Narrative:

Jfk-mynn (nassau) on feb/xa/99. Originally rted by dispatch over land but captain unilaterally rerted over water diw AR7 BR63V to NAS. En route, dispatch sent an ACARS message stating that aircraft we were flying was not allowed on overwater rtes regarding our operations specifications. Captain made comment that, because the aircraft we were flying had life vests installed, the 'operations specifications probably just had not been updated.' the captain continued on the overwater route to nassau. On the return flight, air carrier Y NAS-jfk, the dispatcher again rted the flight over the florida land route. Seeing this, the captain instructed me to get a clearance. I said we can call dispatch from inside the terminal and he said no, get the clearance from nassau clearance delivery now. I knew this imprudent and rationalizing by the captain, but because I'd flown with him before and was fully aware of his near dictatorial style of management, I complied with his request and got the clearance as instructed. I felt that safety of flight was not an issue and this was a contest between the captain and the dispatcher. Current CRM training emphasizes creating an environment where crew members can freely express their inputs on sits they don't like. However, training a 'leopard to change his spots' is another ball game, and is an area that may merit further development.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MD80 FO RPTS THAT CAPT ON THIS FLT FAILED TO FOLLOW HIS COMPANY OPS SPECS AND REFUSES TO COOPERATE WITH COMPANY DISPATCHER CONCERNING OVERWATER ROUTING.

Narrative: JFK-MYNN (NASSAU) ON FEB/XA/99. ORIGINALLY RTED BY DISPATCH OVER LAND BUT CAPT UNILATERALLY RERTED OVER WATER DIW AR7 BR63V TO NAS. ENRTE, DISPATCH SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE STATING THAT ACFT WE WERE FLYING WAS NOT ALLOWED ON OVERWATER RTES REGARDING OUR OPS SPECS. CAPT MADE COMMENT THAT, BECAUSE THE ACFT WE WERE FLYING HAD LIFE VESTS INSTALLED, THE 'OPS SPECS PROBABLY JUST HAD NOT BEEN UPDATED.' THE CAPT CONTINUED ON THE OVERWATER RTE TO NASSAU. ON THE RETURN FLT, ACR Y NAS-JFK, THE DISPATCHER AGAIN RTED THE FLT OVER THE FLORIDA LAND RTE. SEEING THIS, THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO GET A CLRNC. I SAID WE CAN CALL DISPATCH FROM INSIDE THE TERMINAL AND HE SAID NO, GET THE CLRNC FROM NASSAU CLRNC DELIVERY NOW. I KNEW THIS IMPRUDENT AND RATIONALIZING BY THE CAPT, BUT BECAUSE I'D FLOWN WITH HIM BEFORE AND WAS FULLY AWARE OF HIS NEAR DICTATORIAL STYLE OF MGMNT, I COMPLIED WITH HIS REQUEST AND GOT THE CLRNC AS INSTRUCTED. I FELT THAT SAFETY OF FLT WAS NOT AN ISSUE AND THIS WAS A CONTEST BTWN THE CAPT AND THE DISPATCHER. CURRENT CRM TRAINING EMPHASIZES CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE CREW MEMBERS CAN FREELY EXPRESS THEIR INPUTS ON SITS THEY DON'T LIKE. HOWEVER, TRAINING A 'LEOPARD TO CHANGE HIS SPOTS' IS ANOTHER BALL GAME, AND IS AN AREA THAT MAY MERIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.