Narrative:

As we initiated our taxi to runway 21, we began a turn to the right to maneuver between an aircraft in front of us and another aircraft to our right side. Throughout this procedure, the copilot was watching my right wing clearance and I was observing the clearance of the left wing of the aircraft and of course simultaneously minding the clearance on the right wing. After clearing the aircraft to our left (previously in front of) and clearing the nose of the aircraft to our right, a further r-hand turn was initiated to exit the ramp. As we approached the right wing of the parked aircraft on our right side, the copilot and I both affixed our primary attention to the right wing although I was also maintaining vigilance of the left side of the aircraft as we approached the edge of the taxiway. As we discussed the clearance between our aircraft and the aircraft on our right, the copilot stated, 'I'm not as confident about this one.' I immediately slowed the aircraft further and approximately 2 seconds later, we contacted the right wingtip of the parked aircraft. I immediately backed our aircraft approximately 4 inches so our wings would not be contacting each other and initiated an immediate shutdown of our aircraft. After completing the shutdown procedure, I explained the situation to the passenger and asked if they could please disembark the airplane and wait in the passenger lounge until we could further evaluate the situation. Upon examination of the point of contact, the following damage was observed: the resulting damage to our king air 350 was chipped paint extending along 3 inches of the right winglet. There was no damage to the fiberglas structure below the paint. The resulting damage to the parked aircraft (king air 200) was a broken lens cover containing the right wing navigation lights and slight bending of the navigation light housing. After examining the damage, I immediately set about locating the pilot of the other aircraft and upon finding him, apologized and explained the situation. I then located an aircraft mechanic from the FBO and asked him to evaluate the extent of the damage. He confirmed that there was no structural damage to the winglet of the king air 350 and confirmed the aforementioned damage to the other aircraft. The mechanic expressed that he may have a replacement lens cover in stock for the other aircraft. I telephoned the flight department offices and explained the situation to our aircraft scheduler and director of maintenance, mr X. Mr X confirmed the airworthiness of the aircraft. After conferring with the pilot of the other aircraft (mr Y) we exchanged phone numbers, addresses, and company information. After many apologies, I once again expressed my regret and explained we would be in contact with him again by monday morning. Factors contributing to the accident: 1) congested ramp area with little room for maneuvering. 2) other parking ramp exit was partially blocked by another aircraft. 3) no wing walkers or guidance from ground personnel outside the aircraft. 4) I believe a false confidence had been established by having been forced to successfully taxi on this congested ramp many times before. 5) previous conflicts in personalities between copilot and myself may have led to a lack of communication during the incident. Regrettably it is too late, but I can now see that the friction between the copilot and myself may have been a primary contributing factor in this accident. Final summary: the accident which occurred was unfortunate and although it was an accident, it was an accident which was completely preventable. Proper discussion between the pilot and copilot as we approached the other aircraft should have revealed that continuing brought unnecessary risks. In retrospect, any of the following courses of action may have prevented the accident: 1) evaluating the distance from the wing of the other aircraft to the edge of the taxiway prior to boarding. Simply walking over to the other aircraft before beginning the flight would most likely have revealed that the aircraft was parked too closely to allow our aircraft to pass safely along the taxiway. 2) not allowing the fact that the other ramp exit was blocked force us into the mindset that the other exit is our only option. 3) proper discussion between pilot and copilot regarding clrncs from other aircraft and the appropriate action to take. 4) if any doubt arose in the mind of either pilot, that objection should be voiced and corrective action should be formulated before progressing any further. 5) the use of ground personnel should be used to ascertain adequate aircraft clrncs while the aircraft is taxiing from any crowded ramp area. 6) not allowing the fact that both the pilot and copilot had successfully maneuvered on this ramp during many previous occasions to lull us into a false sense of security.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A BE350 TAXIING ON RAMP HIT THE WINGTIP OF A PARKED BE200. SOME DAMAGE TO EACH ACFT.

Narrative: AS WE INITIATED OUR TAXI TO RWY 21, WE BEGAN A TURN TO THE R TO MANEUVER BTWN AN ACFT IN FRONT OF US AND ANOTHER ACFT TO OUR R SIDE. THROUGHOUT THIS PROC, THE COPLT WAS WATCHING MY R WING CLRNC AND I WAS OBSERVING THE CLRNC OF THE L WING OF THE ACFT AND OF COURSE SIMULTANEOUSLY MINDING THE CLRNC ON THE R WING. AFTER CLRING THE ACFT TO OUR L (PREVIOUSLY IN FRONT OF) AND CLRING THE NOSE OF THE ACFT TO OUR R, A FURTHER R-HAND TURN WAS INITIATED TO EXIT THE RAMP. AS WE APCHED THE R WING OF THE PARKED ACFT ON OUR R SIDE, THE COPLT AND I BOTH AFFIXED OUR PRIMARY ATTN TO THE R WING ALTHOUGH I WAS ALSO MAINTAINING VIGILANCE OF THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT AS WE APCHED THE EDGE OF THE TXWY. AS WE DISCUSSED THE CLRNC BTWN OUR ACFT AND THE ACFT ON OUR R, THE COPLT STATED, 'I'M NOT AS CONFIDENT ABOUT THIS ONE.' I IMMEDIATELY SLOWED THE ACFT FURTHER AND APPROX 2 SECONDS LATER, WE CONTACTED THE R WINGTIP OF THE PARKED ACFT. I IMMEDIATELY BACKED OUR ACFT APPROX 4 INCHES SO OUR WINGS WOULD NOT BE CONTACTING EACH OTHER AND INITIATED AN IMMEDIATE SHUTDOWN OF OUR ACFT. AFTER COMPLETING THE SHUTDOWN PROC, I EXPLAINED THE SIT TO THE PAX AND ASKED IF THEY COULD PLEASE DISEMBARK THE AIRPLANE AND WAIT IN THE PAX LOUNGE UNTIL WE COULD FURTHER EVALUATE THE SIT. UPON EXAMINATION OF THE POINT OF CONTACT, THE FOLLOWING DAMAGE WAS OBSERVED: THE RESULTING DAMAGE TO OUR KING AIR 350 WAS CHIPPED PAINT EXTENDING ALONG 3 INCHES OF THE R WINGLET. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE FIBERGLAS STRUCTURE BELOW THE PAINT. THE RESULTING DAMAGE TO THE PARKED ACFT (KING AIR 200) WAS A BROKEN LENS COVER CONTAINING THE R WING NAV LIGHTS AND SLIGHT BENDING OF THE NAV LIGHT HOUSING. AFTER EXAMINING THE DAMAGE, I IMMEDIATELY SET ABOUT LOCATING THE PLT OF THE OTHER ACFT AND UPON FINDING HIM, APOLOGIZED AND EXPLAINED THE SIT. I THEN LOCATED AN ACFT MECH FROM THE FBO AND ASKED HIM TO EVALUATE THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE. HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS NO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO THE WINGLET OF THE KING AIR 350 AND CONFIRMED THE AFOREMENTIONED DAMAGE TO THE OTHER ACFT. THE MECH EXPRESSED THAT HE MAY HAVE A REPLACEMENT LENS COVER IN STOCK FOR THE OTHER ACFT. I TELEPHONED THE FLT DEPT OFFICES AND EXPLAINED THE SIT TO OUR ACFT SCHEDULER AND DIRECTOR OF MAINT, MR X. MR X CONFIRMED THE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE ACFT. AFTER CONFERRING WITH THE PLT OF THE OTHER ACFT (MR Y) WE EXCHANGED PHONE NUMBERS, ADDRESSES, AND COMPANY INFO. AFTER MANY APOLOGIES, I ONCE AGAIN EXPRESSED MY REGRET AND EXPLAINED WE WOULD BE IN CONTACT WITH HIM AGAIN BY MONDAY MORNING. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT: 1) CONGESTED RAMP AREA WITH LITTLE ROOM FOR MANEUVERING. 2) OTHER PARKING RAMP EXIT WAS PARTIALLY BLOCKED BY ANOTHER ACFT. 3) NO WING WALKERS OR GUIDANCE FROM GND PERSONNEL OUTSIDE THE ACFT. 4) I BELIEVE A FALSE CONFIDENCE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY HAVING BEEN FORCED TO SUCCESSFULLY TAXI ON THIS CONGESTED RAMP MANY TIMES BEFORE. 5) PREVIOUS CONFLICTS IN PERSONALITIES BTWN COPLT AND MYSELF MAY HAVE LED TO A LACK OF COM DURING THE INCIDENT. REGRETTABLY IT IS TOO LATE, BUT I CAN NOW SEE THAT THE FRICTION BTWN THE COPLT AND MYSELF MAY HAVE BEEN A PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THIS ACCIDENT. FINAL SUMMARY: THE ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED WAS UNFORTUNATE AND ALTHOUGH IT WAS AN ACCIDENT, IT WAS AN ACCIDENT WHICH WAS COMPLETELY PREVENTABLE. PROPER DISCUSSION BTWN THE PLT AND COPLT AS WE APCHED THE OTHER ACFT SHOULD HAVE REVEALED THAT CONTINUING BROUGHT UNNECESSARY RISKS. IN RETROSPECT, ANY OF THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION MAY HAVE PREVENTED THE ACCIDENT: 1) EVALUATING THE DISTANCE FROM THE WING OF THE OTHER ACFT TO THE EDGE OF THE TXWY PRIOR TO BOARDING. SIMPLY WALKING OVER TO THE OTHER ACFT BEFORE BEGINNING THE FLT WOULD MOST LIKELY HAVE REVEALED THAT THE ACFT WAS PARKED TOO CLOSELY TO ALLOW OUR ACFT TO PASS SAFELY ALONG THE TXWY. 2) NOT ALLOWING THE FACT THAT THE OTHER RAMP EXIT WAS BLOCKED FORCE US INTO THE MINDSET THAT THE OTHER EXIT IS OUR ONLY OPTION. 3) PROPER DISCUSSION BTWN PLT AND COPLT REGARDING CLRNCS FROM OTHER ACFT AND THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO TAKE. 4) IF ANY DOUBT AROSE IN THE MIND OF EITHER PLT, THAT OBJECTION SHOULD BE VOICED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION SHOULD BE FORMULATED BEFORE PROGRESSING ANY FURTHER. 5) THE USE OF GND PERSONNEL SHOULD BE USED TO ASCERTAIN ADEQUATE ACFT CLRNCS WHILE THE ACFT IS TAXIING FROM ANY CROWDED RAMP AREA. 6) NOT ALLOWING THE FACT THAT BOTH THE PLT AND COPLT HAD SUCCESSFULLY MANEUVERED ON THIS RAMP DURING MANY PREVIOUS OCCASIONS TO LULL US INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.