Narrative:

FAA air carrier examiner in jump seat. His comments to me after the flight: 1) he did not get a thorough enough jump seat briefing. Earlier I asked if he was familiar and he said yes. I did not give him the jump seat information card. 2) during the landing checklist, I read all items from yoke checklist, but flaps were still at 15 degrees vice 30 degrees for landing and had let drop over yoke checklist the lax approach plate. When flaps were finally placed at 30 degrees, I did not go back to checklist. I called 'flaps' from memory and after response called 'landing checklist complete.' FAA examiner did not like my memorization of any part of a checklist. 3) he also did not like a poor marshalling job by lax ground personnel in to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737. AN FAA ACI DEBRIEFED A CAPT AFTER A FLT.

Narrative: FAA ACR EXAMINER IN JUMP SEAT. HIS COMMENTS TO ME AFTER THE FLT: 1) HE DID NOT GET A THOROUGH ENOUGH JUMP SEAT BRIEFING. EARLIER I ASKED IF HE WAS FAMILIAR AND HE SAID YES. I DID NOT GIVE HIM THE JUMP SEAT INFO CARD. 2) DURING THE LNDG CHKLIST, I READ ALL ITEMS FROM YOKE CHKLIST, BUT FLAPS WERE STILL AT 15 DEGS VICE 30 DEGS FOR LNDG AND HAD LET DROP OVER YOKE CHKLIST THE LAX APCH PLATE. WHEN FLAPS WERE FINALLY PLACED AT 30 DEGS, I DID NOT GO BACK TO CHKLIST. I CALLED 'FLAPS' FROM MEMORY AND AFTER RESPONSE CALLED 'LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETE.' FAA EXAMINER DID NOT LIKE MY MEMORIZATION OF ANY PART OF A CHKLIST. 3) HE ALSO DID NOT LIKE A POOR MARSHALLING JOB BY LAX GND PERSONNEL IN TO THE GATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.