Narrative:

Reporting one dark morning at the hangar, I found my first officer already on the aircraft saying she had preflted and was ready to go, with acceptance checklist complete. I checked through the aircraft clipboard and noticed in the deferral log that 'right main landing gear door bellcrank has play, ok per confign deviation list.' after repositioning to the gate, a look at our dispatch release showed us flight planned using our normal climb, cruise and descent profiles at normal airspds, as high as 320 KIAS, and the ete looked normal. In other words, everything seemed normal to me at this point. About 2/3 into our flight, my first officer mentioned some weight penalties noted on the release. There were 2 sets of penalties and restrs, both for the same confign deviation list item in the deferral log. One set for missing gear door brushes, and another for the gear doors themselves. I asked her if it was the brushes that were missing, because surely she would've noticed if the gear door was missing, right? And surely dispatch would have planned the flight for 250 KIAS, along with a grater ete and fuel burn that would've stood out as unusual, right? At least that's what we thought. In order to make sure, we called maintenance on the radio, and to our shock, the right gear door had in fact been removed, and she had missed it in her preflight! We slowed to 250 KIAS for the remainder of the flight, and made a write-up in the clipboard so that an inspection of the gear could be made. No damage was noted upon inspection. While still en route, we called our dispatch, and they admitted that this is a recurring problem that sometimes slips through. In this case, as in many incidents, it's a string of errors from different sources that leads to the outcome. I realize the PIC has the final responsibility for the proper operation of the aircraft, but I need help in achieving that. While it seems unlikely that something like this could be missed, it's been a recurring problem. Of course we must avoid complacency during preflight. Also I few other things that would help: 1) a large placard placed on each side of the cockpit instrument panel, under the existing speed limitations placard, stating 'gear doors removed, maximum 250 KIAS!' 2) make the gear doors and door brushes separate confign deviation list items, not lumped together under 1 entry as they are now, with the 250 KIAS limitation a small note at the bottom of it all. 3) require a clear, unambiguous entry in the deferral log: 'gear doors removed, maximum 250 KIAS!' 4) a better means of flagging aircraft with this deferral in the dispatcher's computer, even programming it to prevent flight planning with normal speed profiles. 5) shortening the expiration of this confign deviation list item from 7 days to 3 days would limit the risk of exposure to this sort of problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CANADAIR CL65 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A MAIN GEAR DOOR REMOVED PER THE CONFIGN DEV LIST. REQUIRED WT AND SPD RESTRS WERE NOT LISTED IN THE DISPATCH RELEASE OR WAS THE COCKPIT INST PANEL PLACARDED.

Narrative: RPTING ONE DARK MORNING AT THE HANGAR, I FOUND MY FO ALREADY ON THE ACFT SAYING SHE HAD PREFLTED AND WAS READY TO GO, WITH ACCEPTANCE CHKLIST COMPLETE. I CHKED THROUGH THE ACFT CLIPBOARD AND NOTICED IN THE DEFERRAL LOG THAT 'R MAIN LNDG GEAR DOOR BELLCRANK HAS PLAY, OK PER CONFIGN DEV LIST.' AFTER REPOSITIONING TO THE GATE, A LOOK AT OUR DISPATCH RELEASE SHOWED US FLT PLANNED USING OUR NORMAL CLB, CRUISE AND DSCNT PROFILES AT NORMAL AIRSPDS, AS HIGH AS 320 KIAS, AND THE ETE LOOKED NORMAL. IN OTHER WORDS, EVERYTHING SEEMED NORMAL TO ME AT THIS POINT. ABOUT 2/3 INTO OUR FLT, MY FO MENTIONED SOME WT PENALTIES NOTED ON THE RELEASE. THERE WERE 2 SETS OF PENALTIES AND RESTRS, BOTH FOR THE SAME CONFIGN DEV LIST ITEM IN THE DEFERRAL LOG. ONE SET FOR MISSING GEAR DOOR BRUSHES, AND ANOTHER FOR THE GEAR DOORS THEMSELVES. I ASKED HER IF IT WAS THE BRUSHES THAT WERE MISSING, BECAUSE SURELY SHE WOULD'VE NOTICED IF THE GEAR DOOR WAS MISSING, RIGHT? AND SURELY DISPATCH WOULD HAVE PLANNED THE FLT FOR 250 KIAS, ALONG WITH A GRATER ETE AND FUEL BURN THAT WOULD'VE STOOD OUT AS UNUSUAL, RIGHT? AT LEAST THAT'S WHAT WE THOUGHT. IN ORDER TO MAKE SURE, WE CALLED MAINT ON THE RADIO, AND TO OUR SHOCK, THE R GEAR DOOR HAD IN FACT BEEN REMOVED, AND SHE HAD MISSED IT IN HER PREFLT! WE SLOWED TO 250 KIAS FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT, AND MADE A WRITE-UP IN THE CLIPBOARD SO THAT AN INSPECTION OF THE GEAR COULD BE MADE. NO DAMAGE WAS NOTED UPON INSPECTION. WHILE STILL ENRTE, WE CALLED OUR DISPATCH, AND THEY ADMITTED THAT THIS IS A RECURRING PROB THAT SOMETIMES SLIPS THROUGH. IN THIS CASE, AS IN MANY INCIDENTS, IT'S A STRING OF ERRORS FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT LEADS TO THE OUTCOME. I REALIZE THE PIC HAS THE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROPER OP OF THE ACFT, BUT I NEED HELP IN ACHIEVING THAT. WHILE IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT SOMETHING LIKE THIS COULD BE MISSED, IT'S BEEN A RECURRING PROB. OF COURSE WE MUST AVOID COMPLACENCY DURING PREFLT. ALSO I FEW OTHER THINGS THAT WOULD HELP: 1) A LARGE PLACARD PLACED ON EACH SIDE OF THE COCKPIT INST PANEL, UNDER THE EXISTING SPD LIMITATIONS PLACARD, STATING 'GEAR DOORS REMOVED, MAX 250 KIAS!' 2) MAKE THE GEAR DOORS AND DOOR BRUSHES SEPARATE CONFIGN DEV LIST ITEMS, NOT LUMPED TOGETHER UNDER 1 ENTRY AS THEY ARE NOW, WITH THE 250 KIAS LIMITATION A SMALL NOTE AT THE BOTTOM OF IT ALL. 3) REQUIRE A CLR, UNAMBIGUOUS ENTRY IN THE DEFERRAL LOG: 'GEAR DOORS REMOVED, MAX 250 KIAS!' 4) A BETTER MEANS OF FLAGGING ACFT WITH THIS DEFERRAL IN THE DISPATCHER'S COMPUTER, EVEN PROGRAMMING IT TO PREVENT FLT PLANNING WITH NORMAL SPD PROFILES. 5) SHORTENING THE EXPIRATION OF THIS CONFIGN DEV LIST ITEM FROM 7 DAYS TO 3 DAYS WOULD LIMIT THE RISK OF EXPOSURE TO THIS SORT OF PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.