A B747 in cruise at FL250 experienced a galley oven fire extinguished with 2 halon bottles caused by...

Attributes
ACN	424544
Time
Date	199901
Day	Sat
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : rjss
State Reference	FO
Altitude	msl bound lower : 25000 msl bound upper : 25000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : ord
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B747-100
Flight Phase	cruise other
Route In Use	enroute airway : rjtg
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 90 flight time total : 23500 flight time type : 1200
ASRS Report	424544
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 83 flight time total : 5000 flight time type : 284
ASRS Report	425485
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other other : unspecified
Resolutory Action	flight crew : declared emergency other
Consequence	Other

Narrative:

This was a scheduled air carrier flight, air carrier xyz, from shanghai to tokyo. Aircraft was a B747-200 in passenger confign. During cruise the chief purser reported he was fighting a galley fire in the forward galley oven. We initiated the emergency cockpit procedure which primarily involved disconnecting electrical power to the galleys. The so then proceeded to the galley area to support the fire fighting efforts. Upon his arrival the fire was extinguished and he verified that it had been contained entirely to the interior of 1 oven. This oven was unloaded and further inspected for residual heat and any potential for further ignition. He then reported back to me that the situation was under control and stable. I then inspected the galley personally and verified that there was no ongoing hazard to the aircraft, passenger or crew. The crew universally felt that no further emergency procedures were required and potential hazards were not occurring. Notification was made to the airline maintenance center in ZZZ and to the station operations staff in tokyo where a normal landing was made. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that after the purser discharged the fire bottles and extinguished the fire the reporter inspected the oven and could find no source of the fire nor anything burned. The reporter said the decision was made to continue on to the flight destination. The reporter stated later on after the oven had been removed and sent to the shop it was discovered plastic and food debris was the cause of the fire. The reporter said the material was either left on top of the oven liner when loaded or pulled out of the liner by the oven fan located in the oven top surface. The reporter stated that none of the crew was aware of the removable oven liner and not seeing anything combustible inside the oven could lead to a bad decision. The reporter said crews should be made aware of this removable liner so a complete inspection can be accomplished.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747 IN CRUISE AT FL250 EXPERIENCED A GALLEY OVEN FIRE EXTINGUISHED WITH 2 HALON BOTTLES CAUSED BY DEBRIS COLLECTING ON THE TOP SURFACE OF THE OVEN LINER.

Narrative: THIS WAS A SCHEDULED ACR FLT, ACR XYZ, FROM SHANGHAI TO TOKYO. ACFT WAS A B747-200 IN PAX CONFIGN. DURING CRUISE THE CHIEF PURSER RPTED HE WAS FIGHTING A GALLEY FIRE IN THE FORWARD GALLEY OVEN. WE INITIATED THE EMER COCKPIT PROC WHICH PRIMARILY INVOLVED DISCONNECTING ELECTRICAL PWR TO THE GALLEYS. THE SO THEN PROCEEDED TO THE GALLEY AREA TO SUPPORT THE FIRE FIGHTING EFFORTS. UPON HIS ARR THE FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED AND HE VERIFIED THAT IT HAD BEEN CONTAINED ENTIRELY TO THE INTERIOR OF 1 OVEN. THIS OVEN WAS UNLOADED AND FURTHER INSPECTED FOR RESIDUAL HEAT AND ANY POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER IGNITION. HE THEN RPTED BACK TO ME THAT THE SIT WAS UNDER CTL AND STABLE. I THEN INSPECTED THE GALLEY PERSONALLY AND VERIFIED THAT THERE WAS NO ONGOING HAZARD TO THE ACFT, PAX OR CREW. THE CREW UNIVERSALLY FELT THAT NO FURTHER EMER PROCS WERE REQUIRED AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS WERE NOT OCCURRING. NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE AIRLINE MAINT CTR IN ZZZ AND TO THE STATION OPS STAFF IN TOKYO WHERE A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT AFTER THE PURSER DISCHARGED THE FIRE BOTTLES AND EXTINGUISHED THE FIRE THE RPTR INSPECTED THE OVEN AND COULD FIND NO SOURCE OF THE FIRE NOR ANYTHING BURNED. THE RPTR SAID THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CONTINUE ON TO THE FLT DEST. THE RPTR STATED LATER ON AFTER THE OVEN HAD BEEN REMOVED AND SENT TO THE SHOP IT WAS DISCOVERED PLASTIC AND FOOD DEBRIS WAS THE CAUSE OF THE FIRE. THE RPTR SAID THE MATERIAL WAS EITHER LEFT ON TOP OF THE OVEN LINER WHEN LOADED OR PULLED OUT OF THE LINER BY THE OVEN FAN LOCATED IN THE OVEN TOP SURFACE. THE RPTR STATED THAT NONE OF THE CREW WAS AWARE OF THE REMOVABLE OVEN LINER AND NOT SEEING ANYTHING COMBUSTIBLE INSIDE THE OVEN COULD LEAD TO A BAD DECISION. THE RPTR SAID CREWS SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF THIS REMOVABLE LINER SO A COMPLETE INSPECTION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A B747 in cruise at FL250 experienced a galley oven fire extinguished with 2 halon bottles caused by debris collecting on the top surface of the oven liner.