Narrative:

During the 5TH flight of a 12-hour duty day that included 4 previous IFR approachs to minimums at different and unfamiliar airports, I failed to lower the landing gear on our amphibian cessna caravan. This costly mistake occurred during an IFR approach that followed a missed approach to the tri-county regional airport in lone rock, wi. The aircraft incurred minor damage to the floats as it skidded along the runway on the keels of both floats. Fortunately no one was hurt in this incident. The aircraft was back on its landing gear within a couple of hours, and in good enough shape to fly the next morning to a maintenance facility to have the floats removed and the aircraft was returned to service. This was a short flight from a nearby private strip to the lone rock airport. ZAU cleared me for the lnr GPS runway 27 approach as well as for a frequency change to airport advisories. I proceeded direct to mings intersection and flew the approach as published. At the missed approach point I had ground contact but could not see the runway environment so I executed the missed approach procedure. I retracted the landing gear and began to climb. I advised ZAU of my situation and that I wanted to go to the holding point and that, after talking to someone on the ground at lnr, I would possibly try again. I was cleared to mings intersection to hold as published. The lone rock unicom was unattended, however, I was in contact with our other company aircraft on the ground awaiting my arrival. They advised me that for some reason the runway lights were at low intensity and that is probably why I had to miss. They said that the lights were once on high, but perhaps I had turned them down inadvertently during the approach when I clicked the microphone 7 times to turn them on. They told me that they would monitor the lights and ensure that they were at full intensity if I wanted to make another attempt. Arriving at mings, I told center that I would like to try the approach again. Once again I was cleared for the approach and began to fly it as published. Once established inbound, I became concerned about the runway light status and made several attempts to contact the aircraft on the ground but they did not answer. They were no longer monitoring the frequency. About 3/4 mi from the missed approach point, I had the runway in sight and began my descent for landing. I would soon learn that during the second approach, I failed to lower the landing gear at the final approach point. I immediately advised local traffic on the CTAF, and also ZAU, that a disabled aircraft was on the runway at the lone rock airport and a NOTAM was issued. Several factors, including my preoccupation with the runway light status, contributed to this incident and I have learned very important lessons from them all. First of all, I failed to reset the electronic 'heads up' checklist to the before landing checklist section during the missed approach and instead reverted to a mental checklist that failed to identify the improper confign. In the future, I will take the time to reset the checklist to the current phase of flight or at least revert to the paper checklist to do my best to never fly past the final approach point again without ensuring the aircraft is correctly configured for landing. The caravan is normally a fixed gear airplane and we fly it in that confign 7 months out of the yr, so strict attention to the checklist is necessary to avoid this mistake again. Second, I failed to heed the advice of the aircraft's landing gear advisory system. It makes an audio announcement that either the 'gear is up for water landing' or that the 'gear is down for runway landing.' during the approach, I was aware that the advisory was sounding off but failed to differentiate between the water landing versus runway landing announcements. The advisory can be canceled by depressing the 'gear advisory' annunciator/switch and the pilot may have to cancel it several times during an approach with stepdown dscnts following power reductions even after selecting the correct landing gear confign. From now on, I will be sure to listen carefully and confirm the correct confign before silencing it in the future. On top of everything else, fatigue certainly affected my performance during this flight. This was an unusually busy flying day for me. I was not under any pressure to complete this trip and I felt reasonably alert and competent to do so. However, the long day, coupled with the increased workload of several IFR approachs to multiple unfamiliar airports at night and as a single plot, took its toll that terminated in this incident. I am very lucky that the situation was not worse. In the future, I will carefully consider my physical and mental condition versus the task at hand before making the decision to continue or stay put for the night.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AMPHIBIOUS C208 LANDS WITH ITS LNDG WHEELS RETRACTED FOR A RWY LNDG.

Narrative: DURING THE 5TH FLT OF A 12-HR DUTY DAY THAT INCLUDED 4 PREVIOUS IFR APCHS TO MINIMUMS AT DIFFERENT AND UNFAMILIAR ARPTS, I FAILED TO LOWER THE LNDG GEAR ON OUR AMPHIBIAN CESSNA CARAVAN. THIS COSTLY MISTAKE OCCURRED DURING AN IFR APCH THAT FOLLOWED A MISSED APCH TO THE TRI-COUNTY REGIONAL ARPT IN LONE ROCK, WI. THE ACFT INCURRED MINOR DAMAGE TO THE FLOATS AS IT SKIDDED ALONG THE RWY ON THE KEELS OF BOTH FLOATS. FORTUNATELY NO ONE WAS HURT IN THIS INCIDENT. THE ACFT WAS BACK ON ITS LNDG GEAR WITHIN A COUPLE OF HRS, AND IN GOOD ENOUGH SHAPE TO FLY THE NEXT MORNING TO A MAINT FACILITY TO HAVE THE FLOATS REMOVED AND THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. THIS WAS A SHORT FLT FROM A NEARBY PVT STRIP TO THE LONE ROCK ARPT. ZAU CLRED ME FOR THE LNR GPS RWY 27 APCH AS WELL AS FOR A FREQ CHANGE TO ARPT ADVISORIES. I PROCEEDED DIRECT TO MINGS INTXN AND FLEW THE APCH AS PUBLISHED. AT THE MISSED APCH POINT I HAD GND CONTACT BUT COULD NOT SEE THE RWY ENVIRONMENT SO I EXECUTED THE MISSED APCH PROC. I RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR AND BEGAN TO CLB. I ADVISED ZAU OF MY SIT AND THAT I WANTED TO GO TO THE HOLDING POINT AND THAT, AFTER TALKING TO SOMEONE ON THE GND AT LNR, I WOULD POSSIBLY TRY AGAIN. I WAS CLRED TO MINGS INTXN TO HOLD AS PUBLISHED. THE LONE ROCK UNICOM WAS UNATTENDED, HOWEVER, I WAS IN CONTACT WITH OUR OTHER COMPANY ACFT ON THE GND AWAITING MY ARR. THEY ADVISED ME THAT FOR SOME REASON THE RWY LIGHTS WERE AT LOW INTENSITY AND THAT IS PROBABLY WHY I HAD TO MISS. THEY SAID THAT THE LIGHTS WERE ONCE ON HIGH, BUT PERHAPS I HAD TURNED THEM DOWN INADVERTENTLY DURING THE APCH WHEN I CLICKED THE MIKE 7 TIMES TO TURN THEM ON. THEY TOLD ME THAT THEY WOULD MONITOR THE LIGHTS AND ENSURE THAT THEY WERE AT FULL INTENSITY IF I WANTED TO MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT. ARRIVING AT MINGS, I TOLD CTR THAT I WOULD LIKE TO TRY THE APCH AGAIN. ONCE AGAIN I WAS CLRED FOR THE APCH AND BEGAN TO FLY IT AS PUBLISHED. ONCE ESTABLISHED INBOUND, I BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT THE RWY LIGHT STATUS AND MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT THE ACFT ON THE GND BUT THEY DID NOT ANSWER. THEY WERE NO LONGER MONITORING THE FREQ. ABOUT 3/4 MI FROM THE MISSED APCH POINT, I HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT AND BEGAN MY DSCNT FOR LNDG. I WOULD SOON LEARN THAT DURING THE SECOND APCH, I FAILED TO LOWER THE LNDG GEAR AT THE FINAL APCH POINT. I IMMEDIATELY ADVISED LCL TFC ON THE CTAF, AND ALSO ZAU, THAT A DISABLED ACFT WAS ON THE RWY AT THE LONE ROCK ARPT AND A NOTAM WAS ISSUED. SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING MY PREOCCUPATION WITH THE RWY LIGHT STATUS, CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT AND I HAVE LEARNED VERY IMPORTANT LESSONS FROM THEM ALL. FIRST OF ALL, I FAILED TO RESET THE ELECTRONIC 'HEADS UP' CHKLIST TO THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST SECTION DURING THE MISSED APCH AND INSTEAD REVERTED TO A MENTAL CHKLIST THAT FAILED TO IDENT THE IMPROPER CONFIGN. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL TAKE THE TIME TO RESET THE CHKLIST TO THE CURRENT PHASE OF FLT OR AT LEAST REVERT TO THE PAPER CHKLIST TO DO MY BEST TO NEVER FLY PAST THE FINAL APCH POINT AGAIN WITHOUT ENSURING THE ACFT IS CORRECTLY CONFIGURED FOR LNDG. THE CARAVAN IS NORMALLY A FIXED GEAR AIRPLANE AND WE FLY IT IN THAT CONFIGN 7 MONTHS OUT OF THE YR, SO STRICT ATTN TO THE CHKLIST IS NECESSARY TO AVOID THIS MISTAKE AGAIN. SECOND, I FAILED TO HEED THE ADVICE OF THE ACFT'S LNDG GEAR ADVISORY SYS. IT MAKES AN AUDIO ANNOUNCEMENT THAT EITHER THE 'GEAR IS UP FOR WATER LNDG' OR THAT THE 'GEAR IS DOWN FOR RWY LNDG.' DURING THE APCH, I WAS AWARE THAT THE ADVISORY WAS SOUNDING OFF BUT FAILED TO DIFFERENTIATE BTWN THE WATER LNDG VERSUS RWY LNDG ANNOUNCEMENTS. THE ADVISORY CAN BE CANCELED BY DEPRESSING THE 'GEAR ADVISORY' ANNUNCIATOR/SWITCH AND THE PLT MAY HAVE TO CANCEL IT SEVERAL TIMES DURING AN APCH WITH STEPDOWN DSCNTS FOLLOWING PWR REDUCTIONS EVEN AFTER SELECTING THE CORRECT LNDG GEAR CONFIGN. FROM NOW ON, I WILL BE SURE TO LISTEN CAREFULLY AND CONFIRM THE CORRECT CONFIGN BEFORE SILENCING IT IN THE FUTURE. ON TOP OF EVERYTHING ELSE, FATIGUE CERTAINLY AFFECTED MY PERFORMANCE DURING THIS FLT. THIS WAS AN UNUSUALLY BUSY FLYING DAY FOR ME. I WAS NOT UNDER ANY PRESSURE TO COMPLETE THIS TRIP AND I FELT REASONABLY ALERT AND COMPETENT TO DO SO. HOWEVER, THE LONG DAY, COUPLED WITH THE INCREASED WORKLOAD OF SEVERAL IFR APCHS TO MULTIPLE UNFAMILIAR ARPTS AT NIGHT AND AS A SINGLE PLOT, TOOK ITS TOLL THAT TERMINATED IN THIS INCIDENT. I AM VERY LUCKY THAT THE SIT WAS NOT WORSE. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER MY PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION VERSUS THE TASK AT HAND BEFORE MAKING THE DECISION TO CONTINUE OR STAY PUT FOR THE NIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.