Narrative:

On the day of the incident I was planning a flight with a multi-student who I have trained during the previous days. We conducted a preflight including checking fuel quantity and draining the fuel tanks as well as draining the xfeed line. Also, the flaps were lowered using the manual gear/flap extension pump. The flaps were then raised with the engine running using the flap handle only. The engine start was conducted without any problem. Afterwards we taxied the aircraft to the runup area. In the runup area, we conducted an engine runup and system check, which included checking the magnetos, running the engine up to 2000 RPM/20 inches. Carburetor heat was checked as well as the propeller governor by reducing RPM to 1900 and increasing manifold to see if 1900 RPM are maintained. No problem of any kind was detected. After the runup we were cleared for takeoff on runway 4R. My student conducted the takeoff. He applied throttles to 1500 RPM while holding the brakes. Engine instruments were checked and no problem was detected. Then my student released the brakes, the aircraft started rolling and he smoothly applied power to full throttle. Airspeed built up quickly and we noted 'airspeed alive.' at 80 mph (VMC) my student rotated and the aircraft started climbing and accelerating to blue line (95 mph). At the end of the runway, the aircraft was at a ht of approximately 200 ft (gear still down) I noted a strong yawing to the left and right accompanied by loud oscillating engine noise. At this point, I took over the controls of the aircraft and notified tower that we had to return for landing. Tower cleared us for any runway. The yawing of the aircraft made it very difficult to control the aircraft. At this point I idented the right engine as the source of the problem (dead foot dead engine). I told my student to check: magnetos on, electric fuel pumps on, fuel selectors on main tanks. My student checked the items and repeated to me that they are on. At this point, I pulled the right propeller control into feather. Immediately afterwards, I tried to initiate a left turn attempting to land on runway 22R. I noted that the airplane was not turning enough to reach that runway. Then I selected the landing gear up, which I left down since the aircraft was still in close proximity of the runways. With the gear up I noted that it was still impossible to turn the aircraft to the left to reach either runway 22R or fly a complete pattern to runways 4. I decided to make a 180 degree right turn over the dead engine. During this turn the aircraft started to sink drastically, putting it into close proximity of the ground. After the turn was completed, the aircraft's altitude stabilized and was lined up with runway 22L. I delayed the cycling of the gear until the aircraft was close to the runway. During this time, tower advised me that the gear is still up. Briefly afterwards, when I estimated that a safe landing can be made, I selected the gear down. The gear needed a significant amount of time to cycle. At this point I told my student to begin pumping the gear down manually. I decided to do this as a precautionary measurement since we were coming closer to the runway and a go around to resolve a gear problem seemed to be near impossible. Additionally, I asked tower to have fire crews standing by in case of a gear up landing, and also to advise me when the gear was down. At this point, I delayed my touchdown point further down the runway where I still could make a safe landing, but allow more time for the gear to extend. Tower then advised me that the gear appeared to be down and briefly after that I noted the 3 green indication of the gear. I touched down midfield and advised my student that when all wheels are on the ground to apply heavy braking. My student applied brakes when all 3 wheels were on the ground and we were able to stop the aircraft before we reached the end of the runway. During the taxi back, I checked all controls and switches in the cockpit and detected no fault in the confign. Additionally, I noted that even though the propeller control was moved to full feather, the propeller was still spinning and was not feathered. I then moved the propeller control full forward. Afterwards I learned from the line mechanic of the FBO the aircraft is rented from that therewas contamination in the fuel lines (something that looked like grass) which had caused the power surges. Additionally, I learned that there was air in the hydraulic lines of the landing gear causing it to cycle slower than usual. The right propeller was later removed from the aircraft due to an oil leak. At this time the aircraft is still in the shop with the propeller removed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR PLT WITH TRAINEE, DURING MULTI ENG TRAINING IN AN SMA TWIN, RETURN LAND AFTER THE R ENG BEGAN UNCTLABLE SURGES AFTER TKOF. THE PROP CTL WAS PULLED INTO THE FEATHERED POS, BUT DID NOT FEATHER. THE LNDG GEAR RETRACTED AND EXTENDED VERY SLOWLY DURING THE DIRECTIONAL REVERSAL TO LAND ON THE ADJACENT PARALLEL RWY DEP END.

Narrative: ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT I WAS PLANNING A FLT WITH A MULTI-STUDENT WHO I HAVE TRAINED DURING THE PREVIOUS DAYS. WE CONDUCTED A PREFLT INCLUDING CHKING FUEL QUANTITY AND DRAINING THE FUEL TANKS AS WELL AS DRAINING THE XFEED LINE. ALSO, THE FLAPS WERE LOWERED USING THE MANUAL GEAR/FLAP EXTENSION PUMP. THE FLAPS WERE THEN RAISED WITH THE ENG RUNNING USING THE FLAP HANDLE ONLY. THE ENG START WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT ANY PROB. AFTERWARDS WE TAXIED THE ACFT TO THE RUNUP AREA. IN THE RUNUP AREA, WE CONDUCTED AN ENG RUNUP AND SYS CHK, WHICH INCLUDED CHKING THE MAGNETOS, RUNNING THE ENG UP TO 2000 RPM/20 INCHES. CARB HEAT WAS CHKED AS WELL AS THE PROP GOVERNOR BY REDUCING RPM TO 1900 AND INCREASING MANIFOLD TO SEE IF 1900 RPM ARE MAINTAINED. NO PROB OF ANY KIND WAS DETECTED. AFTER THE RUNUP WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 4R. MY STUDENT CONDUCTED THE TKOF. HE APPLIED THROTTLES TO 1500 RPM WHILE HOLDING THE BRAKES. ENG INSTS WERE CHKED AND NO PROB WAS DETECTED. THEN MY STUDENT RELEASED THE BRAKES, THE ACFT STARTED ROLLING AND HE SMOOTHLY APPLIED PWR TO FULL THROTTLE. AIRSPD BUILT UP QUICKLY AND WE NOTED 'AIRSPD ALIVE.' AT 80 MPH (VMC) MY STUDENT ROTATED AND THE ACFT STARTED CLBING AND ACCELERATING TO BLUE LINE (95 MPH). AT THE END OF THE RWY, THE ACFT WAS AT A HT OF APPROX 200 FT (GEAR STILL DOWN) I NOTED A STRONG YAWING TO THE L AND R ACCOMPANIED BY LOUD OSCILLATING ENG NOISE. AT THIS POINT, I TOOK OVER THE CTLS OF THE ACFT AND NOTIFIED TWR THAT WE HAD TO RETURN FOR LNDG. TWR CLRED US FOR ANY RWY. THE YAWING OF THE ACFT MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO CTL THE ACFT. AT THIS POINT I IDENTED THE R ENG AS THE SOURCE OF THE PROB (DEAD FOOT DEAD ENG). I TOLD MY STUDENT TO CHK: MAGNETOS ON, ELECTRIC FUEL PUMPS ON, FUEL SELECTORS ON MAIN TANKS. MY STUDENT CHKED THE ITEMS AND REPEATED TO ME THAT THEY ARE ON. AT THIS POINT, I PULLED THE R PROP CTL INTO FEATHER. IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, I TRIED TO INITIATE A L TURN ATTEMPTING TO LAND ON RWY 22R. I NOTED THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT TURNING ENOUGH TO REACH THAT RWY. THEN I SELECTED THE LNDG GEAR UP, WHICH I LEFT DOWN SINCE THE ACFT WAS STILL IN CLOSE PROX OF THE RWYS. WITH THE GEAR UP I NOTED THAT IT WAS STILL IMPOSSIBLE TO TURN THE ACFT TO THE L TO REACH EITHER RWY 22R OR FLY A COMPLETE PATTERN TO RWYS 4. I DECIDED TO MAKE A 180 DEG R TURN OVER THE DEAD ENG. DURING THIS TURN THE ACFT STARTED TO SINK DRASTICALLY, PUTTING IT INTO CLOSE PROX OF THE GND. AFTER THE TURN WAS COMPLETED, THE ACFT'S ALT STABILIZED AND WAS LINED UP WITH RWY 22L. I DELAYED THE CYCLING OF THE GEAR UNTIL THE ACFT WAS CLOSE TO THE RWY. DURING THIS TIME, TWR ADVISED ME THAT THE GEAR IS STILL UP. BRIEFLY AFTERWARDS, WHEN I ESTIMATED THAT A SAFE LNDG CAN BE MADE, I SELECTED THE GEAR DOWN. THE GEAR NEEDED A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TIME TO CYCLE. AT THIS POINT I TOLD MY STUDENT TO BEGIN PUMPING THE GEAR DOWN MANUALLY. I DECIDED TO DO THIS AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASUREMENT SINCE WE WERE COMING CLOSER TO THE RWY AND A GAR TO RESOLVE A GEAR PROB SEEMED TO BE NEAR IMPOSSIBLE. ADDITIONALLY, I ASKED TWR TO HAVE FIRE CREWS STANDING BY IN CASE OF A GEAR UP LNDG, AND ALSO TO ADVISE ME WHEN THE GEAR WAS DOWN. AT THIS POINT, I DELAYED MY TOUCHDOWN POINT FURTHER DOWN THE RWY WHERE I STILL COULD MAKE A SAFE LNDG, BUT ALLOW MORE TIME FOR THE GEAR TO EXTEND. TWR THEN ADVISED ME THAT THE GEAR APPEARED TO BE DOWN AND BRIEFLY AFTER THAT I NOTED THE 3 GREEN INDICATION OF THE GEAR. I TOUCHED DOWN MIDFIELD AND ADVISED MY STUDENT THAT WHEN ALL WHEELS ARE ON THE GND TO APPLY HVY BRAKING. MY STUDENT APPLIED BRAKES WHEN ALL 3 WHEELS WERE ON THE GND AND WE WERE ABLE TO STOP THE ACFT BEFORE WE REACHED THE END OF THE RWY. DURING THE TAXI BACK, I CHKED ALL CTLS AND SWITCHES IN THE COCKPIT AND DETECTED NO FAULT IN THE CONFIGN. ADDITIONALLY, I NOTED THAT EVEN THOUGH THE PROP CTL WAS MOVED TO FULL FEATHER, THE PROP WAS STILL SPINNING AND WAS NOT FEATHERED. I THEN MOVED THE PROP CTL FULL FORWARD. AFTERWARDS I LEARNED FROM THE LINE MECH OF THE FBO THE ACFT IS RENTED FROM THAT THEREWAS CONTAMINATION IN THE FUEL LINES (SOMETHING THAT LOOKED LIKE GRASS) WHICH HAD CAUSED THE PWR SURGES. ADDITIONALLY, I LEARNED THAT THERE WAS AIR IN THE HYD LINES OF THE LNDG GEAR CAUSING IT TO CYCLE SLOWER THAN USUAL. THE R PROP WAS LATER REMOVED FROM THE ACFT DUE TO AN OIL LEAK. AT THIS TIME THE ACFT IS STILL IN THE SHOP WITH THE PROP REMOVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.