Narrative:

En route for landing at san, we were being vectored for approach by socal on 125.3 MHZ. Our heading was approximately 120 degrees. We noticed a target on our TCASII 1 mi north at 2000 ft above us. Socal asked if we could see an air carrier B737 at the same place as the target on our TCASII. We reported 'looking.' my captain told socal that we were slowing, and that we could take a visual approach in front of the B737 (in order to avoid wake turbulence). With no reply to our request, socal told us to turn to 090 degrees. My captain called the B737 in sight (since we had slowed, the B737 was now in front of us by approximately 2 NM) and expressed concern for wake turbulence if we were to turn to 090 degrees. Socal descended the B737 to 5000 ft, and then insisted that we turn to 090 degrees. My captain delayed the turn and again expressed concern for wake turbulence. Socal said that if we had a problem he would give us a phone number to call. We copied the phone number. During the turn to 090 degrees, we hit wake turbulence. When socal gave us a frequency change, we advised them that we had hit wake turbulence, and that we would include that in our 'report.' due to our schedule and activities in san, we were unable to make a phone call to socal. I believe that all involved, pilots and controllers, acted unprofessionally, and that this wake turbulence encounter could have been avoided if all parties had worked together instead of against each other. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first officer stated that perhaps the controller might have been more considerate of the PIC's request had the captain shown more tact in his request for being #1 aircraft. The captain was a bit harsh and too direct, a sort of 'in your face' approach that turned the approach controller 'off.' the B737 was about 6 mi from the trailing aircraft, turned to the east heading for the high downwind leg for san runway 27. The captain was known to this first officer as being 'hot headed' about wake turbulence and sometimes turning to headings other than that given for 'wake turbulence' separation. This occurred more than one time and was usually associated with frequency congestion sits where the PIC could not make a request. The first officer volunteered the feeling, which agreed with the analyst's thoughts, that the PIC would have been better served had he simply declared an emergency for his heading deviation. The first officer feels that the definition of wake turbulence might be better defined as to the acceptable levels that the crew and the aircraft might sustain before the term or condition reaches a catastrophic value. This, in turn, might better place a limitation on the distance actually created between aircraft and the expected levels of turbulence.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB120 FO'S RPT ON ENCOUNTERING WAKE TURB BEHIND A B737 WHILE ON RADAR VECTORS INTO SAN. THE PIC HAD DELAYED HIS VECTORED TURN IN TRAIL BEHIND THE B737 BECAUSE OF CONCERN OVER THEIR PROX TO THE PRECEDING B737. APCH CTLR DIDN'T SEEM CONCERNED ABOUT THE IN TRAIL SETUP.

Narrative: ENRTE FOR LNDG AT SAN, WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR APCH BY SOCAL ON 125.3 MHZ. OUR HDG WAS APPROX 120 DEGS. WE NOTICED A TARGET ON OUR TCASII 1 MI N AT 2000 FT ABOVE US. SOCAL ASKED IF WE COULD SEE AN ACR B737 AT THE SAME PLACE AS THE TARGET ON OUR TCASII. WE RPTED 'LOOKING.' MY CAPT TOLD SOCAL THAT WE WERE SLOWING, AND THAT WE COULD TAKE A VISUAL APCH IN FRONT OF THE B737 (IN ORDER TO AVOID WAKE TURB). WITH NO REPLY TO OUR REQUEST, SOCAL TOLD US TO TURN TO 090 DEGS. MY CAPT CALLED THE B737 IN SIGHT (SINCE WE HAD SLOWED, THE B737 WAS NOW IN FRONT OF US BY APPROX 2 NM) AND EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR WAKE TURB IF WE WERE TO TURN TO 090 DEGS. SOCAL DSNDED THE B737 TO 5000 FT, AND THEN INSISTED THAT WE TURN TO 090 DEGS. MY CAPT DELAYED THE TURN AND AGAIN EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR WAKE TURB. SOCAL SAID THAT IF WE HAD A PROB HE WOULD GIVE US A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL. WE COPIED THE PHONE NUMBER. DURING THE TURN TO 090 DEGS, WE HIT WAKE TURB. WHEN SOCAL GAVE US A FREQ CHANGE, WE ADVISED THEM THAT WE HAD HIT WAKE TURB, AND THAT WE WOULD INCLUDE THAT IN OUR 'RPT.' DUE TO OUR SCHEDULE AND ACTIVITIES IN SAN, WE WERE UNABLE TO MAKE A PHONE CALL TO SOCAL. I BELIEVE THAT ALL INVOLVED, PLTS AND CTLRS, ACTED UNPROFESSIONALLY, AND THAT THIS WAKE TURB ENCOUNTER COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF ALL PARTIES HAD WORKED TOGETHER INSTEAD OF AGAINST EACH OTHER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO STATED THAT PERHAPS THE CTLR MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE CONSIDERATE OF THE PIC'S REQUEST HAD THE CAPT SHOWN MORE TACT IN HIS REQUEST FOR BEING #1 ACFT. THE CAPT WAS A BIT HARSH AND TOO DIRECT, A SORT OF 'IN YOUR FACE' APCH THAT TURNED THE APCH CTLR 'OFF.' THE B737 WAS ABOUT 6 MI FROM THE TRAILING ACFT, TURNED TO THE E HDG FOR THE HIGH DOWNWIND LEG FOR SAN RWY 27. THE CAPT WAS KNOWN TO THIS FO AS BEING 'HOT HEADED' ABOUT WAKE TURB AND SOMETIMES TURNING TO HDGS OTHER THAN THAT GIVEN FOR 'WAKE TURB' SEPARATION. THIS OCCURRED MORE THAN ONE TIME AND WAS USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH FREQ CONGESTION SITS WHERE THE PIC COULD NOT MAKE A REQUEST. THE FO VOLUNTEERED THE FEELING, WHICH AGREED WITH THE ANALYST'S THOUGHTS, THAT THE PIC WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER SERVED HAD HE SIMPLY DECLARED AN EMER FOR HIS HDG DEV. THE FO FEELS THAT THE DEFINITION OF WAKE TURB MIGHT BE BETTER DEFINED AS TO THE ACCEPTABLE LEVELS THAT THE CREW AND THE ACFT MIGHT SUSTAIN BEFORE THE TERM OR CONDITION REACHES A CATASTROPHIC VALUE. THIS, IN TURN, MIGHT BETTER PLACE A LIMITATION ON THE DISTANCE ACTUALLY CREATED BTWN ACFT AND THE EXPECTED LEVELS OF TURB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.