Narrative:

We were pushing back from the gate at ZZZ with an FAA maintenance inspector on the jump seat when we had a nose gear unsafe warning light illuminate. We returned to gate and had a micro switch adjusted and then resumed pushback. The same problem occurred again, so we returned and had the micro switch replaced, which solved the problem. During taxi out, when we set takeoff flaps and the confign warning horn sounded continuously until thrust levers were advanced beyond idle. We called maintenance control to advise of new problem and they said they didn't know what was causing the problem, but if we thought it was serious we should return to gate, but left the decision up to us. The captain decided to taxi out to runway, saying that it was not a real concern because we knew we were properly configured and the horn was silenced when power was advanced. He wanted to take off, adding that he would abort takeoff if any unsafe warning occurred during the takeoff roll. I told the captain I was not at all comfortable departing in an aircraft with a known problem, however insignificant it may have appeared, but he chose to accept a takeoff clearance anyway and we departed without incident. Upon configuring for landing at our destination, the confign warning horn again sounded continuously as we extended flaps, although all indications were otherwise normal. We landed without incident and wrote the problem up and the aircraft was grounded until the micro switch which was replaced was found to be misadjusted. I think the captain's decision was influenced by the fact that we were flying with a full airplane and almost every passenger was making a connection. He was concerned that they would be stranded if the flight canceled. I later spoke to the FAA inspector about the situation and he said he was pleased that I voiced my concern to the captain. He was more concerned, however, with the way maintenance control handled the problem. He and I felt that they should have insisted that we return to gate for repairs instead of putting the decision back upon us. I don't feel that the captain ever considered any CRM factors in his decision, and I certainly did not use all available to me, ie, simply refusing to go along with his poor decision. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the maintenance controller shifted the decision of going with the gear warning system not operating correctly on to the crew. The reporter said the reporter expressed concern to the captain about proceeding with a known faulty system but was ignored. The reporter said that on setting up for landing the warning horn came on steady and could not be silenced. The reporter stated the aircraft was taken OTS for 2 days to accomplish a positive fix including a gear swing. The reporter said the FAA inspector was dismayed with the maintenance controller for not making a clear decision and the captain for poor judgement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE TKOF WARNING AND THE LNDG GEAR POS AND WARNING SYS ACTIVATED CAUSED BY A NOSE LNDG GEAR POS SWITCH OUT OF ADJUSTMENT.

Narrative: WE WERE PUSHING BACK FROM THE GATE AT ZZZ WITH AN FAA MAINT INSPECTOR ON THE JUMP SEAT WHEN WE HAD A NOSE GEAR UNSAFE WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATE. WE RETURNED TO GATE AND HAD A MICRO SWITCH ADJUSTED AND THEN RESUMED PUSHBACK. THE SAME PROB OCCURRED AGAIN, SO WE RETURNED AND HAD THE MICRO SWITCH REPLACED, WHICH SOLVED THE PROB. DURING TAXI OUT, WHEN WE SET TKOF FLAPS AND THE CONFIGN WARNING HORN SOUNDED CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL THRUST LEVERS WERE ADVANCED BEYOND IDLE. WE CALLED MAINT CTL TO ADVISE OF NEW PROB AND THEY SAID THEY DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS CAUSING THE PROB, BUT IF WE THOUGHT IT WAS SERIOUS WE SHOULD RETURN TO GATE, BUT LEFT THE DECISION UP TO US. THE CAPT DECIDED TO TAXI OUT TO RWY, SAYING THAT IT WAS NOT A REAL CONCERN BECAUSE WE KNEW WE WERE PROPERLY CONFIGURED AND THE HORN WAS SILENCED WHEN PWR WAS ADVANCED. HE WANTED TO TAKE OFF, ADDING THAT HE WOULD ABORT TKOF IF ANY UNSAFE WARNING OCCURRED DURING THE TKOF ROLL. I TOLD THE CAPT I WAS NOT AT ALL COMFORTABLE DEPARTING IN AN ACFT WITH A KNOWN PROB, HOWEVER INSIGNIFICANT IT MAY HAVE APPEARED, BUT HE CHOSE TO ACCEPT A TKOF CLRNC ANYWAY AND WE DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON CONFIGURING FOR LNDG AT OUR DEST, THE CONFIGN WARNING HORN AGAIN SOUNDED CONTINUOUSLY AS WE EXTENDED FLAPS, ALTHOUGH ALL INDICATIONS WERE OTHERWISE NORMAL. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND WROTE THE PROB UP AND THE ACFT WAS GNDED UNTIL THE MICRO SWITCH WHICH WAS REPLACED WAS FOUND TO BE MISADJUSTED. I THINK THE CAPT'S DECISION WAS INFLUENCED BY THE FACT THAT WE WERE FLYING WITH A FULL AIRPLANE AND ALMOST EVERY PAX WAS MAKING A CONNECTION. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THEY WOULD BE STRANDED IF THE FLT CANCELED. I LATER SPOKE TO THE FAA INSPECTOR ABOUT THE SIT AND HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT I VOICED MY CONCERN TO THE CAPT. HE WAS MORE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, WITH THE WAY MAINT CTL HANDLED THE PROB. HE AND I FELT THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE INSISTED THAT WE RETURN TO GATE FOR REPAIRS INSTEAD OF PUTTING THE DECISION BACK UPON US. I DON'T FEEL THAT THE CAPT EVER CONSIDERED ANY CRM FACTORS IN HIS DECISION, AND I CERTAINLY DID NOT USE ALL AVAILABLE TO ME, IE, SIMPLY REFUSING TO GO ALONG WITH HIS POOR DECISION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE MAINT CTLR SHIFTED THE DECISION OF GOING WITH THE GEAR WARNING SYS NOT OPERATING CORRECTLY ON TO THE CREW. THE RPTR SAID THE RPTR EXPRESSED CONCERN TO THE CAPT ABOUT PROCEEDING WITH A KNOWN FAULTY SYS BUT WAS IGNORED. THE RPTR SAID THAT ON SETTING UP FOR LNDG THE WARNING HORN CAME ON STEADY AND COULD NOT BE SILENCED. THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS TAKEN OTS FOR 2 DAYS TO ACCOMPLISH A POSITIVE FIX INCLUDING A GEAR SWING. THE RPTR SAID THE FAA INSPECTOR WAS DISMAYED WITH THE MAINT CTLR FOR NOT MAKING A CLR DECISION AND THE CAPT FOR POOR JUDGEMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.