FK10 crew discovers air conditioning packs had not been turned on before takeoff at stl.

Attributes
ACN	425089
Time
Date	199901
Day	Thu
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : stl
State Reference	MO
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0
Environment
Light	Dawn
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Fokker 100
Navigation In Use	Other
Flight Phase	ground other : taxi
Route In Use	departure other
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : commercial
ASRS Report	425089
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : less severe other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

After departing stl, cabin pressure controller channel message alert appeared on the MFDU. As I was PF, the captain selected manual pressurization and regained control. Cabin rate of climb appeared normal afterward. Also normal psid. A min or two later, the 10000 ft cabin altitude alarm sounded. We found both packs had been left off since ground deicing. Captain restored packs and cabin pressurized normally without further incident. Checked and found no ill effects among passenger or crew. Warning lasted 20-30 seconds, and cabin altitude did not climb visibly past 10000 ft. We believe several events contributed to the situation. We had deiced once and delayed past holdover time during heavy snow. We encountered concerted resistance to redeicing on the part of stl personnel, but succeeded in deicing a second time after refusing to accept anything other than clean wings and surfaces. We then attempted with more success to taxi and depart within the performance envelope of the deice fluid. During the short taxi we made all our adjustments to the tps and spent a lot of time watching traffic and txwys in addition to (ironically) discussing the takeoff and the WX. Time became a bit too compressed. In hindsight, we should have recognized the potential for task saturation and notched up the vigilance or slowed down. Moral of the story: pay more attention and slow down when events begin to pile up.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FK10 CREW DISCOVERS AIR CONDITIONING PACKS HAD NOT BEEN TURNED ON BEFORE TKOF AT STL.

Narrative: AFTER DEPARTING STL, CABIN PRESSURE CTLR CHANNEL MESSAGE ALERT APPEARED ON THE MFDU. AS I WAS PF, THE CAPT SELECTED MANUAL PRESSURIZATION AND REGAINED CTL. CABIN RATE OF CLB APPEARED NORMAL AFTERWARD. ALSO NORMAL PSID. A MIN OR TWO LATER, THE 10000 FT CABIN ALT ALARM SOUNDED. WE FOUND BOTH PACKS HAD BEEN LEFT OFF SINCE GND DEICING. CAPT RESTORED PACKS AND CABIN PRESSURIZED NORMALLY WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CHKED AND FOUND NO ILL EFFECTS AMONG PAX OR CREW. WARNING LASTED 20-30 SECONDS, AND CABIN ALT DID NOT CLB VISIBLY PAST 10000 FT. WE BELIEVE SEVERAL EVENTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SIT. WE HAD DEICED ONCE AND DELAYED PAST HOLDOVER TIME DURING HVY SNOW. WE ENCOUNTERED CONCERTED RESISTANCE TO REDEICING ON THE PART OF STL PERSONNEL, BUT SUCCEEDED IN DEICING A SECOND TIME AFTER REFUSING TO ACCEPT ANYTHING OTHER THAN CLEAN WINGS AND SURFACES. WE THEN ATTEMPTED WITH MORE SUCCESS TO TAXI AND DEPART WITHIN THE PERFORMANCE ENVELOPE OF THE DEICE FLUID. DURING THE SHORT TAXI WE MADE ALL OUR ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TPS AND SPENT A LOT OF TIME WATCHING TFC AND TXWYS IN ADDITION TO (IRONICALLY) DISCUSSING THE TKOF AND THE WX. TIME BECAME A BIT TOO COMPRESSED. IN HINDSIGHT, WE SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL FOR TASK SATURATION AND NOTCHED UP THE VIGILANCE OR SLOWED DOWN. MORAL OF THE STORY: PAY MORE ATTN AND SLOW DOWN WHEN EVENTS BEGIN TO PILE UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.