Narrative:

Our B727-200 was en route to sacramento from denver. Climb and initial cruise were normal. The aircraft had numerous deferred items, which is unusual in the airplanes we usually fly. The crew discussed all the deferrals and how it would affect us operationally. The deferred items included: 1) red 'doors' light and right gear door light on with landing gear up, no operational restrs. 2) automatic pack trip/engine fail light inoperative. 3) #3 fuel quantity gauge inoperative. 4) APU inoperative. Takeoff and climb were uneventful. ATC kept us lower than the flight plan provided and the lower altitude appeared to be using more gas as was indicated by our first fuel check. The discrepancy was about 1200 pounds below projected. The crew discussed the shortage and according to the flight plan, there still was plenty of gas. The next fuel check also indicated 1200 pounds low. The captain was flying the aircraft and noticed that more and more left rudder trim was required. It had reached the point of 3 units of left rudder trim, which is very unusual. The captain mentioned his concern for this condition and suggested that the red 'doors' light and right gear door light that was illuminated was actually indicating a gear door dragging, causing the rudder trip condition and the increased fuel consumption. The captain sent the so back to see if there was any unusual vibration. The so returned and said that he did perceive a vibration in the landing gear area. The crew reviewed the maintenance log write-up and decided to put the gear handle to the up position. The gear door lights went out, but the captain did not notice an improvement in the rudder trim condition. Shortly after this, the so indicated to the captain that he had a fuel split. Upon closer inspection, it appeared that it was becoming worse than just a split. #1 fuel tank indicated approximately 2500 pounds, #2 tank approximately 4000 pounds, and #3 tank 8600 pounds. #3 tank fuel quantity indicator was deferred inoperative so we had to assume it was the same as #1 or #2. With this situation, the aircraft could have from between 9000 pounds to 11500 pounds. This would be approximately 4000 pounds below what we should have. This caused us some concern because the fuel panel xfeeds had been set tank- to-engine from the before start checklist. There had been no change in the xfeeds the whole flight and all boost pumps had been on with no low fuel pressure lights. This condition seemed to be caused by a possible fuel leak condition. The captain decided to declare an emergency and to divert to the nearest suitable airfield. The fuel panel was continuing to degrade. #1 tank was dropping more rapidly than #2 tank, and the crew had no idea what was in #3 tank since its gauge was inoperative. The #1 tank was soon indicating below 1000 pounds, #2 approximately 3500 pounds. The crew decided it was necessary to open all xfeeds to make sure we did not flame out #1 engine. The captain had the first officer fly the aircraft, while he and the so reviewed all the applicable checklists including reviewing the flameout and engine out procedures. The captain also utilized the jump seater to make all the necessary ACARS inputs. A very expeditious descent and approach was flown in the attempt to get the aircraft on the ground absolutely as fast and safe as possible. The rudder trim condition was a slight factor, but was easy enough to control. The approach speed was flown 5-10 KTS faster than normal target to give more ctlability with the heavy wing. Upon landing, the captain requested the emergency vehicles to inspect the aircraft and to follow to make sure the aircraft condition was all right and there was no streaming fuel. After shutdown, the fuel gauge on #1 tank was approximately 500 pounds, #2 tank approximately 2000 pounds and #3 tank 8600 pounds. The tanks were dripsticked to determine the exact fuel in each. The first report was near what our gauges said. The second report indicated more because an allowance was made for different fuel density. The aircraft left denver with the right amount of fuel as confirmed by the fuel sheet. The fuel remaining as determined by the dripsticks indicated that the aircraft had the right amount of fuel on board for making such a divert. There was no fuel leak as we suspected. It appears that #3 tank stopped feeding #3 engine shortly after reaching altitude. #1 tank may have been feeding #3 engine. It makes no sense because the xfeeds were set tank-to-engine from start-up and stayed that way until the emergency of possible flameout. The boost pumps were always on with no low fuel pressure lights ever indicated until the descent. The captain and first officer can confirm this. The only explanation is an unwanted fuel xfer event. The departure day at den was exceptionally cold (5-10 degrees F with gusty winds present). The cruise altitude was 10 degrees C below standard. This may have been a contributing factor to a frozen valve. Strictly speculation. There is no other way to explain the condition that was experienced. Mismgmnt of the fuel panel was always possible, but the fuel distribution problems that were experienced in this aircraft would be impossible to duplicate with xfeeds and boost pumps alone. It would have taken a concerted mismgmnt effort to come close to this condition. All crew members will confirm that there were no unusual fuel panel configns.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 CREW WAS DISPATCHED WITH MULTIPLE INOP MEL ITEMS, INCLUDING #3 FUEL QUANTITY SYS. INDICATED FUEL BURN WAS EXCESSIVE. FLC DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED TO LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT, RENO, NV.

Narrative: OUR B727-200 WAS ENRTE TO SACRAMENTO FROM DENVER. CLB AND INITIAL CRUISE WERE NORMAL. THE ACFT HAD NUMEROUS DEFERRED ITEMS, WHICH IS UNUSUAL IN THE AIRPLANES WE USUALLY FLY. THE CREW DISCUSSED ALL THE DEFERRALS AND HOW IT WOULD AFFECT US OPERATIONALLY. THE DEFERRED ITEMS INCLUDED: 1) RED 'DOORS' LIGHT AND R GEAR DOOR LIGHT ON WITH LNDG GEAR UP, NO OPERATIONAL RESTRS. 2) AUTO PACK TRIP/ENG FAIL LIGHT INOP. 3) #3 FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE INOP. 4) APU INOP. TKOF AND CLB WERE UNEVENTFUL. ATC KEPT US LOWER THAN THE FLT PLAN PROVIDED AND THE LOWER ALT APPEARED TO BE USING MORE GAS AS WAS INDICATED BY OUR FIRST FUEL CHK. THE DISCREPANCY WAS ABOUT 1200 LBS BELOW PROJECTED. THE CREW DISCUSSED THE SHORTAGE AND ACCORDING TO THE FLT PLAN, THERE STILL WAS PLENTY OF GAS. THE NEXT FUEL CHK ALSO INDICATED 1200 LBS LOW. THE CAPT WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND NOTICED THAT MORE AND MORE L RUDDER TRIM WAS REQUIRED. IT HAD REACHED THE POINT OF 3 UNITS OF L RUDDER TRIM, WHICH IS VERY UNUSUAL. THE CAPT MENTIONED HIS CONCERN FOR THIS CONDITION AND SUGGESTED THAT THE RED 'DOORS' LIGHT AND R GEAR DOOR LIGHT THAT WAS ILLUMINATED WAS ACTUALLY INDICATING A GEAR DOOR DRAGGING, CAUSING THE RUDDER TRIP CONDITION AND THE INCREASED FUEL CONSUMPTION. THE CAPT SENT THE SO BACK TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANY UNUSUAL VIBRATION. THE SO RETURNED AND SAID THAT HE DID PERCEIVE A VIBRATION IN THE LNDG GEAR AREA. THE CREW REVIEWED THE MAINT LOG WRITE-UP AND DECIDED TO PUT THE GEAR HANDLE TO THE UP POS. THE GEAR DOOR LIGHTS WENT OUT, BUT THE CAPT DID NOT NOTICE AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE RUDDER TRIM CONDITION. SHORTLY AFTER THIS, THE SO INDICATED TO THE CAPT THAT HE HAD A FUEL SPLIT. UPON CLOSER INSPECTION, IT APPEARED THAT IT WAS BECOMING WORSE THAN JUST A SPLIT. #1 FUEL TANK INDICATED APPROX 2500 LBS, #2 TANK APPROX 4000 LBS, AND #3 TANK 8600 LBS. #3 TANK FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR WAS DEFERRED INOP SO WE HAD TO ASSUME IT WAS THE SAME AS #1 OR #2. WITH THIS SIT, THE ACFT COULD HAVE FROM BTWN 9000 LBS TO 11500 LBS. THIS WOULD BE APPROX 4000 LBS BELOW WHAT WE SHOULD HAVE. THIS CAUSED US SOME CONCERN BECAUSE THE FUEL PANEL XFEEDS HAD BEEN SET TANK- TO-ENG FROM THE BEFORE START CHKLIST. THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE XFEEDS THE WHOLE FLT AND ALL BOOST PUMPS HAD BEEN ON WITH NO LOW FUEL PRESSURE LIGHTS. THIS CONDITION SEEMED TO BE CAUSED BY A POSSIBLE FUEL LEAK CONDITION. THE CAPT DECIDED TO DECLARE AN EMER AND TO DIVERT TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRFIELD. THE FUEL PANEL WAS CONTINUING TO DEGRADE. #1 TANK WAS DROPPING MORE RAPIDLY THAN #2 TANK, AND THE CREW HAD NO IDEA WHAT WAS IN #3 TANK SINCE ITS GAUGE WAS INOP. THE #1 TANK WAS SOON INDICATING BELOW 1000 LBS, #2 APPROX 3500 LBS. THE CREW DECIDED IT WAS NECESSARY TO OPEN ALL XFEEDS TO MAKE SURE WE DID NOT FLAME OUT #1 ENG. THE CAPT HAD THE FO FLY THE ACFT, WHILE HE AND THE SO REVIEWED ALL THE APPLICABLE CHKLISTS INCLUDING REVIEWING THE FLAMEOUT AND ENG OUT PROCS. THE CAPT ALSO UTILIZED THE JUMP SEATER TO MAKE ALL THE NECESSARY ACARS INPUTS. A VERY EXPEDITIOUS DSCNT AND APCH WAS FLOWN IN THE ATTEMPT TO GET THE ACFT ON THE GND ABSOLUTELY AS FAST AND SAFE AS POSSIBLE. THE RUDDER TRIM CONDITION WAS A SLIGHT FACTOR, BUT WAS EASY ENOUGH TO CTL. THE APCH SPD WAS FLOWN 5-10 KTS FASTER THAN NORMAL TARGET TO GIVE MORE CTLABILITY WITH THE HVY WING. UPON LNDG, THE CAPT REQUESTED THE EMER VEHICLES TO INSPECT THE ACFT AND TO FOLLOW TO MAKE SURE THE ACFT CONDITION WAS ALL RIGHT AND THERE WAS NO STREAMING FUEL. AFTER SHUTDOWN, THE FUEL GAUGE ON #1 TANK WAS APPROX 500 LBS, #2 TANK APPROX 2000 LBS AND #3 TANK 8600 LBS. THE TANKS WERE DRIPSTICKED TO DETERMINE THE EXACT FUEL IN EACH. THE FIRST RPT WAS NEAR WHAT OUR GAUGES SAID. THE SECOND RPT INDICATED MORE BECAUSE AN ALLOWANCE WAS MADE FOR DIFFERENT FUEL DENSITY. THE ACFT LEFT DENVER WITH THE R AMOUNT OF FUEL AS CONFIRMED BY THE FUEL SHEET. THE FUEL REMAINING AS DETERMINED BY THE DRIPSTICKS INDICATED THAT THE ACFT HAD THE RIGHT AMOUNT OF FUEL ON BOARD FOR MAKING SUCH A DIVERT. THERE WAS NO FUEL LEAK AS WE SUSPECTED. IT APPEARS THAT #3 TANK STOPPED FEEDING #3 ENG SHORTLY AFTER REACHING ALT. #1 TANK MAY HAVE BEEN FEEDING #3 ENG. IT MAKES NO SENSE BECAUSE THE XFEEDS WERE SET TANK-TO-ENG FROM START-UP AND STAYED THAT WAY UNTIL THE EMER OF POSSIBLE FLAMEOUT. THE BOOST PUMPS WERE ALWAYS ON WITH NO LOW FUEL PRESSURE LIGHTS EVER INDICATED UNTIL THE DSCNT. THE CAPT AND FO CAN CONFIRM THIS. THE ONLY EXPLANATION IS AN UNWANTED FUEL XFER EVENT. THE DEP DAY AT DEN WAS EXCEPTIONALLY COLD (5-10 DEGS F WITH GUSTY WINDS PRESENT). THE CRUISE ALT WAS 10 DEGS C BELOW STANDARD. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO A FROZEN VALVE. STRICTLY SPECULATION. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO EXPLAIN THE CONDITION THAT WAS EXPERIENCED. MISMGMNT OF THE FUEL PANEL WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE, BUT THE FUEL DISTRIBUTION PROBS THAT WERE EXPERIENCED IN THIS ACFT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DUPLICATE WITH XFEEDS AND BOOST PUMPS ALONE. IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN A CONCERTED MISMGMNT EFFORT TO COME CLOSE TO THIS CONDITION. ALL CREW MEMBERS WILL CONFIRM THAT THERE WERE NO UNUSUAL FUEL PANEL CONFIGNS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.