Narrative:

I scheduled the rental (PA28-181) from FBO at essex county airport. FBO's policy is that if a rental plane is not back on the flight line by XX00 the next morning, there will be a minimum 3.5 hour charge for that day. I was strictly advised that the plane was scheduled for rental on sunday morning, and was threatened with heavy financial penalties if I was at all late. Saturday evening I departed cdw for hvn where I picked up 2 passenger. I continued to msv, where the 3 of us were visiting my sister. Flight conditions throughout were excellent VFR and were forecast to remain that way for the rest of the weekend. On sunday morning I returned to the airport with 1 passenger. Dawn had just broken, and a thick fog was blanketing the area. I preflted the plane, but decided not to takeoff due to the fog. Later the fog appeared to be lifting, and I estimated ground visibility to have improved to 3-4 mi. Because the forecast the day before had predicted good VFR WX, I assumed that I was looking at radiation fog from the night before and decided that it was likely to burn off in the rising sun. The field at msv is 1400 ft MSL, while cdw is at 174 MSL. Since I would land at a lower elevation and later in the day, I thought that the fog was likely to be gone by the time I got to cdw. I felt immense pressure to get the plane back to cdw by XA00 -- it would cost me a lot of money and being yelled at if I didn't. I allowed that thought to consume me during the night and in the morning. I forgot entirely to obtain a WX briefing, and it had been made clear to me by the owner of the FBO that requesting an authority/authorized to return the plane late was not an option. Under these conditions, I made the nearly fatal mistake of deciding to fly directly back to cdw. I took off with 1 passenger from msv and climbed out to 2500 ft MSL on direct heading to the hugenot VOR. Visibility during the climb was a few mi in fog, but around 2000 ft MSL (600 ft AGL) we cleared the top of the fog and visibility was virtually unlimited. This reinforced my belief that the fog was burning off, and that it was probably confined to the higher terrain. We flew in good visibility, though without ground contact, to hugenot where we picked up the 165 degree radial from the VOR. After approximately 10 mins visibility began to decline markedly, and I decided to alter course to the sparta VOR, where I hoped to be able to orient myself towards cdw. As we came to sparta VOR visibility on top was again very good, and I was able to see the VOR antenna on the top of a hill very clearly. The valleys all around were still blanketed in a thick fog, and I was unable to identify any terrain features beyond the area of the VOR. I began to circle the VOR while I contacted the cdw tower. They advised me that the airport was in solid IMC, and that no special VFR descent was possible. After determining that I was not IFR-rated, they advised me to contact N90 for assistance. Approach advised that they could vector me to stewart international or to duchess county airports. I decided that if I had to head back, I might as well head back to my sister's house where I could wait out the WX. Since both stewart and poughkeepsie are fairly close to white lake, I guessed that the WX would be the acceptable at msv. I told approach that I would return to sullivan county, and obtained flight following from them. I tracked back to msv using the sparta and hugenot vors, and as I neared the airport approach asked me if I had it in sight. I said that I was unsure, and they told me that I was very close to it. The fog had thickened considerably since my departure, and my ground contact was sporadic. In a moment, though, I thought that I saw the runway through a hole in the fog, and I advised approach that I had the airport in sight. They terminated radar service, and I descended through the hole. At around 2300 ft MSL I realized that what I had seen had not been the airport, and that the base of the fog was very low. I tried looking everywhere for the airport, and was struggling with extreme spatial disorientation and increasing tension. I continued to descend to 2000 ft MSL, where I was able to see the ground for about 1/2 mi around me. After a few mins, I contacted approach and told them that I'd been wrong about identing the airport. They advised me to climb so that they could get me on radar. I climbed to 3500 ft MSL through thick fog, again struggling with extreme spatial disorientation and flying on instruments alone. At 2700 ft MSL I broke through the tops of the fog, and approach was able to assign me a transponder code. They vectored me back to the airport, and again I had to descend very low to see the ground. I searched the area for quite some time around 2000 ft MSL (600 ft AGL) before finding the runway. I announced my position and intentions over the CTAF. Visibility at this point was so poor that I lost sight of the airport when I went into a low downwind for runway 15. I announced that I was aborting the pattern and making a short approach for runway 34. I passed low over the airport, and circled into a short left traffic landing on runway 34. There was no other traffic in the pattern. After I called FBO to explain the situation, I obtained periodic WX briefings until flight conditions improved. In excellent VFR late that afternoon, I took my 2 passenger back to hvn, and then returned to cdw without further incident. Analysis: I made several critical mistakes. First, I hadn't developed a contingency plan if WX prevented me from returning, nor had I discussed that possibility with the FBO. Second, I forgot to obtain a WX briefing immediately before my flight. Third, I allowed financial pressure to affect my go/no go decision, with the result that I made that decision very poorly. I feel that my flight training did not adequately address the intricacies of the decision making process. No one really talked to me at any length about the ways in which financial pressure, anxious passenger, and time pressure can affect the decision to takeoff. Flying with a ppl is different than flying solo as a student, and there is no mechanism in place to assist in the transition. My suggestion is that some formal communication between the CFI and the pilot be maintained in the period immediately following the issuance of the license, and that that communication relate to each flight. Furthermore, the FBO made no effort to inform me of any existing policies about late returns due to WX. I was badgered and bullied about getting the plane back on time, and was convinced that no alternative was possible. This was absolutely the most important factor that affected my decision making process. My suggestion here is that an FBO renting aircraft overnight be obliged to brief the renter on contingency policies for bad WX, and that such FBO's be prevented from penalizing pilots who decide for any reason that it is unsafe to comply with their rental policies. There were a few things which I feel saved my life that day. Foremost, new york approach control remained calm, friendly, and extraordinarily helpful throughout the flight. The feeling that I had friends helping me by monitoring my position and guarding me from traffic was immensely reassuring. Second, the FAA requirement for hood time (simulated IMC) during private pilot training gave me the skills and the confidence that I needed to deal with my flight into IMC. These skills allowed me to recognize spatial disorientation, and gave me a concrete plan of action to deal with it. Third, I was fortunate to have a passenger who made no demands on me during the flight. He remained calm and silent, keeping his apprehensions and tension to himself until we were safely on the ground. If he had required my reassurances or explanations in-flight, I fear that the distraction would have dramatically increased the danger that we were in.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF A PA28-181 INADVERTENTLY FLIES INTO MARGINAL WX. HE CONTACTS APCH AND IS VECTORED TO A NEARBY ARPT. HE ENTERS IMC.

Narrative: I SCHEDULED THE RENTAL (PA28-181) FROM FBO AT ESSEX COUNTY ARPT. FBO'S POLICY IS THAT IF A RENTAL PLANE IS NOT BACK ON THE FLT LINE BY XX00 THE NEXT MORNING, THERE WILL BE A MINIMUM 3.5 HR CHARGE FOR THAT DAY. I WAS STRICTLY ADVISED THAT THE PLANE WAS SCHEDULED FOR RENTAL ON SUNDAY MORNING, AND WAS THREATENED WITH HVY FINANCIAL PENALTIES IF I WAS AT ALL LATE. SATURDAY EVENING I DEPARTED CDW FOR HVN WHERE I PICKED UP 2 PAX. I CONTINUED TO MSV, WHERE THE 3 OF US WERE VISITING MY SISTER. FLT CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT WERE EXCELLENT VFR AND WERE FORECAST TO REMAIN THAT WAY FOR THE REST OF THE WEEKEND. ON SUNDAY MORNING I RETURNED TO THE ARPT WITH 1 PAX. DAWN HAD JUST BROKEN, AND A THICK FOG WAS BLANKETING THE AREA. I PREFLTED THE PLANE, BUT DECIDED NOT TO TKOF DUE TO THE FOG. LATER THE FOG APPEARED TO BE LIFTING, AND I ESTIMATED GND VISIBILITY TO HAVE IMPROVED TO 3-4 MI. BECAUSE THE FORECAST THE DAY BEFORE HAD PREDICTED GOOD VFR WX, I ASSUMED THAT I WAS LOOKING AT RADIATION FOG FROM THE NIGHT BEFORE AND DECIDED THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO BURN OFF IN THE RISING SUN. THE FIELD AT MSV IS 1400 FT MSL, WHILE CDW IS AT 174 MSL. SINCE I WOULD LAND AT A LOWER ELEVATION AND LATER IN THE DAY, I THOUGHT THAT THE FOG WAS LIKELY TO BE GONE BY THE TIME I GOT TO CDW. I FELT IMMENSE PRESSURE TO GET THE PLANE BACK TO CDW BY XA00 -- IT WOULD COST ME A LOT OF MONEY AND BEING YELLED AT IF I DIDN'T. I ALLOWED THAT THOUGHT TO CONSUME ME DURING THE NIGHT AND IN THE MORNING. I FORGOT ENTIRELY TO OBTAIN A WX BRIEFING, AND IT HAD BEEN MADE CLR TO ME BY THE OWNER OF THE FBO THAT REQUESTING AN AUTH TO RETURN THE PLANE LATE WAS NOT AN OPTION. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, I MADE THE NEARLY FATAL MISTAKE OF DECIDING TO FLY DIRECTLY BACK TO CDW. I TOOK OFF WITH 1 PAX FROM MSV AND CLBED OUT TO 2500 FT MSL ON DIRECT HDG TO THE HUGENOT VOR. VISIBILITY DURING THE CLB WAS A FEW MI IN FOG, BUT AROUND 2000 FT MSL (600 FT AGL) WE CLRED THE TOP OF THE FOG AND VISIBILITY WAS VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED. THIS REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT THE FOG WAS BURNING OFF, AND THAT IT WAS PROBABLY CONFINED TO THE HIGHER TERRAIN. WE FLEW IN GOOD VISIBILITY, THOUGH WITHOUT GND CONTACT, TO HUGENOT WHERE WE PICKED UP THE 165 DEG RADIAL FROM THE VOR. AFTER APPROX 10 MINS VISIBILITY BEGAN TO DECLINE MARKEDLY, AND I DECIDED TO ALTER COURSE TO THE SPARTA VOR, WHERE I HOPED TO BE ABLE TO ORIENT MYSELF TOWARDS CDW. AS WE CAME TO SPARTA VOR VISIBILITY ON TOP WAS AGAIN VERY GOOD, AND I WAS ABLE TO SEE THE VOR ANTENNA ON THE TOP OF A HILL VERY CLRLY. THE VALLEYS ALL AROUND WERE STILL BLANKETED IN A THICK FOG, AND I WAS UNABLE TO IDENT ANY TERRAIN FEATURES BEYOND THE AREA OF THE VOR. I BEGAN TO CIRCLE THE VOR WHILE I CONTACTED THE CDW TWR. THEY ADVISED ME THAT THE ARPT WAS IN SOLID IMC, AND THAT NO SPECIAL VFR DSCNT WAS POSSIBLE. AFTER DETERMINING THAT I WAS NOT IFR-RATED, THEY ADVISED ME TO CONTACT N90 FOR ASSISTANCE. APCH ADVISED THAT THEY COULD VECTOR ME TO STEWART INTL OR TO DUCHESS COUNTY ARPTS. I DECIDED THAT IF I HAD TO HEAD BACK, I MIGHT AS WELL HEAD BACK TO MY SISTER'S HOUSE WHERE I COULD WAIT OUT THE WX. SINCE BOTH STEWART AND POUGHKEEPSIE ARE FAIRLY CLOSE TO WHITE LAKE, I GUESSED THAT THE WX WOULD BE THE ACCEPTABLE AT MSV. I TOLD APCH THAT I WOULD RETURN TO SULLIVAN COUNTY, AND OBTAINED FLT FOLLOWING FROM THEM. I TRACKED BACK TO MSV USING THE SPARTA AND HUGENOT VORS, AND AS I NEARED THE ARPT APCH ASKED ME IF I HAD IT IN SIGHT. I SAID THAT I WAS UNSURE, AND THEY TOLD ME THAT I WAS VERY CLOSE TO IT. THE FOG HAD THICKENED CONSIDERABLY SINCE MY DEP, AND MY GND CONTACT WAS SPORADIC. IN A MOMENT, THOUGH, I THOUGHT THAT I SAW THE RWY THROUGH A HOLE IN THE FOG, AND I ADVISED APCH THAT I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. THEY TERMINATED RADAR SVC, AND I DSNDED THROUGH THE HOLE. AT AROUND 2300 FT MSL I REALIZED THAT WHAT I HAD SEEN HAD NOT BEEN THE ARPT, AND THAT THE BASE OF THE FOG WAS VERY LOW. I TRIED LOOKING EVERYWHERE FOR THE ARPT, AND WAS STRUGGLING WITH EXTREME SPATIAL DISORIENTATION AND INCREASING TENSION. I CONTINUED TO DSND TO 2000 FT MSL, WHERE I WAS ABLE TO SEE THE GND FOR ABOUT 1/2 MI AROUND ME. AFTER A FEW MINS, I CONTACTED APCH AND TOLD THEM THAT I'D BEEN WRONG ABOUT IDENTING THE ARPT. THEY ADVISED ME TO CLB SO THAT THEY COULD GET ME ON RADAR. I CLBED TO 3500 FT MSL THROUGH THICK FOG, AGAIN STRUGGLING WITH EXTREME SPATIAL DISORIENTATION AND FLYING ON INSTS ALONE. AT 2700 FT MSL I BROKE THROUGH THE TOPS OF THE FOG, AND APCH WAS ABLE TO ASSIGN ME A XPONDER CODE. THEY VECTORED ME BACK TO THE ARPT, AND AGAIN I HAD TO DSND VERY LOW TO SEE THE GND. I SEARCHED THE AREA FOR QUITE SOME TIME AROUND 2000 FT MSL (600 FT AGL) BEFORE FINDING THE RWY. I ANNOUNCED MY POS AND INTENTIONS OVER THE CTAF. VISIBILITY AT THIS POINT WAS SO POOR THAT I LOST SIGHT OF THE ARPT WHEN I WENT INTO A LOW DOWNWIND FOR RWY 15. I ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS ABORTING THE PATTERN AND MAKING A SHORT APCH FOR RWY 34. I PASSED LOW OVER THE ARPT, AND CIRCLED INTO A SHORT L TFC LNDG ON RWY 34. THERE WAS NO OTHER TFC IN THE PATTERN. AFTER I CALLED FBO TO EXPLAIN THE SIT, I OBTAINED PERIODIC WX BRIEFINGS UNTIL FLT CONDITIONS IMPROVED. IN EXCELLENT VFR LATE THAT AFTERNOON, I TOOK MY 2 PAX BACK TO HVN, AND THEN RETURNED TO CDW WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ANALYSIS: I MADE SEVERAL CRITICAL MISTAKES. FIRST, I HADN'T DEVELOPED A CONTINGENCY PLAN IF WX PREVENTED ME FROM RETURNING, NOR HAD I DISCUSSED THAT POSSIBILITY WITH THE FBO. SECOND, I FORGOT TO OBTAIN A WX BRIEFING IMMEDIATELY BEFORE MY FLT. THIRD, I ALLOWED FINANCIAL PRESSURE TO AFFECT MY GO/NO GO DECISION, WITH THE RESULT THAT I MADE THAT DECISION VERY POORLY. I FEEL THAT MY FLT TRAINING DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE INTRICACIES OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. NO ONE REALLY TALKED TO ME AT ANY LENGTH ABOUT THE WAYS IN WHICH FINANCIAL PRESSURE, ANXIOUS PAX, AND TIME PRESSURE CAN AFFECT THE DECISION TO TKOF. FLYING WITH A PPL IS DIFFERENT THAN FLYING SOLO AS A STUDENT, AND THERE IS NO MECHANISM IN PLACE TO ASSIST IN THE TRANSITION. MY SUGGESTION IS THAT SOME FORMAL COM BTWN THE CFI AND THE PLT BE MAINTAINED IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE LICENSE, AND THAT THAT COM RELATE TO EACH FLT. FURTHERMORE, THE FBO MADE NO EFFORT TO INFORM ME OF ANY EXISTING POLICIES ABOUT LATE RETURNS DUE TO WX. I WAS BADGERED AND BULLIED ABOUT GETTING THE PLANE BACK ON TIME, AND WAS CONVINCED THAT NO ALTERNATIVE WAS POSSIBLE. THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR THAT AFFECTED MY DECISION MAKING PROCESS. MY SUGGESTION HERE IS THAT AN FBO RENTING ACFT OVERNIGHT BE OBLIGED TO BRIEF THE RENTER ON CONTINGENCY POLICIES FOR BAD WX, AND THAT SUCH FBO'S BE PREVENTED FROM PENALIZING PLTS WHO DECIDE FOR ANY REASON THAT IT IS UNSAFE TO COMPLY WITH THEIR RENTAL POLICIES. THERE WERE A FEW THINGS WHICH I FEEL SAVED MY LIFE THAT DAY. FOREMOST, NEW YORK APCH CTL REMAINED CALM, FRIENDLY, AND EXTRAORDINARILY HELPFUL THROUGHOUT THE FLT. THE FEELING THAT I HAD FRIENDS HELPING ME BY MONITORING MY POS AND GUARDING ME FROM TFC WAS IMMENSELY REASSURING. SECOND, THE FAA REQUIREMENT FOR HOOD TIME (SIMULATED IMC) DURING PVT PLT TRAINING GAVE ME THE SKILLS AND THE CONFIDENCE THAT I NEEDED TO DEAL WITH MY FLT INTO IMC. THESE SKILLS ALLOWED ME TO RECOGNIZE SPATIAL DISORIENTATION, AND GAVE ME A CONCRETE PLAN OF ACTION TO DEAL WITH IT. THIRD, I WAS FORTUNATE TO HAVE A PAX WHO MADE NO DEMANDS ON ME DURING THE FLT. HE REMAINED CALM AND SILENT, KEEPING HIS APPREHENSIONS AND TENSION TO HIMSELF UNTIL WE WERE SAFELY ON THE GND. IF HE HAD REQUIRED MY REASSURANCES OR EXPLANATIONS INFLT, I FEAR THAT THE DISTR WOULD HAVE DRAMATICALLY INCREASED THE DANGER THAT WE WERE IN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.