Narrative:

Approximately 30 mins before landing, the captain called me and asked me to come into the cockpit. He told me that the right engine was losing oil/oil pressure, and that they would probably have to shut it down prior to landing. They also thought that we might have to land in managua. He asked me to have the flight attendants run our checklist to prepare the passenger for an emergency evacuate/evacuation, but he didn't think that it would be necessary. This preparation was only a precaution in the unlikely event that we would have an emergency. I got the 'test' information from him -- type of emergency, evacuate/evacuation necessary?, signal to evacuate/evacuation, time remaining. I returned to the first class galley and told 2 flight attendants there what was up. I told 1 flight attendant there to tell the other flight attendants in the back to get their manuals since we had to run the checklist. I forgot to give her all the test information and to explain the nature of the problem, so after I got my manual I ran to the back to relay this information. Unfortunately, I couldn't just call them because the interphone in the back was inoperative. This cost time. I returned to first class galley and looked over the checklist and PA's while I waited for the others to stow the galleys and get into position. This seemed to take forever. Some (2 or 3) flight attendants were confused about the checklist -- namely, where to start. We had already completed #1 (captain informs #1 flight attendant of test information), #2 (flight attendant #1 advises all other flight attendants), and #3 (turn lights to bright). We were at #4 (PA announcement). I was to read 'planned emergency PA' while other flight attendants demonstrate in aisle per duty assignment chart. The emergency situation and nerves may have disoriented these flight attendants and their training, slowing their response to find where they were supposed to be (in the checklist, as well as in their designated position in the aisle). By the same token, I may have been able to alleviate some crew confusion if I had just told the crew to only get their A300 emergency checklist with the red tab on it. That has all the information that they need in the aisle in preparing the passenger for landing. They didn't need to FLIP through the manual to look for PA's, etc. That cost time. While the flight attendants got in position, I made a PA to inform passenger, in as calm a way as possible, that we had a mechanical problem, and that the captain wished us to prepare the passenger for a possible evacuate/evacuation, though it was unlikely to be necessary. I assured them that this was only a precaution, to better prepare us for the unlikely event. I then explained the same things in spanish for our spanish speaking passenger. I began to read the 'planned emergency PA' while the other flight attendants demonstrated in the aisle. I read it by section, translating each one into spanish. I just got to the end of the PA's, finishing step #4, when the captain made the PA, 'flight attendants prepare for landing.' we did, and while the flight attendants were in their jump seats, I called them all simultaneously, a nice feature on airbus, and told them that the captain said that if there would be any problem outside to look for when assessing before opening any doors, it would likely be on the right side (where we had engine trouble). Fortunately, we had a smooth landing without incident, and did not have to evacuate/evacuation. I later found out that the cockpit had to shut down the engine at about 1000 ft. The passenger were very attentive, and the cockpit and flight attendants handled it all professionally and efficiently, using their training background. Many passenger said they were calmed by our calm and professionalism. The only thing was that I thought we should have gotten through more steps on the checklist in the time available. Supplemental information from acn 419785: fire trucks met us and after aircraft was checked and brakes cooled off, we went to the gate. All passenger walked off aircraft. No injuries.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT ATTENDANT RPT REGARDING AN A300 ENG WITH OIL PRESSURE PROBS WHICH DEVELOPED 30 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG. ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AND PRECAUTIONARY EMER PREPARATION.

Narrative: APPROX 30 MINS BEFORE LNDG, THE CAPT CALLED ME AND ASKED ME TO COME INTO THE COCKPIT. HE TOLD ME THAT THE R ENG WAS LOSING OIL/OIL PRESSURE, AND THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO SHUT IT DOWN PRIOR TO LNDG. THEY ALSO THOUGHT THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO LAND IN MANAGUA. HE ASKED ME TO HAVE THE FLT ATTENDANTS RUN OUR CHKLIST TO PREPARE THE PAX FOR AN EMER EVAC, BUT HE DIDN'T THINK THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY. THIS PREPARATION WAS ONLY A PRECAUTION IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT WE WOULD HAVE AN EMER. I GOT THE 'TEST' INFO FROM HIM -- TYPE OF EMER, EVAC NECESSARY?, SIGNAL TO EVAC, TIME REMAINING. I RETURNED TO THE FIRST CLASS GALLEY AND TOLD 2 FLT ATTENDANTS THERE WHAT WAS UP. I TOLD 1 FLT ATTENDANT THERE TO TELL THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS IN THE BACK TO GET THEIR MANUALS SINCE WE HAD TO RUN THE CHKLIST. I FORGOT TO GIVE HER ALL THE TEST INFO AND TO EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF THE PROB, SO AFTER I GOT MY MANUAL I RAN TO THE BACK TO RELAY THIS INFO. UNFORTUNATELY, I COULDN'T JUST CALL THEM BECAUSE THE INTERPHONE IN THE BACK WAS INOP. THIS COST TIME. I RETURNED TO FIRST CLASS GALLEY AND LOOKED OVER THE CHKLIST AND PA'S WHILE I WAITED FOR THE OTHERS TO STOW THE GALLEYS AND GET INTO POS. THIS SEEMED TO TAKE FOREVER. SOME (2 OR 3) FLT ATTENDANTS WERE CONFUSED ABOUT THE CHKLIST -- NAMELY, WHERE TO START. WE HAD ALREADY COMPLETED #1 (CAPT INFORMS #1 FLT ATTENDANT OF TEST INFO), #2 (FLT ATTENDANT #1 ADVISES ALL OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS), AND #3 (TURN LIGHTS TO BRIGHT). WE WERE AT #4 (PA ANNOUNCEMENT). I WAS TO READ 'PLANNED EMER PA' WHILE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS DEMONSTRATE IN AISLE PER DUTY ASSIGNMENT CHART. THE EMER SIT AND NERVES MAY HAVE DISORIENTED THESE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THEIR TRAINING, SLOWING THEIR RESPONSE TO FIND WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE (IN THE CHKLIST, AS WELL AS IN THEIR DESIGNATED POS IN THE AISLE). BY THE SAME TOKEN, I MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ALLEVIATE SOME CREW CONFUSION IF I HAD JUST TOLD THE CREW TO ONLY GET THEIR A300 EMER CHKLIST WITH THE RED TAB ON IT. THAT HAS ALL THE INFO THAT THEY NEED IN THE AISLE IN PREPARING THE PAX FOR LNDG. THEY DIDN'T NEED TO FLIP THROUGH THE MANUAL TO LOOK FOR PA'S, ETC. THAT COST TIME. WHILE THE FLT ATTENDANTS GOT IN POS, I MADE A PA TO INFORM PAX, IN AS CALM A WAY AS POSSIBLE, THAT WE HAD A MECHANICAL PROB, AND THAT THE CAPT WISHED US TO PREPARE THE PAX FOR A POSSIBLE EVAC, THOUGH IT WAS UNLIKELY TO BE NECESSARY. I ASSURED THEM THAT THIS WAS ONLY A PRECAUTION, TO BETTER PREPARE US FOR THE UNLIKELY EVENT. I THEN EXPLAINED THE SAME THINGS IN SPANISH FOR OUR SPANISH SPEAKING PAX. I BEGAN TO READ THE 'PLANNED EMER PA' WHILE THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS DEMONSTRATED IN THE AISLE. I READ IT BY SECTION, TRANSLATING EACH ONE INTO SPANISH. I JUST GOT TO THE END OF THE PA'S, FINISHING STEP #4, WHEN THE CAPT MADE THE PA, 'FLT ATTENDANTS PREPARE FOR LNDG.' WE DID, AND WHILE THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE IN THEIR JUMP SEATS, I CALLED THEM ALL SIMULTANEOUSLY, A NICE FEATURE ON AIRBUS, AND TOLD THEM THAT THE CAPT SAID THAT IF THERE WOULD BE ANY PROB OUTSIDE TO LOOK FOR WHEN ASSESSING BEFORE OPENING ANY DOORS, IT WOULD LIKELY BE ON THE R SIDE (WHERE WE HAD ENG TROUBLE). FORTUNATELY, WE HAD A SMOOTH LNDG WITHOUT INCIDENT, AND DID NOT HAVE TO EVAC. I LATER FOUND OUT THAT THE COCKPIT HAD TO SHUT DOWN THE ENG AT ABOUT 1000 FT. THE PAX WERE VERY ATTENTIVE, AND THE COCKPIT AND FLT ATTENDANTS HANDLED IT ALL PROFESSIONALLY AND EFFICIENTLY, USING THEIR TRAINING BACKGROUND. MANY PAX SAID THEY WERE CALMED BY OUR CALM AND PROFESSIONALISM. THE ONLY THING WAS THAT I THOUGHT WE SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN THROUGH MORE STEPS ON THE CHKLIST IN THE TIME AVAILABLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 419785: FIRE TRUCKS MET US AND AFTER ACFT WAS CHKED AND BRAKES COOLED OFF, WE WENT TO THE GATE. ALL PAX WALKED OFF ACFT. NO INJURIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.