Narrative:

I had flown a military contracted civilian twin from new orleans, la, to pensacola regional and then on to hxd. I flew the VOR approach and landed on runway 3. After about 2.5 hours, I filed for the return trip, electing a fuel stop in valdosta, GA. I had plenty of gas to get there -- about 2 hours 45 mins worth. I wanted to stay relatively light as hxd is only about 4000 ft in length. I contacted anderson FSS and was briefed for the flight. Of special importance was the SIGMET for icing above 8000 ft, I believe. I filed for direct valdosta at 6000 ft. There is no WX reporting on the field, and I had to interpolate between savannah and beaufort for current conditions. I believe the conditions were ranging from 3 mi light rain and 2000 ft overcast to 600 ft broken and 2 1/2 mi visibility. As well, I asked if I was to contact savannah approach since hxd is unicom, and I was told 'contact savannah approach on 125.3.' after engine start, I attempted to contact clearance delivery on 121.1, but was unable to get a response. I made all my other calls on unicom as I taxied out for departure on runway 3. As I sat at the hold short, I was unable to contact savannah. I was squawking 1200 and making my calls on unicom. I took the runway and began my takeoff roll. Upon climb out, I turned wbound and continued to try and contact savannah. I was now at about 1200 ft and heading westerly. I was VMC and beginning to go in and out of the clouds. I remember checking in with approach and stating that I was VFR, as well as the fact that I had been attempting to contact him repeatedly on his frequency. Shortly thereafter, I called inadvertent IMC and asked for a radar pickup. I was told unable due to possible pilot deviation and to continue squawking 1200. I was finally given a squawk and issued instructions for transit of the savannah airspace. I remember the controller saying something to the effect of needing to contact him earlier (ie, on the deck?) next time, but seemed to relate 'no harm no foul.' then I was told to contact savannah approach via phone for possible 'pilot deviation.'I landed at valdosta and immediately contacted savannah approach. I spoke with the supervisor, who related the following items: apparently, if someone is shooting the localizer to runway 21 he will be controled by beaufort approach (nbc) and not be talking to savannah (sav) at all. I did not have a copy of the localizer 21, even though I had new pubs on board (effective 3 december). I was told this aircraft (I think an MU2) was being controled by beaufort, and from all indications did not switch advisories once inside the FAF. I did not hear him call inbound at all. At some point on my departure he got a warning on his TCASII of possible near midair. I never saw him and never heard him. When he was finished working that area, he too checked in with savannah, was given the same number to call, and had yet to do so. I think, in retrospect, there are a couple of significant factors at work in this event. First, the same airport is being svced by 2 separate agencies. I was told by one of the controllers that this causes occasional problems due to unknown pop-up targets and no interaction between the 2 agencies. Personally, I failed to be more definite and resourceful in contacting another agency to coordinate a departure, especially since there was heavy IFR traffic that time of day in the whole area. I was not aware that anyone would be working with beaufort approach. I felt I could get clearance once airborne, as I was unable on the ground. I reviewed the aim (5-1-7), and it is in my reading unclr about other ways to file a flight plan at non twred airports. Also, I thought I would be able to maintain VFR significantly longer than I was. I believe that integrating all approachs through one common agency would have helped avoid this incident. I did not feel in a hurry to get the flight underway, and felt confident that my abilities were great enough to fly safely in that environment and that the aircraft was well equipped for any WX condition. It does, however, lack a TCASII system. At the time of this writing, I am waiting to hear of any further action by the sc FSDO. I was informed that the tapes have been sent to them for review.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIL BE60 PLT WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT SAV CLRNC ON THE PUBLISHED FREQ. PLT DEPARTED HXD AND FLEW IN IMC CONDITIONS BEFORE OBTAINING AN IFR CLRNC FROM SAV APCH CTL.

Narrative: I HAD FLOWN A MIL CONTRACTED CIVILIAN TWIN FROM NEW ORLEANS, LA, TO PENSACOLA REGIONAL AND THEN ON TO HXD. I FLEW THE VOR APCH AND LANDED ON RWY 3. AFTER ABOUT 2.5 HRS, I FILED FOR THE RETURN TRIP, ELECTING A FUEL STOP IN VALDOSTA, GA. I HAD PLENTY OF GAS TO GET THERE -- ABOUT 2 HRS 45 MINS WORTH. I WANTED TO STAY RELATIVELY LIGHT AS HXD IS ONLY ABOUT 4000 FT IN LENGTH. I CONTACTED ANDERSON FSS AND WAS BRIEFED FOR THE FLT. OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE WAS THE SIGMET FOR ICING ABOVE 8000 FT, I BELIEVE. I FILED FOR DIRECT VALDOSTA AT 6000 FT. THERE IS NO WX RPTING ON THE FIELD, AND I HAD TO INTERPOLATE BTWN SAVANNAH AND BEAUFORT FOR CURRENT CONDITIONS. I BELIEVE THE CONDITIONS WERE RANGING FROM 3 MI LIGHT RAIN AND 2000 FT OVCST TO 600 FT BROKEN AND 2 1/2 MI VISIBILITY. AS WELL, I ASKED IF I WAS TO CONTACT SAVANNAH APCH SINCE HXD IS UNICOM, AND I WAS TOLD 'CONTACT SAVANNAH APCH ON 125.3.' AFTER ENG START, I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT CLRNC DELIVERY ON 121.1, BUT WAS UNABLE TO GET A RESPONSE. I MADE ALL MY OTHER CALLS ON UNICOM AS I TAXIED OUT FOR DEP ON RWY 3. AS I SAT AT THE HOLD SHORT, I WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT SAVANNAH. I WAS SQUAWKING 1200 AND MAKING MY CALLS ON UNICOM. I TOOK THE RWY AND BEGAN MY TKOF ROLL. UPON CLBOUT, I TURNED WBOUND AND CONTINUED TO TRY AND CONTACT SAVANNAH. I WAS NOW AT ABOUT 1200 FT AND HDG WESTERLY. I WAS VMC AND BEGINNING TO GO IN AND OUT OF THE CLOUDS. I REMEMBER CHKING IN WITH APCH AND STATING THAT I WAS VFR, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT I HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT HIM REPEATEDLY ON HIS FREQ. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I CALLED INADVERTENT IMC AND ASKED FOR A RADAR PICKUP. I WAS TOLD UNABLE DUE TO POSSIBLE PLTDEV AND TO CONTINUE SQUAWKING 1200. I WAS FINALLY GIVEN A SQUAWK AND ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRANSIT OF THE SAVANNAH AIRSPACE. I REMEMBER THE CTLR SAYING SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF NEEDING TO CONTACT HIM EARLIER (IE, ON THE DECK?) NEXT TIME, BUT SEEMED TO RELATE 'NO HARM NO FOUL.' THEN I WAS TOLD TO CONTACT SAVANNAH APCH VIA PHONE FOR POSSIBLE 'PLTDEV.'I LANDED AT VALDOSTA AND IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED SAVANNAH APCH. I SPOKE WITH THE SUPVR, WHO RELATED THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: APPARENTLY, IF SOMEONE IS SHOOTING THE LOC TO RWY 21 HE WILL BE CTLED BY BEAUFORT APCH (NBC) AND NOT BE TALKING TO SAVANNAH (SAV) AT ALL. I DID NOT HAVE A COPY OF THE LOC 21, EVEN THOUGH I HAD NEW PUBS ON BOARD (EFFECTIVE 3 DECEMBER). I WAS TOLD THIS ACFT (I THINK AN MU2) WAS BEING CTLED BY BEAUFORT, AND FROM ALL INDICATIONS DID NOT SWITCH ADVISORIES ONCE INSIDE THE FAF. I DID NOT HEAR HIM CALL INBOUND AT ALL. AT SOME POINT ON MY DEP HE GOT A WARNING ON HIS TCASII OF POSSIBLE NEAR MIDAIR. I NEVER SAW HIM AND NEVER HEARD HIM. WHEN HE WAS FINISHED WORKING THAT AREA, HE TOO CHKED IN WITH SAVANNAH, WAS GIVEN THE SAME NUMBER TO CALL, AND HAD YET TO DO SO. I THINK, IN RETROSPECT, THERE ARE A COUPLE OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS AT WORK IN THIS EVENT. FIRST, THE SAME ARPT IS BEING SVCED BY 2 SEPARATE AGENCIES. I WAS TOLD BY ONE OF THE CTLRS THAT THIS CAUSES OCCASIONAL PROBS DUE TO UNKNOWN POP-UP TARGETS AND NO INTERACTION BTWN THE 2 AGENCIES. PERSONALLY, I FAILED TO BE MORE DEFINITE AND RESOURCEFUL IN CONTACTING ANOTHER AGENCY TO COORDINATE A DEP, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE WAS HVY IFR TFC THAT TIME OF DAY IN THE WHOLE AREA. I WAS NOT AWARE THAT ANYONE WOULD BE WORKING WITH BEAUFORT APCH. I FELT I COULD GET CLRNC ONCE AIRBORNE, AS I WAS UNABLE ON THE GND. I REVIEWED THE AIM (5-1-7), AND IT IS IN MY READING UNCLR ABOUT OTHER WAYS TO FILE A FLT PLAN AT NON TWRED ARPTS. ALSO, I THOUGHT I WOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN VFR SIGNIFICANTLY LONGER THAN I WAS. I BELIEVE THAT INTEGRATING ALL APCHS THROUGH ONE COMMON AGENCY WOULD HAVE HELPED AVOID THIS INCIDENT. I DID NOT FEEL IN A HURRY TO GET THE FLT UNDERWAY, AND FELT CONFIDENT THAT MY ABILITIES WERE GREAT ENOUGH TO FLY SAFELY IN THAT ENVIRONMENT AND THAT THE ACFT WAS WELL EQUIPPED FOR ANY WX CONDITION. IT DOES, HOWEVER, LACK A TCASII SYS. AT THE TIME OF THIS WRITING, I AM WAITING TO HEAR OF ANY FURTHER ACTION BY THE SC FSDO. I WAS INFORMED THAT THE TAPES HAVE BEEN SENT TO THEM FOR REVIEW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.