Narrative:

Problem: air carrier flight abc stl to pah at approximately XA20 (night) 35 NM from cng VOR at 9000 ft. Center gave us 'heading 120 degrees descend to 3000 ft, vectors right base runway 22.' we proceeded as requested. We broke out of the bottom of an overcast layer at approximately 6500 ft and roughly 19 mi from pah and began looking for the beacon. We were looking for an airport at approximately our 1 O'clock position. We spotted a beacon at our 1 O'clock position and confirmed that with runway lights. Since we had not heard from center and we were getting close to the airport, we called airport in sight. Center said 'cleared for visual, contact tower.' upon contacting tower we were cleared to land. Upon landing we realized we were at the wrong airport. Contributing factors (listed in order of events instead of importance): 1) night XA20 local. 2) center gave us vectors that put us north of both airports and directly in line with one another (normally we are given vectors only if we have not picked up the visual by approximately 10 NM from cng. This put us south of M30. With M30 behind us we normally never even see M30, ie, out of sight out of mind. 3) we were left at a high altitude and close to the airport above an overcast layer. By the time we were through the overcast layer and had spotted the beacon, we were 13-15 NM from the airport and high. Consequently, this resulted in a great increase in workload. 4) pah runway lights, we later learned, were on low where M30 lights were on high (usually it is opposite, or at least both on low). 5) REIL lights OTS for runway 22 at pah (M30 has no reils). 6) strong windy/gusty conditions between approximately 4000 ft to 200 ft AGL. This caused the crew's attention to focus on controling the aircraft and configuring it for landing instead of the variation in runway heading 7) close proximity of both airports (6 mi) and directly in line with where we were being vectored. 8) center's failure to call out airport's direction and distance from us. 9) tower's failure to notify us we were not in sight when cleared to land. 10) fatigue (captain) on the 5TH day of 6 and had been on duty for more than 12 hours and had flown approximately 6 hours 25 mins for that day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BA31 CREW LANDED AT THE WRONG ARPT.

Narrative: PROB: ACR FLT ABC STL TO PAH AT APPROX XA20 (NIGHT) 35 NM FROM CNG VOR AT 9000 FT. CTR GAVE US 'HDG 120 DEGS DSND TO 3000 FT, VECTORS R BASE RWY 22.' WE PROCEEDED AS REQUESTED. WE BROKE OUT OF THE BOTTOM OF AN OVCST LAYER AT APPROX 6500 FT AND ROUGHLY 19 MI FROM PAH AND BEGAN LOOKING FOR THE BEACON. WE WERE LOOKING FOR AN ARPT AT APPROX OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS. WE SPOTTED A BEACON AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS AND CONFIRMED THAT WITH RWY LIGHTS. SINCE WE HAD NOT HEARD FROM CTR AND WE WERE GETTING CLOSE TO THE ARPT, WE CALLED ARPT IN SIGHT. CTR SAID 'CLRED FOR VISUAL, CONTACT TWR.' UPON CONTACTING TWR WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. UPON LNDG WE REALIZED WE WERE AT THE WRONG ARPT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (LISTED IN ORDER OF EVENTS INSTEAD OF IMPORTANCE): 1) NIGHT XA20 LCL. 2) CTR GAVE US VECTORS THAT PUT US N OF BOTH ARPTS AND DIRECTLY IN LINE WITH ONE ANOTHER (NORMALLY WE ARE GIVEN VECTORS ONLY IF WE HAVE NOT PICKED UP THE VISUAL BY APPROX 10 NM FROM CNG. THIS PUT US S OF M30. WITH M30 BEHIND US WE NORMALLY NEVER EVEN SEE M30, IE, OUT OF SIGHT OUT OF MIND. 3) WE WERE LEFT AT A HIGH ALT AND CLOSE TO THE ARPT ABOVE AN OVCST LAYER. BY THE TIME WE WERE THROUGH THE OVCST LAYER AND HAD SPOTTED THE BEACON, WE WERE 13-15 NM FROM THE ARPT AND HIGH. CONSEQUENTLY, THIS RESULTED IN A GREAT INCREASE IN WORKLOAD. 4) PAH RWY LIGHTS, WE LATER LEARNED, WERE ON LOW WHERE M30 LIGHTS WERE ON HIGH (USUALLY IT IS OPPOSITE, OR AT LEAST BOTH ON LOW). 5) REIL LIGHTS OTS FOR RWY 22 AT PAH (M30 HAS NO REILS). 6) STRONG WINDY/GUSTY CONDITIONS BTWN APPROX 4000 FT TO 200 FT AGL. THIS CAUSED THE CREW'S ATTN TO FOCUS ON CTLING THE ACFT AND CONFIGURING IT FOR LNDG INSTEAD OF THE VARIATION IN RWY HDG 7) CLOSE PROX OF BOTH ARPTS (6 MI) AND DIRECTLY IN LINE WITH WHERE WE WERE BEING VECTORED. 8) CTR'S FAILURE TO CALL OUT ARPT'S DIRECTION AND DISTANCE FROM US. 9) TWR'S FAILURE TO NOTIFY US WE WERE NOT IN SIGHT WHEN CLRED TO LAND. 10) FATIGUE (CAPT) ON THE 5TH DAY OF 6 AND HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR MORE THAN 12 HRS AND HAD FLOWN APPROX 6 HRS 25 MINS FOR THAT DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.