Narrative:

Due to heavy aircraft weight at mdw, company provided takeoff and landing data received via company gate agent at time of departure. This allowed for only 1 legal runway at mdw, and required bleeds off for takeoff. Unfortunately, this only legal option (runway 22L at mdw) was not the active runway. Due to winds (approximately 130 degrees at 8 KTS) mdw was operating runway 13 and runway 4. Due to runway slope, our computer generated takeoff and landing data allowed only runway 22L. The ground controller questioned our requirement, then advised us to expect a long delay waiting for an opposite direction takeoff in IMC (in chicago). As we were starting engines (#2 started, beginning to start #1), the ground controller advised us they had an opportunity to take off if we took off immediately. We felt we could do this, so we completed engine start and all checks prior to takeoff while taxiing to the takeoff position. Our takeoff and landing data required zero tailwind for us to use this only option. Because we knew the takeoff opportunity on the opposite direction runway was fleeting, and both the automated weight and data and ATIS said the winds were precisely a direct crosswind, we felt 'pressured' to hurry and take the opportunity to take off when, in hindsight, with such adverse conditions, it would be better to slow down, reduce weight, wait for better conditions, etc. If the winds varied at all during takeoff to even a slight tailwind (which is quite possible), we would not have had valid takeoff and landing data. A second big lesson is that central load planning should never allow a passenger and fuel load that requires a bleeds off takeoff on a non active runway at a major airport -- especially during IMC. Supplemental information from acn 425867: numerous radio chatter along with talking to the tug driver caused much confusion. Anyway, I relayed the information to the tug driver and we proceeded to push. Tug was disconnecting, etc. Ground then gave us taxi instructions as I was saluting the ramp personnel for clearance to taxi. Told to taxi on taxiway then turn onto runway 13L and hold short of runway 4R at the intersection. Began the taxi while consulting the airport diagram and first officer accomplishing the taxi checklist. Also have the weight and balance issue rattling around in my head convincing myself that this was correct. Additionally, figured a delay would allow us to burn more fuel thereby padding our margin. Many radio calls going on at the same time with ground still questioning our need for runway 22L. I transmitted that it was the slope that made the difference. About this time we were at the intersection of the runways and a plane was rolling out on runway 4R. Unexpectedly, tower then said to follow the landing aircraft down the runway, do a 180 degree turn and be ready to go. Hurriedly called for the before takeoff checklist and started to taxi. Many things still rattling around in my head as we hurried. -- Before takeoff checklist, configuring for no bleed takeoff, etc. I did note the windsock and noted it was limp. As we neared the end of the runway and I was concentrating on making my turn, we were cleared for an immediate takeoff. At this point I felt confident about being safe for takeoff but didn't like the feeling of being so rushed. At any rate we took off without incident. I then started to have uneasy feelings about the whole affair. Couldn't say for sure what tower said the winds were, etc. Thought he said 130 degrees at 4 KTS. This was further confirmed by my observation of the windsock. About this time I noticed a message light flashing on our ACARS panel (not in our normal field of view). I pulled the message up and it was the dispatcher advising us that the winds were shifting and we might be overweight. I noted that it was written 2 mins prior to our takeoff, about the time we were hurrying down the runway. I was furious at myself for not just stopping and making darned sure we were legal. I was also furious with the company for putting me in such a compromising situation. After the flight I pulled out the manual and accomplished an additional manual weight and balance calculation. The result was that we were legal if the wind direction was 130 degrees or greater. I checked the copy of the ATIS that I had along with the WX reports. All showed the winds to be 130 degrees and 140 degrees. I should note that this was the last leg of a 4 day trip. It's ironic that on the first flight that day the first officer made a comment that most errors seem to occur on the last day of a trip and I told him that I agreed wholeheartedly. In retrospect, I let my attitude towards accomplishing the mission and my fatigue cloud my judgement. Short runways, weird winds, unfamiliarity with the airport all contribute to making mistakes. I also feel that the company should not have planned the flight so close. They should have planned to limit the weight to that allowed for the active runway. At the very least, perhaps, a heads up call in advance would have given us more time to study the situation and plan options.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 FLC RPT ON A POSSIBLE OVERWT TKOF ON A NON PREFERRED RWY, OPPOSITE DIRECTION TO THE ACTIVE, AT MDW ARPT.

Narrative: DUE TO HVY ACFT WT AT MDW, COMPANY PROVIDED TKOF AND LNDG DATA RECEIVED VIA COMPANY GATE AGENT AT TIME OF DEP. THIS ALLOWED FOR ONLY 1 LEGAL RWY AT MDW, AND REQUIRED BLEEDS OFF FOR TKOF. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS ONLY LEGAL OPTION (RWY 22L AT MDW) WAS NOT THE ACTIVE RWY. DUE TO WINDS (APPROX 130 DEGS AT 8 KTS) MDW WAS OPERATING RWY 13 AND RWY 4. DUE TO RWY SLOPE, OUR COMPUTER GENERATED TKOF AND LNDG DATA ALLOWED ONLY RWY 22L. THE GND CTLR QUESTIONED OUR REQUIREMENT, THEN ADVISED US TO EXPECT A LONG DELAY WAITING FOR AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION TKOF IN IMC (IN CHICAGO). AS WE WERE STARTING ENGS (#2 STARTED, BEGINNING TO START #1), THE GND CTLR ADVISED US THEY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE OFF IF WE TOOK OFF IMMEDIATELY. WE FELT WE COULD DO THIS, SO WE COMPLETED ENG START AND ALL CHKS PRIOR TO TKOF WHILE TAXIING TO THE TKOF POS. OUR TKOF AND LNDG DATA REQUIRED ZERO TAILWIND FOR US TO USE THIS ONLY OPTION. BECAUSE WE KNEW THE TKOF OPPORTUNITY ON THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION RWY WAS FLEETING, AND BOTH THE AUTOMATED WT AND DATA AND ATIS SAID THE WINDS WERE PRECISELY A DIRECT XWIND, WE FELT 'PRESSURED' TO HURRY AND TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE OFF WHEN, IN HINDSIGHT, WITH SUCH ADVERSE CONDITIONS, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO SLOW DOWN, REDUCE WT, WAIT FOR BETTER CONDITIONS, ETC. IF THE WINDS VARIED AT ALL DURING TKOF TO EVEN A SLIGHT TAILWIND (WHICH IS QUITE POSSIBLE), WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD VALID TKOF AND LNDG DATA. A SECOND BIG LESSON IS THAT CENTRAL LOAD PLANNING SHOULD NEVER ALLOW A PAX AND FUEL LOAD THAT REQUIRES A BLEEDS OFF TKOF ON A NON ACTIVE RWY AT A MAJOR ARPT -- ESPECIALLY DURING IMC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 425867: NUMEROUS RADIO CHATTER ALONG WITH TALKING TO THE TUG DRIVER CAUSED MUCH CONFUSION. ANYWAY, I RELAYED THE INFO TO THE TUG DRIVER AND WE PROCEEDED TO PUSH. TUG WAS DISCONNECTING, ETC. GND THEN GAVE US TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AS I WAS SALUTING THE RAMP PERSONNEL FOR CLRNC TO TAXI. TOLD TO TAXI ON TXWY THEN TURN ONTO RWY 13L AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4R AT THE INTXN. BEGAN THE TAXI WHILE CONSULTING THE ARPT DIAGRAM AND FO ACCOMPLISHING THE TAXI CHKLIST. ALSO HAVE THE WT AND BAL ISSUE RATTLING AROUND IN MY HEAD CONVINCING MYSELF THAT THIS WAS CORRECT. ADDITIONALLY, FIGURED A DELAY WOULD ALLOW US TO BURN MORE FUEL THEREBY PADDING OUR MARGIN. MANY RADIO CALLS GOING ON AT THE SAME TIME WITH GND STILL QUESTIONING OUR NEED FOR RWY 22L. I XMITTED THAT IT WAS THE SLOPE THAT MADE THE DIFFERENCE. ABOUT THIS TIME WE WERE AT THE INTXN OF THE RWYS AND A PLANE WAS ROLLING OUT ON RWY 4R. UNEXPECTEDLY, TWR THEN SAID TO FOLLOW THE LNDG ACFT DOWN THE RWY, DO A 180 DEG TURN AND BE READY TO GO. HURRIEDLY CALLED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND STARTED TO TAXI. MANY THINGS STILL RATTLING AROUND IN MY HEAD AS WE HURRIED. -- BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, CONFIGURING FOR NO BLEED TKOF, ETC. I DID NOTE THE WINDSOCK AND NOTED IT WAS LIMP. AS WE NEARED THE END OF THE RWY AND I WAS CONCENTRATING ON MAKING MY TURN, WE WERE CLRED FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. AT THIS POINT I FELT CONFIDENT ABOUT BEING SAFE FOR TKOF BUT DIDN'T LIKE THE FEELING OF BEING SO RUSHED. AT ANY RATE WE TOOK OFF WITHOUT INCIDENT. I THEN STARTED TO HAVE UNEASY FEELINGS ABOUT THE WHOLE AFFAIR. COULDN'T SAY FOR SURE WHAT TWR SAID THE WINDS WERE, ETC. THOUGHT HE SAID 130 DEGS AT 4 KTS. THIS WAS FURTHER CONFIRMED BY MY OBSERVATION OF THE WINDSOCK. ABOUT THIS TIME I NOTICED A MESSAGE LIGHT FLASHING ON OUR ACARS PANEL (NOT IN OUR NORMAL FIELD OF VIEW). I PULLED THE MESSAGE UP AND IT WAS THE DISPATCHER ADVISING US THAT THE WINDS WERE SHIFTING AND WE MIGHT BE OVERWT. I NOTED THAT IT WAS WRITTEN 2 MINS PRIOR TO OUR TKOF, ABOUT THE TIME WE WERE HURRYING DOWN THE RWY. I WAS FURIOUS AT MYSELF FOR NOT JUST STOPPING AND MAKING DARNED SURE WE WERE LEGAL. I WAS ALSO FURIOUS WITH THE COMPANY FOR PUTTING ME IN SUCH A COMPROMISING SIT. AFTER THE FLT I PULLED OUT THE MANUAL AND ACCOMPLISHED AN ADDITIONAL MANUAL WT AND BAL CALCULATION. THE RESULT WAS THAT WE WERE LEGAL IF THE WIND DIRECTION WAS 130 DEGS OR GREATER. I CHKED THE COPY OF THE ATIS THAT I HAD ALONG WITH THE WX RPTS. ALL SHOWED THE WINDS TO BE 130 DEGS AND 140 DEGS. I SHOULD NOTE THAT THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP. IT'S IRONIC THAT ON THE FIRST FLT THAT DAY THE FO MADE A COMMENT THAT MOST ERRORS SEEM TO OCCUR ON THE LAST DAY OF A TRIP AND I TOLD HIM THAT I AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY. IN RETROSPECT, I LET MY ATTITUDE TOWARDS ACCOMPLISHING THE MISSION AND MY FATIGUE CLOUD MY JUDGEMENT. SHORT RWYS, WEIRD WINDS, UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT ALL CONTRIBUTE TO MAKING MISTAKES. I ALSO FEEL THAT THE COMPANY SHOULD NOT HAVE PLANNED THE FLT SO CLOSE. THEY SHOULD HAVE PLANNED TO LIMIT THE WT TO THAT ALLOWED FOR THE ACTIVE RWY. AT THE VERY LEAST, PERHAPS, A HEADS UP CALL IN ADVANCE WOULD HAVE GIVEN US MORE TIME TO STUDY THE SIT AND PLAN OPTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.