GC1 arriving aircraft conflicts with departing traffic in sgr airspace.

Attributes
ACN	415650
Time
Date	199809
Day	Sat
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : sgr
State Reference	TX
Altitude	msl bound lower : 700 msl bound upper : 700
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : sgr
Operator	general aviation : personal
Make Model Name	Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	approach : straight in
Flight Plan	None
Aircraft 2
Make Model Name	Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part	other : unknown
Flight Phase	climbout : initial
Person 1
Affiliation	Other
Function	other personnel other
Qualification	pilot : private pilot : instrument
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 40 flight time total : 3000 flight time type : 600
ASRS Report	415650
Person 2
Affiliation	Other
Function	flight crew : single pilot
Qualification	pilot : private
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : less severe conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : clearance
Independent Detector	other controllera other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance other
Consequence	Other
Miss Distance	horizontal : 1000 vertical : 500
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Pilot was flying a practice ILS approach to runway 35 in VMC 'under the hood.' active runway was runway 17. I was acting as safety pilot in 2-SEAT single engine aircraft. The approach was flown out of a holding pattern at the FAF. The tower controller at the airport had instructed the pilot to report leaving hold. Pilot announced leaving hold and proceeded inbound on the ILS. No response from the controller, but at the time there was ongoing controller communications with an aircraft shooting touch-and-goes and another aircraft preparing to depart. Pilot reported inbound and the FAF. Again, no response from the controller, but continued heavy radio traffic with other aircraft. As pilot continued inbound on the ILS approach, the controller cleared an aircraft to depart on runway 17. Given our position on the approach this did not seem right and I brought this to the attention of the pilot. I then observed that the aircraft shooting touch-and-goes was climbing out toward us and instructed the pilot to break off his approach to the east to avoid the climbing aircraft. Just afterwards, the controller saw our aircraft, instructed the climbing aircraft to turn west and instructed the aircraft that had been cleared for departure to abort his takeoff run. The controller reprimanded my pilot for proceeding inbound without radio contact. When my pilot attempted to reply it was clear that his radio was receiving but not transmitting. After several transmission attempts, it was discovered that there was an intermittent problem with the push-to-talk switch on his radio. This conflict resulted from a combination of an equipment problem (push-to-talk switch failure) and human error (failure to ensure proper communications). The pilot should have ensured that the controller acknowledged his position reports (although at the time this lapse did not seem alarming due to the busy radio traffic). Enough time had elapsed since the last controller communications that the controller (knowing the pilots intentions) should probably have called the pilot to check on his situation. The safety pilot system worked well to avoid a more serious problem, although in retrospect the safety pilot should have played a more active role in monitoring the communication situation.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GC1 ARRIVING ACFT CONFLICTS WITH DEPARTING TFC IN SGR AIRSPACE.

Narrative: PLT WAS FLYING A PRACTICE ILS APCH TO RWY 35 IN VMC 'UNDER THE HOOD.' ACTIVE RWY WAS RWY 17. I WAS ACTING AS SAFETY PLT IN 2-SEAT SINGLE ENG ACFT. THE APCH WAS FLOWN OUT OF A HOLDING PATTERN AT THE FAF. THE TWR CTLR AT THE ARPT HAD INSTRUCTED THE PLT TO RPT LEAVING HOLD. PLT ANNOUNCED LEAVING HOLD AND PROCEEDED INBOUND ON THE ILS. NO RESPONSE FROM THE CTLR, BUT AT THE TIME THERE WAS ONGOING CTLR COMS WITH AN ACFT SHOOTING TOUCH-AND-GOES AND ANOTHER ACFT PREPARING TO DEPART. PLT RPTED INBOUND AND THE FAF. AGAIN, NO RESPONSE FROM THE CTLR, BUT CONTINUED HVY RADIO TFC WITH OTHER ACFT. AS PLT CONTINUED INBOUND ON THE ILS APCH, THE CTLR CLRED AN ACFT TO DEPART ON RWY 17. GIVEN OUR POS ON THE APCH THIS DID NOT SEEM RIGHT AND I BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTN OF THE PLT. I THEN OBSERVED THAT THE ACFT SHOOTING TOUCH-AND-GOES WAS CLBING OUT TOWARD US AND INSTRUCTED THE PLT TO BREAK OFF HIS APCH TO THE E TO AVOID THE CLBING ACFT. JUST AFTERWARDS, THE CTLR SAW OUR ACFT, INSTRUCTED THE CLBING ACFT TO TURN W AND INSTRUCTED THE ACFT THAT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR DEP TO ABORT HIS TKOF RUN. THE CTLR REPRIMANDED MY PLT FOR PROCEEDING INBOUND WITHOUT RADIO CONTACT. WHEN MY PLT ATTEMPTED TO REPLY IT WAS CLR THAT HIS RADIO WAS RECEIVING BUT NOT XMITTING. AFTER SEVERAL XMISSION ATTEMPTS, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS AN INTERMITTENT PROB WITH THE PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH ON HIS RADIO. THIS CONFLICT RESULTED FROM A COMBINATION OF AN EQUIP PROB (PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH FAILURE) AND HUMAN ERROR (FAILURE TO ENSURE PROPER COMS). THE PLT SHOULD HAVE ENSURED THAT THE CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED HIS POS RPTS (ALTHOUGH AT THE TIME THIS LAPSE DID NOT SEEM ALARMING DUE TO THE BUSY RADIO TFC). ENOUGH TIME HAD ELAPSED SINCE THE LAST CTLR COMS THAT THE CTLR (KNOWING THE PLTS INTENTIONS) SHOULD PROBABLY HAVE CALLED THE PLT TO CHK ON HIS SIT. THE SAFETY PLT SYS WORKED WELL TO AVOID A MORE SERIOUS PROB, ALTHOUGH IN RETROSPECT THE SAFETY PLT SHOULD HAVE PLAYED A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN MONITORING THE COM SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.