Narrative:

At about 7 or so mi southeast of the mobile downtown airport, mobile approach gave me a right turn on an intercept heading for the ILS 32 localizer. Then, mobile approach cleared me for the ILS 32 approach. (As I started to make the right turn, the autoplt uncoupled, would not couple again and I had to hand fly the rest of the approach. Also, I was getting conflicting information from my navigation equipment, I was concerned about the navigation equipment working properly, and I was having to check the navigation equipment against my wet compass.) then mobile approach instructed me to call the bfm tower. I radioed the bfm tower and informed the tower that I was on final for the ILS 32 approach to mobile downtown. The bfm tower radioed back. At this time, I cannot state with 100% accuracy what I was told by tower. However, I remember that I was under the distinct impression that I had been cleared to land. (I am very aware that you are not to land at a controled airport without a clearance to land.) I proceeded with the approach and I broke out of the clouds about 2 or so mi from the runway and at about 800 or so ft. (Even though I was under the clouds, it was still hazy.) after spotting the runway, I began to set the airplane up for landing. Then, I began to see a flashing light in the middle of the runway at the approach end. But, at that point, I could not tell what it was, other than a flashing light. As I continued the approach, I could tell that the flashing light was on a military helicopter. At that point, since I did not know what was to my right or left and the helicopter was not moving, I felt that it was safer to climb and fly over the helicopter rather than turning right or left. I added power, pulled the nose up and climbed, overflying the helicopter a few hundred ft. Since runway 32 is a long runway, after overflying the helicopter, I landed long on runway 32. I do not remember hearing the tower controller talking with the helicopter pilot on approach. After landing, the controller in the tower asked me why I did not report leaving the heckl intersection on the approach. I told him then, and I am stating now, that I did not hear the controller instruct me to report leaving the heckl intersection. I am not saying that he did not give that instruction. I am stating that I did not hear that instruction, that I did not read that instruction back to the controller, and that I was operating the airplane under the belief that I had been cleared to land. While taxiing, the tower controller instructed me to call the tower from the FBO.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA34 AND MIL HELI HAD NMAC AT BFM.

Narrative: AT ABOUT 7 OR SO MI SE OF THE MOBILE DOWNTOWN ARPT, MOBILE APCH GAVE ME A R TURN ON AN INTERCEPT HDG FOR THE ILS 32 LOC. THEN, MOBILE APCH CLRED ME FOR THE ILS 32 APCH. (AS I STARTED TO MAKE THE R TURN, THE AUTOPLT UNCOUPLED, WOULD NOT COUPLE AGAIN AND I HAD TO HAND FLY THE REST OF THE APCH. ALSO, I WAS GETTING CONFLICTING INFO FROM MY NAV EQUIP, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE NAV EQUIP WORKING PROPERLY, AND I WAS HAVING TO CHK THE NAV EQUIP AGAINST MY WET COMPASS.) THEN MOBILE APCH INSTRUCTED ME TO CALL THE BFM TWR. I RADIOED THE BFM TWR AND INFORMED THE TWR THAT I WAS ON FINAL FOR THE ILS 32 APCH TO MOBILE DOWNTOWN. THE BFM TWR RADIOED BACK. AT THIS TIME, I CANNOT STATE WITH 100% ACCURACY WHAT I WAS TOLD BY TWR. HOWEVER, I REMEMBER THAT I WAS UNDER THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT I HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. (I AM VERY AWARE THAT YOU ARE NOT TO LAND AT A CTLED ARPT WITHOUT A CLRNC TO LAND.) I PROCEEDED WITH THE APCH AND I BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS ABOUT 2 OR SO MI FROM THE RWY AND AT ABOUT 800 OR SO FT. (EVEN THOUGH I WAS UNDER THE CLOUDS, IT WAS STILL HAZY.) AFTER SPOTTING THE RWY, I BEGAN TO SET THE AIRPLANE UP FOR LNDG. THEN, I BEGAN TO SEE A FLASHING LIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RWY AT THE APCH END. BUT, AT THAT POINT, I COULD NOT TELL WHAT IT WAS, OTHER THAN A FLASHING LIGHT. AS I CONTINUED THE APCH, I COULD TELL THAT THE FLASHING LIGHT WAS ON A MIL HELI. AT THAT POINT, SINCE I DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS TO MY R OR L AND THE HELI WAS NOT MOVING, I FELT THAT IT WAS SAFER TO CLB AND FLY OVER THE HELI RATHER THAN TURNING R OR L. I ADDED PWR, PULLED THE NOSE UP AND CLBED, OVERFLYING THE HELI A FEW HUNDRED FT. SINCE RWY 32 IS A LONG RWY, AFTER OVERFLYING THE HELI, I LANDED LONG ON RWY 32. I DO NOT REMEMBER HEARING THE TWR CTLR TALKING WITH THE HELI PLT ON APCH. AFTER LNDG, THE CTLR IN THE TWR ASKED ME WHY I DID NOT RPT LEAVING THE HECKL INTXN ON THE APCH. I TOLD HIM THEN, AND I AM STATING NOW, THAT I DID NOT HEAR THE CTLR INSTRUCT ME TO RPT LEAVING THE HECKL INTXN. I AM NOT SAYING THAT HE DID NOT GIVE THAT INSTRUCTION. I AM STATING THAT I DID NOT HEAR THAT INSTRUCTION, THAT I DID NOT READ THAT INSTRUCTION BACK TO THE CTLR, AND THAT I WAS OPERATING THE AIRPLANE UNDER THE BELIEF THAT I HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. WHILE TAXIING, THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED ME TO CALL THE TWR FROM THE FBO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.