Narrative:

During routine maintenance on a B737 aircraft #xyz, cfm-56 #2 engine fan blade clean and lube, a set of dampers were found worn, caused by a missing set of axial stops. A set of axial stops and a new set of dampers were installed to correct the problem without further incident. An investigation led back to work performed during scheduled maintenance in ZZZ in which the job task of installing the axial stops, dampers and fan blades was performed. As an aircraft inspector and having performed this task many times before I am fully knowledgeable about the job task I signed for as being complied with. Possible contributing factors are: with different configns, some with or without the same parts along with more than one set of documents with duplicate sign-offs, with the exception of added items, the possibility of confusion exists. Add complacency, with all involved having a lot of experience between us, exists the possibility of a part not being installed, although safety and security was not compromised. In question remains -- what happened to the axial stops if they were not installed? The stops are to be issued as part of a predraw kit. A parts accountability could help prevent a recurrence, along with remaining focused on the importance of the job at hand. Safety first.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-500 WAS RELEASED FOR SVC IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE #2 ENG FAN BLADE DAMPERS MISSING THE AXIAL STOPS.

Narrative: DURING ROUTINE MAINT ON A B737 ACFT #XYZ, CFM-56 #2 ENG FAN BLADE CLEAN AND LUBE, A SET OF DAMPERS WERE FOUND WORN, CAUSED BY A MISSING SET OF AXIAL STOPS. A SET OF AXIAL STOPS AND A NEW SET OF DAMPERS WERE INSTALLED TO CORRECT THE PROB WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AN INVESTIGATION LED BACK TO WORK PERFORMED DURING SCHEDULED MAINT IN ZZZ IN WHICH THE JOB TASK OF INSTALLING THE AXIAL STOPS, DAMPERS AND FAN BLADES WAS PERFORMED. AS AN ACFT INSPECTOR AND HAVING PERFORMED THIS TASK MANY TIMES BEFORE I AM FULLY KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE JOB TASK I SIGNED FOR AS BEING COMPLIED WITH. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE: WITH DIFFERENT CONFIGNS, SOME WITH OR WITHOUT THE SAME PARTS ALONG WITH MORE THAN ONE SET OF DOCUMENTS WITH DUPLICATE SIGN-OFFS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ADDED ITEMS, THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFUSION EXISTS. ADD COMPLACENCY, WITH ALL INVOLVED HAVING A LOT OF EXPERIENCE BTWN US, EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY OF A PART NOT BEING INSTALLED, ALTHOUGH SAFETY AND SECURITY WAS NOT COMPROMISED. IN QUESTION REMAINS -- WHAT HAPPENED TO THE AXIAL STOPS IF THEY WERE NOT INSTALLED? THE STOPS ARE TO BE ISSUED AS PART OF A PREDRAW KIT. A PARTS ACCOUNTABILITY COULD HELP PREVENT A RECURRENCE, ALONG WITH REMAINING FOCUSED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE JOB AT HAND. SAFETY FIRST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.