Narrative:

On oct/xa/98, trainee and myself were scheduled to conduct a proficiency flight originating from naples, fl. The aircraft reserved for this flight was to be a BE55. Upon arrival, we were notified the BE55 reserved would not be available for flight due to maintenance requirements. Mr X, the owner, told us he arranged for us to use another baron BE55 that he leases on 'as needed' basis. In preparing a local flight plan, I asked mr X for the aircraft registration number. He said he was not sure of the number but he would fill it in prior to our departure. The aircraft was located at the ramp on the opposite side of the airfield. While waiting for the line service, trainee and I reviewed the aircraft documents and found all required documents in order. Preflight was conducted in accordance with aircraft flight manual. Prior to obtaining taxi clearance which was approximately 1 hour after the aircraft documents check, I contacted ground control using the call sign on the aircraft panel, nxxxx. The baron taxied directly in front of the control tower for a departure on runway 5 without anyone notifying us of a difference in radio call sign and the n-number painted on the side of the aircraft. After approximately 1 1/2 hours of airwork and flying multiple approachs into dade collier airport, we agreed to land at marathon for lunch and debriefing. En route to marathon, I suggested we obtain flight following crossing florida bay, to enhance safety of flight. I agreed and made radio contact with ZMA in cruise flight at 6500 ft. All radio calls from the aircraft and controller appeared normal with the controller discussing rainshowers in the vicinity of marathon airport. Approximately 20 mi north of marathon, I advised ZMA of our descent out of 6500 ft for the marathon traffic pattern. The controller acknowledged and passing through approximately 4000 ft the controller advised of an aircraft that appeared to be in the marathon traffic pattern. I responded to the controller that I did not have the aircraft in sight but did have the airport in sight. I then requested a frequency change to unicom. I thought I heard the controller acknowledge the frequency change. I would also like to add that radio communications withzma were not very clear, especially after beginning the descent. I then made a call to ZMA that I had 2 rainshowers in sight, plus the airfield. I was about 10 NM north of marathon when I changed frequencys. I then spoke to the operator of the marathon unicom for landing advisories and made numerous calls on unicom to announce aircraft position, at all times using the call sign nxxxx. After a normal approach and landing, I again spoke to the marathon unicom operator for parking instructions. The marathon FBO sent an attendant to the ramp and signaled the aircraft where to park. I made at least 4 radio calls to the FBO using the call sign nxxxx. It was starting to rain at this time as we parked in front of the FBO. Approximately 1 hour after arriving at marathon, we prepared for the flight back to naples. As this would be my leg of the flight and due to moderate rainshowers over the airport, trainee elected to file and fly the flight under IFR. I agreed and gave him my kneeboard which contained a low altitude IFR chart and the aircraft n-number, nxxxx, on a scratch pad. After discussing the WX with the flight service briefer by phone, trainee filed an IFR flight plan to naples. When he began to taxi from the ramp he announced on the unicom frequency 'nxxxx was taxiing for a runway 7 departure.' the unicom attendant announced something about nzzzz, knowing the call was not directed at us he did not respond to the call. Again the unicom attendant called nzzzz and said something to the effect that you are not nxxxx you are nzzzz. After a few seconds of confusion, he asked again if she was calling nxxxx. She said yes, and then said something to the effect that the coast guard helicopter off the west end of the runway is looking for you. He announced we were going to return to the ramp and find out what was going on. When back on the ramp we checked the side of the aircraft and discovered the n-number painted on the side of the aircraft was nzzzz and the call sign on the panel was nxxxx. Another check of the aircraft registration indicated nzzzz another registration behind the first indicated the number nxxxx. We then learned the n-number mix-up was due to the aircraft's recent new paint and registration number change, without changing the call sign on the aircraft panel. We explained to the coast guard crew flying the helicopter, while their aircraft was being refueled, how the mix-up occurred and then called ATC to explain the problem to them. After penciling in the nzzzz on the aircraft panel, a normal proficiency flight was conducted and the aircraft returned to the naples airport. At no time during this flight was safety compromised. It should be noted that the radio call sign on the instrument panel was nxxxx. In fact, the confusion actually began while obtaining flight following, a voluntary service, to enhance the safety of flight. I admit that in the end it left me confused when you become conditioned to reading a number on the panel and thinking it is the same as on the outside. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the pilot reporter called back and stated that they never filed a flight plan with ATC, the aircraft number was placed into a local flight training record for the base operations at apf. The airports that were used this day, tnt and mth, were all included in this 'training area' and did not require a VFR flight plan. Reporter said that the episode began when ZMA did not get the information from the aircraft that they were changing frequency to the unicom at mth. That alone was not the catalyst. The real event began when some FBO person at mth accidentally set off an ELT. This alerted ZMA and they thought that the 'nxxxx' aircraft had crashed. They then ran that aircraft identify through their computer and could not come up with a valid registration number. That alerted them to the possibility that the aircraft was a 'doper,' a drug smuggler aircraft, and sent the coast guard out to check on them. ZMA called the FBO/unicom at mth but those ground personnel could not see an 'nxxxx,' only an 'nzzzz.' it was after engine start that the unicom operator noted the error in aircraft identify. Later, the FAA had run a check on the nxxxx number and the xref in their computer came up with the nzzzz number. The reporter and the trainee both checked the aircraft papers closely prior to departure and failed to note any discrepancy in the paperwork.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT IDENT PROB. INSTRUCTOR PLT RENTS A BE55 FOR A TRAINING FLT. ZMA SENT A MIL HELI IN SEARCH OF THE 'MISSING' NXXXX.

Narrative: ON OCT/XA/98, TRAINEE AND MYSELF WERE SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT A PROFICIENCY FLT ORIGINATING FROM NAPLES, FL. THE ACFT RESERVED FOR THIS FLT WAS TO BE A BE55. UPON ARR, WE WERE NOTIFIED THE BE55 RESERVED WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR FLT DUE TO MAINT REQUIREMENTS. MR X, THE OWNER, TOLD US HE ARRANGED FOR US TO USE ANOTHER BARON BE55 THAT HE LEASES ON 'AS NEEDED' BASIS. IN PREPARING A LCL FLT PLAN, I ASKED MR X FOR THE ACFT REGISTRATION NUMBER. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE OF THE NUMBER BUT HE WOULD FILL IT IN PRIOR TO OUR DEP. THE ACFT WAS LOCATED AT THE RAMP ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD. WHILE WAITING FOR THE LINE SVC, TRAINEE AND I REVIEWED THE ACFT DOCUMENTS AND FOUND ALL REQUIRED DOCUMENTS IN ORDER. PREFLT WAS CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACFT FLT MANUAL. PRIOR TO OBTAINING TAXI CLRNC WHICH WAS APPROX 1 HR AFTER THE ACFT DOCUMENTS CHK, I CONTACTED GND CTL USING THE CALL SIGN ON THE ACFT PANEL, NXXXX. THE BARON TAXIED DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE CTL TWR FOR A DEP ON RWY 5 WITHOUT ANYONE NOTIFYING US OF A DIFFERENCE IN RADIO CALL SIGN AND THE N-NUMBER PAINTED ON THE SIDE OF THE ACFT. AFTER APPROX 1 1/2 HRS OF AIRWORK AND FLYING MULTIPLE APCHS INTO DADE COLLIER ARPT, WE AGREED TO LAND AT MARATHON FOR LUNCH AND DEBRIEFING. ENRTE TO MARATHON, I SUGGESTED WE OBTAIN FLT FOLLOWING XING FLORIDA BAY, TO ENHANCE SAFETY OF FLT. I AGREED AND MADE RADIO CONTACT WITH ZMA IN CRUISE FLT AT 6500 FT. ALL RADIO CALLS FROM THE ACFT AND CTLR APPEARED NORMAL WITH THE CTLR DISCUSSING RAINSHOWERS IN THE VICINITY OF MARATHON ARPT. APPROX 20 MI N OF MARATHON, I ADVISED ZMA OF OUR DSCNT OUT OF 6500 FT FOR THE MARATHON TFC PATTERN. THE CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED AND PASSING THROUGH APPROX 4000 FT THE CTLR ADVISED OF AN ACFT THAT APPEARED TO BE IN THE MARATHON TFC PATTERN. I RESPONDED TO THE CTLR THAT I DID NOT HAVE THE ACFT IN SIGHT BUT DID HAVE THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I THEN REQUESTED A FREQ CHANGE TO UNICOM. I THOUGHT I HEARD THE CTLR ACKNOWLEDGE THE FREQ CHANGE. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ADD THAT RADIO COMS WITHZMA WERE NOT VERY CLR, ESPECIALLY AFTER BEGINNING THE DSCNT. I THEN MADE A CALL TO ZMA THAT I HAD 2 RAINSHOWERS IN SIGHT, PLUS THE AIRFIELD. I WAS ABOUT 10 NM N OF MARATHON WHEN I CHANGED FREQS. I THEN SPOKE TO THE OPERATOR OF THE MARATHON UNICOM FOR LNDG ADVISORIES AND MADE NUMEROUS CALLS ON UNICOM TO ANNOUNCE ACFT POS, AT ALL TIMES USING THE CALL SIGN NXXXX. AFTER A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG, I AGAIN SPOKE TO THE MARATHON UNICOM OPERATOR FOR PARKING INSTRUCTIONS. THE MARATHON FBO SENT AN ATTENDANT TO THE RAMP AND SIGNALED THE ACFT WHERE TO PARK. I MADE AT LEAST 4 RADIO CALLS TO THE FBO USING THE CALL SIGN NXXXX. IT WAS STARTING TO RAIN AT THIS TIME AS WE PARKED IN FRONT OF THE FBO. APPROX 1 HR AFTER ARRIVING AT MARATHON, WE PREPARED FOR THE FLT BACK TO NAPLES. AS THIS WOULD BE MY LEG OF THE FLT AND DUE TO MODERATE RAINSHOWERS OVER THE ARPT, TRAINEE ELECTED TO FILE AND FLY THE FLT UNDER IFR. I AGREED AND GAVE HIM MY KNEEBOARD WHICH CONTAINED A LOW ALT IFR CHART AND THE ACFT N-NUMBER, NXXXX, ON A SCRATCH PAD. AFTER DISCUSSING THE WX WITH THE FLT SVC BRIEFER BY PHONE, TRAINEE FILED AN IFR FLT PLAN TO NAPLES. WHEN HE BEGAN TO TAXI FROM THE RAMP HE ANNOUNCED ON THE UNICOM FREQ 'NXXXX WAS TAXIING FOR A RWY 7 DEP.' THE UNICOM ATTENDANT ANNOUNCED SOMETHING ABOUT NZZZZ, KNOWING THE CALL WAS NOT DIRECTED AT US HE DID NOT RESPOND TO THE CALL. AGAIN THE UNICOM ATTENDANT CALLED NZZZZ AND SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT YOU ARE NOT NXXXX YOU ARE NZZZZ. AFTER A FEW SECONDS OF CONFUSION, HE ASKED AGAIN IF SHE WAS CALLING NXXXX. SHE SAID YES, AND THEN SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE COAST GUARD HELI OFF THE W END OF THE RWY IS LOOKING FOR YOU. HE ANNOUNCED WE WERE GOING TO RETURN TO THE RAMP AND FIND OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. WHEN BACK ON THE RAMP WE CHKED THE SIDE OF THE ACFT AND DISCOVERED THE N-NUMBER PAINTED ON THE SIDE OF THE ACFT WAS NZZZZ AND THE CALL SIGN ON THE PANEL WAS NXXXX. ANOTHER CHK OF THE ACFT REGISTRATION INDICATED NZZZZ ANOTHER REGISTRATION BEHIND THE FIRST INDICATED THE NUMBER NXXXX. WE THEN LEARNED THE N-NUMBER MIX-UP WAS DUE TO THE ACFT'S RECENT NEW PAINT AND REGISTRATION NUMBER CHANGE, WITHOUT CHANGING THE CALL SIGN ON THE ACFT PANEL. WE EXPLAINED TO THE COAST GUARD CREW FLYING THE HELI, WHILE THEIR ACFT WAS BEING REFUELED, HOW THE MIX-UP OCCURRED AND THEN CALLED ATC TO EXPLAIN THE PROB TO THEM. AFTER PENCILING IN THE NZZZZ ON THE ACFT PANEL, A NORMAL PROFICIENCY FLT WAS CONDUCTED AND THE ACFT RETURNED TO THE NAPLES ARPT. AT NO TIME DURING THIS FLT WAS SAFETY COMPROMISED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE RADIO CALL SIGN ON THE INST PANEL WAS NXXXX. IN FACT, THE CONFUSION ACTUALLY BEGAN WHILE OBTAINING FLT FOLLOWING, A VOLUNTARY SVC, TO ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF FLT. I ADMIT THAT IN THE END IT LEFT ME CONFUSED WHEN YOU BECOME CONDITIONED TO READING A NUMBER ON THE PANEL AND THINKING IT IS THE SAME AS ON THE OUTSIDE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE PLT RPTR CALLED BACK AND STATED THAT THEY NEVER FILED A FLT PLAN WITH ATC, THE ACFT NUMBER WAS PLACED INTO A LCL FLT TRAINING RECORD FOR THE BASE OPS AT APF. THE ARPTS THAT WERE USED THIS DAY, TNT AND MTH, WERE ALL INCLUDED IN THIS 'TRAINING AREA' AND DID NOT REQUIRE A VFR FLT PLAN. RPTR SAID THAT THE EPISODE BEGAN WHEN ZMA DID NOT GET THE INFO FROM THE ACFT THAT THEY WERE CHANGING FREQ TO THE UNICOM AT MTH. THAT ALONE WAS NOT THE CATALYST. THE REAL EVENT BEGAN WHEN SOME FBO PERSON AT MTH ACCIDENTALLY SET OFF AN ELT. THIS ALERTED ZMA AND THEY THOUGHT THAT THE 'NXXXX' ACFT HAD CRASHED. THEY THEN RAN THAT ACFT IDENT THROUGH THEIR COMPUTER AND COULD NOT COME UP WITH A VALID REGISTRATION NUMBER. THAT ALERTED THEM TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ACFT WAS A 'DOPER,' A DRUG SMUGGLER ACFT, AND SENT THE COAST GUARD OUT TO CHK ON THEM. ZMA CALLED THE FBO/UNICOM AT MTH BUT THOSE GND PERSONNEL COULD NOT SEE AN 'NXXXX,' ONLY AN 'NZZZZ.' IT WAS AFTER ENG START THAT THE UNICOM OPERATOR NOTED THE ERROR IN ACFT IDENT. LATER, THE FAA HAD RUN A CHK ON THE NXXXX NUMBER AND THE XREF IN THEIR COMPUTER CAME UP WITH THE NZZZZ NUMBER. THE RPTR AND THE TRAINEE BOTH CHKED THE ACFT PAPERS CLOSELY PRIOR TO DEP AND FAILED TO NOTE ANY DISCREPANCY IN THE PAPERWORK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.