Narrative:

We readied the aircraft for a routine departure for a flight from ZZZ to las with 260 passenger. The aircraft had the APU on MEL, was covered with frost, and the WX was below takeoff minimums. Background: we had flown this aircraft into ZZZ the previous afternoon with no problems. The aircraft overnighted in ZZZ. The APU had been put on the MEL overnight by maintenance -- during the night, on the ground in ZZZ, it had 'filled the cabin with smoke,' and had to be 'svced with 8 qts of oil.' we called dispatch to obtain a takeoff alternate -- msp was selected. The aircraft was deiced and the #2 engine started at the gate. We pushed back at XA00 EST and started engines #1 and #3. The WX had intermittently improved to takeoff minimums on runway 21R. We taxied to runway 21R and took off at XA20 EST with RVR 700/600/600. Shortly after takeoff several flight attendants called the cockpit to report 'smoke or haze in the entire cabin and all lavatory smoke detectors activated.' at the same time we smelled a very strong (chemical) odor of engine oil and/or deicing fluid and observed a fine mist or haze in the cockpit and cabin. We immediately donned oxygen masks and the so started the appropriate checklists starting with: 'air-conditioning smoke.' we completed all appropriate checklists at the appropriate time. We leveled off at 12000 ft departing ZZZ on our planned departure route heading wbound. We ruled out a cargo fire because this aircraft is equipped with: cargo fire, smoke and heat detection. The following cockpit warning lights are installed, of which none activated: 4 cargo smoke detectors, a heat detector, and a 'cargo fire' light on the flight engineer cargo fire/smoke detection panel -- plus 'cargo fire' summary and 'master warning' lights on the pilot's overhead panel and glareshield. Also, there was no smell of fire or burning. We kept track of the nearest airports and considered declaring an emergency, but found that not to be a good and appropriate course of action. Instead, we stayed on our planned (west departure) route which was already programmed into the navigation computers, using standard procedures and profiles. This allowed us to concentrate our efforts, knowledge and ability to work the problem, while heading towards our takeoff alternate. While in level flight (at 12000 ft), and at the same time when so had the #2 pneumatic supply/pack disabled, the cabin had cleared up. With the cabin 'smoke' free -- the so made a personal inspection of the cabin while the first officer and I stayed on oxygen -- we started to climb (at maximum cruise power). During this climb, and after the so had returned from the cabin we discussed our options. We jointly elected to proceed to the nearest suitable airport. At this point chicago was fairly close, and, if the WX was above minimums, it seemed rather foolish not to land the aircraft at there, ord reported RVR 6000 ft. We decided to make a precautionary landing at ord. So contacted dispatch for coordination, we dumped about 5000 pounds of fuel and proceeded to land at ord. Flight attendants and passenger were kept up to date regularly as to our situation, options and intentions. Please note that each and every passenger got back on the same airplane in ord and flew with us to las later that day. All crew members, dispatch, ATC, ord ground crew and mechanics, all did an exceptional job. This potentially disastrous situation was defused with great skill and knowledge and handled with the utmost professionalism by all involved.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10-15 ON INITIAL CLB AT 1000 FT HAD SMOKE AND OIL FUMES IN THE CABIN WHICH THE CREW ISOLATED TO #2 PACK CAUSED BY AN INOP AUX PWR UNIT FILLING THE #2 PNEUMATIC DUCTS WITH OIL.

Narrative: WE READIED THE ACFT FOR A ROUTINE DEP FOR A FLT FROM ZZZ TO LAS WITH 260 PAX. THE ACFT HAD THE APU ON MEL, WAS COVERED WITH FROST, AND THE WX WAS BELOW TKOF MINIMUMS. BACKGROUND: WE HAD FLOWN THIS ACFT INTO ZZZ THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON WITH NO PROBS. THE ACFT OVERNIGHTED IN ZZZ. THE APU HAD BEEN PUT ON THE MEL OVERNIGHT BY MAINT -- DURING THE NIGHT, ON THE GND IN ZZZ, IT HAD 'FILLED THE CABIN WITH SMOKE,' AND HAD TO BE 'SVCED WITH 8 QTS OF OIL.' WE CALLED DISPATCH TO OBTAIN A TKOF ALTERNATE -- MSP WAS SELECTED. THE ACFT WAS DEICED AND THE #2 ENG STARTED AT THE GATE. WE PUSHED BACK AT XA00 EST AND STARTED ENGS #1 AND #3. THE WX HAD INTERMITTENTLY IMPROVED TO TKOF MINIMUMS ON RWY 21R. WE TAXIED TO RWY 21R AND TOOK OFF AT XA20 EST WITH RVR 700/600/600. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF SEVERAL FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED THE COCKPIT TO RPT 'SMOKE OR HAZE IN THE ENTIRE CABIN AND ALL LAVATORY SMOKE DETECTORS ACTIVATED.' AT THE SAME TIME WE SMELLED A VERY STRONG (CHEMICAL) ODOR OF ENG OIL AND/OR DEICING FLUID AND OBSERVED A FINE MIST OR HAZE IN THE COCKPIT AND CABIN. WE IMMEDIATELY DONNED OXYGEN MASKS AND THE SO STARTED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS STARTING WITH: 'AIR-CONDITIONING SMOKE.' WE COMPLETED ALL APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. WE LEVELED OFF AT 12000 FT DEPARTING ZZZ ON OUR PLANNED DEP RTE HEADING WBOUND. WE RULED OUT A CARGO FIRE BECAUSE THIS ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH: CARGO FIRE, SMOKE AND HEAT DETECTION. THE FOLLOWING COCKPIT WARNING LIGHTS ARE INSTALLED, OF WHICH NONE ACTIVATED: 4 CARGO SMOKE DETECTORS, A HEAT DETECTOR, AND A 'CARGO FIRE' LIGHT ON THE FE CARGO FIRE/SMOKE DETECTION PANEL -- PLUS 'CARGO FIRE' SUMMARY AND 'MASTER WARNING' LIGHTS ON THE PLT'S OVERHEAD PANEL AND GLARESHIELD. ALSO, THERE WAS NO SMELL OF FIRE OR BURNING. WE KEPT TRACK OF THE NEAREST ARPTS AND CONSIDERED DECLARING AN EMER, BUT FOUND THAT NOT TO BE A GOOD AND APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION. INSTEAD, WE STAYED ON OUR PLANNED (W DEP) RTE WHICH WAS ALREADY PROGRAMMED INTO THE NAV COMPUTERS, USING STANDARD PROCS AND PROFILES. THIS ALLOWED US TO CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS, KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY TO WORK THE PROB, WHILE HEADING TOWARDS OUR TKOF ALTERNATE. WHILE IN LEVEL FLT (AT 12000 FT), AND AT THE SAME TIME WHEN SO HAD THE #2 PNEUMATIC SUPPLY/PACK DISABLED, THE CABIN HAD CLRED UP. WITH THE CABIN 'SMOKE' FREE -- THE SO MADE A PERSONAL INSPECTION OF THE CABIN WHILE THE FO AND I STAYED ON OXYGEN -- WE STARTED TO CLB (AT MAX CRUISE PWR). DURING THIS CLB, AND AFTER THE SO HAD RETURNED FROM THE CABIN WE DISCUSSED OUR OPTIONS. WE JOINTLY ELECTED TO PROCEED TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. AT THIS POINT CHICAGO WAS FAIRLY CLOSE, AND, IF THE WX WAS ABOVE MINIMUMS, IT SEEMED RATHER FOOLISH NOT TO LAND THE ACFT AT THERE, ORD RPTED RVR 6000 FT. WE DECIDED TO MAKE A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG AT ORD. SO CONTACTED DISPATCH FOR COORD, WE DUMPED ABOUT 5000 LBS OF FUEL AND PROCEEDED TO LAND AT ORD. FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX WERE KEPT UP TO DATE REGULARLY AS TO OUR SIT, OPTIONS AND INTENTIONS. PLEASE NOTE THAT EACH AND EVERY PAX GOT BACK ON THE SAME AIRPLANE IN ORD AND FLEW WITH US TO LAS LATER THAT DAY. ALL CREW MEMBERS, DISPATCH, ATC, ORD GND CREW AND MECHS, ALL DID AN EXCEPTIONAL JOB. THIS POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS SIT WAS DEFUSED WITH GREAT SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE AND HANDLED WITH THE UTMOST PROFESSIONALISM BY ALL INVOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.