Narrative:

Originally we were scheduled mem-cos-gjt. Cos WX below minimums and forecast to remain that way. Flight was dispatched from mem directly to gjt. I did not notice the 'non tower operations north/a' message on the flight plan release. Due to cos overflt, we were scheduled to arrive at gjt 20 mins prior to ATCT opening. We became aware of this fact when company selcalled us about 15 mins after departure. Company said to 'fly slow or take the scenic route' until they could get authority/authorized from the duty officer for a non-tower landing. We were told to expect a SELCAL around cos giving us authority/authorized to land at gjt before the tower opened. SELCAL came around 20 mi south of cos. Captain was surprised when the flight controller said the WX at cos was now above minimums and could we go there now? Surprised because he had just listened to ATIS about 5 mins earlier and it said WX was still 1/4 mi. We talked directly to cos tower and WX was indeed above minimums, so we asked center for a rerte (we were only about 15 mi away at this time, FL280). Cleared to black forest VOR and descend to 9000 ft. We were all extremely busy. First officer was flying, so was copying divert information and arrival WX and calculating landing performance. Captain was getting out cos plates/briefing approach (ILS runway 174). Decided to conduct a monitored approach as WX was just above CAT I minimums. First officer was descending fast with speed brakes out. As we approached 9000 ft MSL, approach gave us an intercept vector for the ILS and said to maintain 9000 ft until established. First officer thought he heard 8000 ft and queried me. Captain was talking to approach and did not hear him. Captain 'wears' the sennheiser headset and it is very quiet but also sometimes hard to hear cockpit conversation and aural alerts, first officer continued descent below 9000 ft. Captain did not hear the aural alert as we went below 8700 ft. Captain was tuning the ILS as aircraft was in a l-hand turn to the intercept heading (140 degrees?). At 8500 ft approach came on and said 'don't descend below 9000 ft until on the localizer.' first officer immediately applied go around power and raised the nose rapidly. Speed brakes were still extended and stick shaker activated. (Speed was 10 KTS above 0 degree bank minimum maneuvering speed.) captain asked first officer to roll wings level which he did. Speed had decayed below 0 degrees minimum maneuvering speed so captain said he was going to flaps 2 degrees. In-flight warning horn sounded due to speed brake extend/flaps extend. He immediately retracted speed brakes and we immediately climbed back to 9000 ft. At this point he asked approach to vector us back around to initiate another approach. This we did and completed the approach and landing without further incident. We don't believe that we got below 8500 ft at any time before GS intercept. Factors were crew fatigue, perceived need to hurry due to close proximity to cos at time of rerte. Discussed what happened with crew after landing and all agreed that we should have loitered to the east of cos until we were all up to speed and ready to commence the approach. Supplemental information from acn 419984: we were given a descent to 9000 ft from center and handed off to approach. When checking in with approach they said maintain 9000 ft and I thought they said 8000 ft cleared for approach. We should not have started the approach yet, we were rushing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 FREIGHTER FLC RPT ON RUSHING AN INST APCH INTO COS AND EXPERIENCING AN ALTDEV ALT OVERSHOT AND A STICK SHAKER. A POSSIBLE OR NEAR CFIT.

Narrative: ORIGINALLY WE WERE SCHEDULED MEM-COS-GJT. COS WX BELOW MINIMUMS AND FORECAST TO REMAIN THAT WAY. FLT WAS DISPATCHED FROM MEM DIRECTLY TO GJT. I DID NOT NOTICE THE 'NON TWR OPS N/A' MESSAGE ON THE FLT PLAN RELEASE. DUE TO COS OVERFLT, WE WERE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE AT GJT 20 MINS PRIOR TO ATCT OPENING. WE BECAME AWARE OF THIS FACT WHEN COMPANY SELCALLED US ABOUT 15 MINS AFTER DEP. COMPANY SAID TO 'FLY SLOW OR TAKE THE SCENIC RTE' UNTIL THEY COULD GET AUTH FROM THE DUTY OFFICER FOR A NON-TWR LNDG. WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT A SELCAL AROUND COS GIVING US AUTH TO LAND AT GJT BEFORE THE TWR OPENED. SELCAL CAME AROUND 20 MI S OF COS. CAPT WAS SURPRISED WHEN THE FLT CTLR SAID THE WX AT COS WAS NOW ABOVE MINIMUMS AND COULD WE GO THERE NOW? SURPRISED BECAUSE HE HAD JUST LISTENED TO ATIS ABOUT 5 MINS EARLIER AND IT SAID WX WAS STILL 1/4 MI. WE TALKED DIRECTLY TO COS TWR AND WX WAS INDEED ABOVE MINIMUMS, SO WE ASKED CTR FOR A RERTE (WE WERE ONLY ABOUT 15 MI AWAY AT THIS TIME, FL280). CLRED TO BLACK FOREST VOR AND DSND TO 9000 FT. WE WERE ALL EXTREMELY BUSY. FO WAS FLYING, SO WAS COPYING DIVERT INFO AND ARR WX AND CALCULATING LNDG PERFORMANCE. CAPT WAS GETTING OUT COS PLATES/BRIEFING APCH (ILS RWY 174). DECIDED TO CONDUCT A MONITORED APCH AS WX WAS JUST ABOVE CAT I MINIMUMS. FO WAS DSNDING FAST WITH SPD BRAKES OUT. AS WE APCHED 9000 FT MSL, APCH GAVE US AN INTERCEPT VECTOR FOR THE ILS AND SAID TO MAINTAIN 9000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED. FO THOUGHT HE HEARD 8000 FT AND QUERIED ME. CAPT WAS TALKING TO APCH AND DID NOT HEAR HIM. CAPT 'WEARS' THE SENNHEISER HEADSET AND IT IS VERY QUIET BUT ALSO SOMETIMES HARD TO HEAR COCKPIT CONVERSATION AND AURAL ALERTS, FO CONTINUED DSCNT BELOW 9000 FT. CAPT DID NOT HEAR THE AURAL ALERT AS WE WENT BELOW 8700 FT. CAPT WAS TUNING THE ILS AS ACFT WAS IN A L-HAND TURN TO THE INTERCEPT HDG (140 DEGS?). AT 8500 FT APCH CAME ON AND SAID 'DON'T DSND BELOW 9000 FT UNTIL ON THE LOC.' FO IMMEDIATELY APPLIED GAR PWR AND RAISED THE NOSE RAPIDLY. SPD BRAKES WERE STILL EXTENDED AND STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED. (SPD WAS 10 KTS ABOVE 0 DEG BANK MINIMUM MANEUVERING SPD.) CAPT ASKED FO TO ROLL WINGS LEVEL WHICH HE DID. SPD HAD DECAYED BELOW 0 DEGS MINIMUM MANEUVERING SPD SO CAPT SAID HE WAS GOING TO FLAPS 2 DEGS. INFLT WARNING HORN SOUNDED DUE TO SPD BRAKE EXTEND/FLAPS EXTEND. HE IMMEDIATELY RETRACTED SPD BRAKES AND WE IMMEDIATELY CLBED BACK TO 9000 FT. AT THIS POINT HE ASKED APCH TO VECTOR US BACK AROUND TO INITIATE ANOTHER APCH. THIS WE DID AND COMPLETED THE APCH AND LNDG WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. WE DON'T BELIEVE THAT WE GOT BELOW 8500 FT AT ANY TIME BEFORE GS INTERCEPT. FACTORS WERE CREW FATIGUE, PERCEIVED NEED TO HURRY DUE TO CLOSE PROX TO COS AT TIME OF RERTE. DISCUSSED WHAT HAPPENED WITH CREW AFTER LNDG AND ALL AGREED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE LOITERED TO THE E OF COS UNTIL WE WERE ALL UP TO SPD AND READY TO COMMENCE THE APCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 419984: WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT TO 9000 FT FROM CTR AND HANDED OFF TO APCH. WHEN CHKING IN WITH APCH THEY SAID MAINTAIN 9000 FT AND I THOUGHT THEY SAID 8000 FT CLRED FOR APCH. WE SHOULD NOT HAVE STARTED THE APCH YET, WE WERE RUSHING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.