Narrative:

We departed lga on the lga 8 departure. A busy and difficult departure. Due to the confusion we got the high speed warning for the slats. Due to the distrs and the delayed speed requirements of the SID, we both had forgotten the slat retraction and the after takeoff checklist. I took the plane off autoplt and raised the nose to slow down while the captain retracted the slats. The autoplt was then re-engaged and checked. This was approximately 13000 ft. We then got the altitude warning. The autoplt had failed to capture the 15000 ft armed altitude. I again took the aircraft off the autoplt and returned us to 15000 ft from about 15500 ft. The autoplt was then re-engaged. I am on reserve this month and this was only my 6TH day to fly all month after 2 weeks with no flying. We both agreed that our communication broke down due to the overly difficult SID and the untimely ATC calls. I feel that this is a classic example of a chain of events causing a problem. The overly difficult SID, ATC instructions at bad times, a hearing/comprehension problem in the busy, noisy flight deck, our never having flown together before, the SID causing the delay and alteration of standard procedures and normal expectations of sequential flows, and ATC changes to the SID during the most critical portion of the departure, all added to our workload and the confusion which eventually led to a mistake by the PF.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 FLC HAD A RATHER BUSY AND COMPLICATED DEP SID OUT OF LGA. THEY BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH ATC AND THE ACFT AND FLEW THROUGH THEIR ALT BY 500 FT.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED LGA ON THE LGA 8 DEP. A BUSY AND DIFFICULT DEP. DUE TO THE CONFUSION WE GOT THE HIGH SPD WARNING FOR THE SLATS. DUE TO THE DISTRS AND THE DELAYED SPD REQUIREMENTS OF THE SID, WE BOTH HAD FORGOTTEN THE SLAT RETRACTION AND THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST. I TOOK THE PLANE OFF AUTOPLT AND RAISED THE NOSE TO SLOW DOWN WHILE THE CAPT RETRACTED THE SLATS. THE AUTOPLT WAS THEN RE-ENGAGED AND CHKED. THIS WAS APPROX 13000 FT. WE THEN GOT THE ALT WARNING. THE AUTOPLT HAD FAILED TO CAPTURE THE 15000 FT ARMED ALT. I AGAIN TOOK THE ACFT OFF THE AUTOPLT AND RETURNED US TO 15000 FT FROM ABOUT 15500 FT. THE AUTOPLT WAS THEN RE-ENGAGED. I AM ON RESERVE THIS MONTH AND THIS WAS ONLY MY 6TH DAY TO FLY ALL MONTH AFTER 2 WKS WITH NO FLYING. WE BOTH AGREED THAT OUR COM BROKE DOWN DUE TO THE OVERLY DIFFICULT SID AND THE UNTIMELY ATC CALLS. I FEEL THAT THIS IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF A CHAIN OF EVENTS CAUSING A PROB. THE OVERLY DIFFICULT SID, ATC INSTRUCTIONS AT BAD TIMES, A HEARING/COMPREHENSION PROB IN THE BUSY, NOISY FLT DECK, OUR NEVER HAVING FLOWN TOGETHER BEFORE, THE SID CAUSING THE DELAY AND ALTERATION OF STANDARD PROCS AND NORMAL EXPECTATIONS OF SEQUENTIAL FLOWS, AND ATC CHANGES TO THE SID DURING THE MOST CRITICAL PORTION OF THE DEP, ALL ADDED TO OUR WORKLOAD AND THE CONFUSION WHICH EVENTUALLY LED TO A MISTAKE BY THE PF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.