICATED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ACFT BEING NO FLAP, GIVEN THE COMPOUND INDICATIONS WE RECEIVED. THE FLAPS INDICATOR WAS SOLIDLY ON #1 THROUGHOUT THIS EVOLUTION. THIS GAVE US THE PATENTLY FALSE INDICATION OF LEADING EDGE FLAP DEPLOYMENT. STICK SHAKER SAVED THE DAY. THE PROCS NEED TO REFLECT THIS, STATING THAT IF STICK SHAKER ACTIVATES, RESPECT IT, AND REFER TO THE NO FLAP LNDG PROC. WHEN THIS HAPPENS WITH THE BODY CLOCK ON 5 AM, IT WOULD REALLY HELP TO GET TIRED MINDS ON THE RIGHT PAGE AND PROC, WITH THE RIGHT AIRSPD ADDITIVES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A B767-200 AND THE TRAILING EDGE FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND AND THE FLAP INDICATOR WAS AT A SOLID '1' AND SHOULD HAVE INDICATED THAT THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES WERE EXTENDED TO THE TKOF POS. THE RPTR SAID THE SPD WAS SET TO LNDG WITH THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES AT THE POS '1' SETTING UNTIL THE STALL WARNING STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED AND THE SPD WAS INCREASED. THE RPTR STATED THERE WAS NO REF IN THE PERFORMANCE AND OPS MANUAL ON NO FLAP OP. THE RPTR SAID MAINT RPTED THE CAUSE WAS POSSIBLY A LUBRICATION PROB IN THE LEADING EDGE PWR DRIVE UNITS. THE RPTR STATED LUBRICATION DID NOT APPEAR TO BE THE CAUSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.