Narrative:

Dual generator failure during climb out, approximately 4500 ft MSL. Occurred 10-15 seconds after APU master switch was selected off. (Bleeds off takeoff.) ram air turbine deployed. Emergency generator came on line. First officer accomplished ECAM action. Generator #2 restored ok. Generator #1 would not reset on first attempt. APU was started and APU generator came on line. Generator #1 then reset ok. #1 FMGS, #1 autoplt, #1 flight director, autothrust remained inoperative. Aircraft was recovered to cmh, ILS runway 28L. Postflt maintenance report printout showed generator #1 fault. Event is being investigated by company and manufacturer. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain stated that he did not know if the generator switches were in the 'off' or 'on' position for takeoff. The company policy on engine start is to have the generator switches in the off position. This is because there is a fault within the electrical system that creates a 'squeal' on the first officer's side of the aircraft within the communication system upon power xfer that occurs when starting engines with the generator switches 'on.' airbus offered a 'modification' that would relieve that condition. It was tried but it was not successful, so the company went back to the 'generator off' position on engine start. The A320 has a warning chime with an EICAS message that alerts the crew if the generator is not on 1 min after starting the first engine. This did not occur. In the event of a 'no generator takeoff' there is an inhibit time of 1 min and 1500 ft for this warning to occur. The aircraft's APU was turned off just 58 seconds after takeoff, at 7000 ft, cutting off power for this warning source. The captain said that there may have been other problems since there was a moment of time where the #1 AC bus was not active after the #2 generator was online, indicating a cross bus tie relay was not xferring any power from right side to left side AC. He further stated that the first officer 'saw a #1 generator fault while the #1 AC bus was pwred from the APU.' that would indicate that the #1 generator switch was on since the fault would not be indicated with an off position on the push button. Without that fault being indicated, the captain said that he would have to think that indeed they had taken off with the generator switches in the off position. The airline procedure is for the crews to check the ECAM status before takeoff, not the ECAM electric page which shows the active line connections. They are still using the 'generator off' technique on engine start, with a modification to a higher altitude for the APU to be turned off. The maintenance department has not come up with a final analysis. They changed the generator push buttons and the integrated drive generator. Everything else checked out. Supplemental information from acn 425590: the WX at takeoff time was reported as being 400 ft overcast in light freezing rain. Visibility was approximately 2 mi. It had been dark out for about 2 hours when we pushed back for our taxi over to the deice pad. After the deicing procedure had been completed we started engines and proceeded to the takeoff runway 28L. All checklists were completed, and the captain elected to do a bleeds off takeoff -- because of the snow and ice covered runway. We were cleared for takeoff immediately after switching from ground control frequency to tower frequency. The captain and I were involved in a discussion of rotation techniques during periods of snow fall and freezing rain. It was to be my takeoff, so I was mentally preoccupied with the takeoff procedure. I did a final scan of flight instruments, overhead panel and center pedestal and noticed nothing out of the ordinary. Lights for the APU and APU bleed were on. Engine bleed off lights were illuminated. Engine anti-ice lights were on. I did not see any lights illuminated for the generator switches. Also, no ECAM warning was received at any time before takeoff for generators being off line. However, the electrics page on the lower ECAM was not checked to ensure that the power distribution was actually as it was configured to be: engine generators on, APU generator running but not connected. Of course, it is not this company's policy to check this ECAM page at that time. It is generally accepted, owing to system design, that there is no need to physically check the electrics page. The flight proceeded normally until, at about 7000 ft, the captain began to reconfigure the aircraft bleed system. Actually, the bleeds were reconfigured at around 3000-4000 ft, but the APU was shut down at about 7000 ft. Seconds after shutting down the APU, the aircraft went dark. All system went down. The ram air turbine had deployed as advertised and was operating normally. We began the ECAM action checklist. The captain had taken the aircraft by now, and I was running the checklist. Since we expected to be on the ground in just a few mins, I suggested that we restart the APU. The captain agreed, and I pushed the APU master switch, receiving the normal indications. However, I did not push the start switch. Instead, I reached up and reset the #2 generator switch. It worked. All system and lights came back. At this time the captain reached for and pushed the APU start switch which started the APU normally. I then checked the electrics page on the ECAM and noted that generator #2 was on line as normal and the APU had picked up the #1 dc and AC system. I looked up and noted that the fault light for the #1 generator was illuminated. Finally, I reset the #1 generator and checked to see that it was properly on line and pwring its normal components. We completed the flight under somewhat standard procedures, although the captain continued to hand fly the aircraft, because of the loss of autothrust. After the aircraft was shut down at the gate we received, of course, a rather lengthy centralized fault display system readout of system failures and warnings. The third item in the warnings column was a generator #1 failure, or fault, at PM05Z, which is when we lost all power. In talking to technical support, we have learned that there is a known condition in which a generator switch may be in the on position, with its associated 'off' light out, and still not have the generator connected through its relay. In such a condition a spike may occur in a power xfer from the shutdown of the APU without first xferring electrical load to another generator. Callback conversation with reporter acn 425590 revealed the following information: the first officer reporter stated that the maintenance department had informed him that the idg, the generator drives, were all ok. No mention of the generator push button's condition. The company is taking a casual view towards the flight crew and bending most of their efforts in attempting to solve this aircraft incident. An ongoing aircraft equipment investigation. No 'finger pointing' at the crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 LOSES ALL ELECTRICAL PWR ON A DEP CLB THROUGH 7000 FT, 10 MI W OF CMH DURING A NIGHT OP. LOSS OCCURRED AFTER THE FO TURNED OFF THE APU.

Narrative: DUAL GENERATOR FAILURE DURING CLBOUT, APPROX 4500 FT MSL. OCCURRED 10-15 SECONDS AFTER APU MASTER SWITCH WAS SELECTED OFF. (BLEEDS OFF TKOF.) RAM AIR TURBINE DEPLOYED. EMER GENERATOR CAME ON LINE. FO ACCOMPLISHED ECAM ACTION. GENERATOR #2 RESTORED OK. GENERATOR #1 WOULD NOT RESET ON FIRST ATTEMPT. APU WAS STARTED AND APU GENERATOR CAME ON LINE. GENERATOR #1 THEN RESET OK. #1 FMGS, #1 AUTOPLT, #1 FLT DIRECTOR, AUTOTHRUST REMAINED INOP. ACFT WAS RECOVERED TO CMH, ILS RWY 28L. POSTFLT MAINT RPT PRINTOUT SHOWED GENERATOR #1 FAULT. EVENT IS BEING INVESTIGATED BY COMPANY AND MANUFACTURER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT STATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE GENERATOR SWITCHES WERE IN THE 'OFF' OR 'ON' POS FOR TKOF. THE COMPANY POLICY ON ENG START IS TO HAVE THE GENERATOR SWITCHES IN THE OFF POS. THIS IS BECAUSE THERE IS A FAULT WITHIN THE ELECTRICAL SYS THAT CREATES A 'SQUEAL' ON THE FO'S SIDE OF THE ACFT WITHIN THE COM SYS UPON PWR XFER THAT OCCURS WHEN STARTING ENGS WITH THE GENERATOR SWITCHES 'ON.' AIRBUS OFFERED A 'MODIFICATION' THAT WOULD RELIEVE THAT CONDITION. IT WAS TRIED BUT IT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL, SO THE COMPANY WENT BACK TO THE 'GENERATOR OFF' POS ON ENG START. THE A320 HAS A WARNING CHIME WITH AN EICAS MESSAGE THAT ALERTS THE CREW IF THE GENERATOR IS NOT ON 1 MIN AFTER STARTING THE FIRST ENG. THIS DID NOT OCCUR. IN THE EVENT OF A 'NO GENERATOR TKOF' THERE IS AN INHIBIT TIME OF 1 MIN AND 1500 FT FOR THIS WARNING TO OCCUR. THE ACFT'S APU WAS TURNED OFF JUST 58 SECONDS AFTER TKOF, AT 7000 FT, CUTTING OFF PWR FOR THIS WARNING SOURCE. THE CAPT SAID THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN OTHER PROBS SINCE THERE WAS A MOMENT OF TIME WHERE THE #1 AC BUS WAS NOT ACTIVE AFTER THE #2 GENERATOR WAS ONLINE, INDICATING A CROSS BUS TIE RELAY WAS NOT XFERRING ANY PWR FROM R SIDE TO L SIDE AC. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE FO 'SAW A #1 GENERATOR FAULT WHILE THE #1 AC BUS WAS PWRED FROM THE APU.' THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT THE #1 GENERATOR SWITCH WAS ON SINCE THE FAULT WOULD NOT BE INDICATED WITH AN OFF POS ON THE PUSH BUTTON. WITHOUT THAT FAULT BEING INDICATED, THE CAPT SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK THAT INDEED THEY HAD TAKEN OFF WITH THE GENERATOR SWITCHES IN THE OFF POS. THE AIRLINE PROC IS FOR THE CREWS TO CHK THE ECAM STATUS BEFORE TKOF, NOT THE ECAM ELECTRIC PAGE WHICH SHOWS THE ACTIVE LINE CONNECTIONS. THEY ARE STILL USING THE 'GENERATOR OFF' TECHNIQUE ON ENG START, WITH A MODIFICATION TO A HIGHER ALT FOR THE APU TO BE TURNED OFF. THE MAINT DEPT HAS NOT COME UP WITH A FINAL ANALYSIS. THEY CHANGED THE GENERATOR PUSH BUTTONS AND THE INTEGRATED DRIVE GENERATOR. EVERYTHING ELSE CHKED OUT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 425590: THE WX AT TKOF TIME WAS RPTED AS BEING 400 FT OVCST IN LIGHT FREEZING RAIN. VISIBILITY WAS APPROX 2 MI. IT HAD BEEN DARK OUT FOR ABOUT 2 HRS WHEN WE PUSHED BACK FOR OUR TAXI OVER TO THE DEICE PAD. AFTER THE DEICING PROC HAD BEEN COMPLETED WE STARTED ENGS AND PROCEEDED TO THE TKOF RWY 28L. ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED, AND THE CAPT ELECTED TO DO A BLEEDS OFF TKOF -- BECAUSE OF THE SNOW AND ICE COVERED RWY. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF IMMEDIATELY AFTER SWITCHING FROM GND CTL FREQ TO TWR FREQ. THE CAPT AND I WERE INVOLVED IN A DISCUSSION OF ROTATION TECHNIQUES DURING PERIODS OF SNOW FALL AND FREEZING RAIN. IT WAS TO BE MY TKOF, SO I WAS MENTALLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE TKOF PROC. I DID A FINAL SCAN OF FLT INSTS, OVERHEAD PANEL AND CTR PEDESTAL AND NOTICED NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY. LIGHTS FOR THE APU AND APU BLEED WERE ON. ENG BLEED OFF LIGHTS WERE ILLUMINATED. ENG ANTI-ICE LIGHTS WERE ON. I DID NOT SEE ANY LIGHTS ILLUMINATED FOR THE GENERATOR SWITCHES. ALSO, NO ECAM WARNING WAS RECEIVED AT ANY TIME BEFORE TKOF FOR GENERATORS BEING OFF LINE. HOWEVER, THE ELECTRICS PAGE ON THE LOWER ECAM WAS NOT CHKED TO ENSURE THAT THE PWR DISTRIBUTION WAS ACTUALLY AS IT WAS CONFIGURED TO BE: ENG GENERATORS ON, APU GENERATOR RUNNING BUT NOT CONNECTED. OF COURSE, IT IS NOT THIS COMPANY'S POLICY TO CHK THIS ECAM PAGE AT THAT TIME. IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED, OWING TO SYS DESIGN, THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO PHYSICALLY CHK THE ELECTRICS PAGE. THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY UNTIL, AT ABOUT 7000 FT, THE CAPT BEGAN TO RECONFIGURE THE ACFT BLEED SYS. ACTUALLY, THE BLEEDS WERE RECONFIGURED AT AROUND 3000-4000 FT, BUT THE APU WAS SHUT DOWN AT ABOUT 7000 FT. SECONDS AFTER SHUTTING DOWN THE APU, THE ACFT WENT DARK. ALL SYS WENT DOWN. THE RAM AIR TURBINE HAD DEPLOYED AS ADVERTISED AND WAS OPERATING NORMALLY. WE BEGAN THE ECAM ACTION CHKLIST. THE CAPT HAD TAKEN THE ACFT BY NOW, AND I WAS RUNNING THE CHKLIST. SINCE WE EXPECTED TO BE ON THE GND IN JUST A FEW MINS, I SUGGESTED THAT WE RESTART THE APU. THE CAPT AGREED, AND I PUSHED THE APU MASTER SWITCH, RECEIVING THE NORMAL INDICATIONS. HOWEVER, I DID NOT PUSH THE START SWITCH. INSTEAD, I REACHED UP AND RESET THE #2 GENERATOR SWITCH. IT WORKED. ALL SYS AND LIGHTS CAME BACK. AT THIS TIME THE CAPT REACHED FOR AND PUSHED THE APU START SWITCH WHICH STARTED THE APU NORMALLY. I THEN CHKED THE ELECTRICS PAGE ON THE ECAM AND NOTED THAT GENERATOR #2 WAS ON LINE AS NORMAL AND THE APU HAD PICKED UP THE #1 DC AND AC SYS. I LOOKED UP AND NOTED THAT THE FAULT LIGHT FOR THE #1 GENERATOR WAS ILLUMINATED. FINALLY, I RESET THE #1 GENERATOR AND CHKED TO SEE THAT IT WAS PROPERLY ON LINE AND PWRING ITS NORMAL COMPONENTS. WE COMPLETED THE FLT UNDER SOMEWHAT STANDARD PROCS, ALTHOUGH THE CAPT CONTINUED TO HAND FLY THE ACFT, BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF AUTOTHRUST. AFTER THE ACFT WAS SHUT DOWN AT THE GATE WE RECEIVED, OF COURSE, A RATHER LENGTHY CENTRALIZED FAULT DISPLAY SYS READOUT OF SYS FAILURES AND WARNINGS. THE THIRD ITEM IN THE WARNINGS COLUMN WAS A GENERATOR #1 FAILURE, OR FAULT, AT PM05Z, WHICH IS WHEN WE LOST ALL PWR. IN TALKING TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THERE IS A KNOWN CONDITION IN WHICH A GENERATOR SWITCH MAY BE IN THE ON POS, WITH ITS ASSOCIATED 'OFF' LIGHT OUT, AND STILL NOT HAVE THE GENERATOR CONNECTED THROUGH ITS RELAY. IN SUCH A CONDITION A SPIKE MAY OCCUR IN A PWR XFER FROM THE SHUTDOWN OF THE APU WITHOUT FIRST XFERRING ELECTRICAL LOAD TO ANOTHER GENERATOR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 425590 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO RPTR STATED THAT THE MAINT DEPT HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THE IDG, THE GENERATOR DRIVES, WERE ALL OK. NO MENTION OF THE GENERATOR PUSH BUTTON'S CONDITION. THE COMPANY IS TAKING A CASUAL VIEW TOWARDS THE FLC AND BENDING MOST OF THEIR EFFORTS IN ATTEMPTING TO SOLVE THIS ACFT INCIDENT. AN ONGOING ACFT EQUIP INVESTIGATION. NO 'FINGER POINTING' AT THE CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.