Narrative:

Flight from eze to mvd (montevideo) at FL150, time en route 28 mins. Very busy. With all of this, captain (as PNF) finds himself behind. The captain is on second leg of flight since 3 weeks vacation. Reaching FL150 approaching tigre, the fir for mvd switched to mvd approach. ATIS is not available at mvd and with previous hour metar reporting wind 210 degrees at 10 KTS, we anticipate ILS runway 24. Captain programs FMS ILS runway 24, crr transition. Captain confirms ILS runway 24. Mvd approach replies, negative, VOR runway 6 in use, wind calm. This is a very short cruise segment, even using the runway 24 ILS. I ask for descent clearance immediately while the captain installs the runway 6 VOR approach. The captain has not been to mvd in some time. The VOR 6 is a penetration reversal from the VOR, however crr mvd often pursues visual approachs to avoid the lengthy overhead procedure in VMC. I am aware of this and begin a power off and speed brakes descent to FL050, our cleared altitude, as we are becoming high and fast for runway 6. We are cleared direct crr VOR. The captain experiences some difficulty programming the direct crr and conflict with the VOR 6 approach. I divert my attention to help several times in the descent along with duties required by the approach checklist. At this point approximately 12 mi out and FL050, we are both rushed -- me with the descent, the captain with FMS, checklists and switch to crr tower. Tower asks if we have airport in sight. We advise affirmatively and we are cleared visual runway 6. There is no immediately obvious way for the captain to give me any FMS guidance on the HSI to the runway. I am busy trying to intercept a 3:1 visual vertical path using VOR FMS DME and dirty up to approach speed. As we close on the airport with checklist complete, my attention is directed outside fully for the first time. As we descend below 1000 ft I feel uneasy, but have not yet idented the problem, but do voice to the captain my consideration for a go around. At the same time crr tower advises a go around as we are lined up for runway 10. Go around and landing on runway 6 are normal. Human performance considerations: operations in foreign countries with minimal approach capabilities, minimal english language skills, little or no runway identify markings. Local procedures and company procedures not conducive to safe flying operations, ie, late discovery of new departure procedure not in FMS, new company procedure 'packs off' complicated by low leveloff after takeoff. Consider what must be done from liftoff to 3000 ft. As pilots, not sensing early enough an overloaded situation developing. We are becoming, at the direction of our companies I must add, children of the FMS purple line. A failure to simply match runway to heading in this incident was at best embarrassing. Once I had the airport in sight, I could have suggested to the captain that he abandon FMS entries and assist me in the visual approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A WDB ACR FLC GOT RUSHED ON A VISUAL APCH TO A FOREIGN ARPT AND LINED UP ON THE WRONG RWY.

Narrative: FLT FROM EZE TO MVD (MONTEVIDEO) AT FL150, TIME ENRTE 28 MINS. VERY BUSY. WITH ALL OF THIS, CAPT (AS PNF) FINDS HIMSELF BEHIND. THE CAPT IS ON SECOND LEG OF FLT SINCE 3 WKS VACATION. REACHING FL150 APCHING TIGRE, THE FIR FOR MVD SWITCHED TO MVD APCH. ATIS IS NOT AVAILABLE AT MVD AND WITH PREVIOUS HR METAR RPTING WIND 210 DEGS AT 10 KTS, WE ANTICIPATE ILS RWY 24. CAPT PROGRAMS FMS ILS RWY 24, CRR TRANSITION. CAPT CONFIRMS ILS RWY 24. MVD APCH REPLIES, NEGATIVE, VOR RWY 6 IN USE, WIND CALM. THIS IS A VERY SHORT CRUISE SEGMENT, EVEN USING THE RWY 24 ILS. I ASK FOR DSCNT CLRNC IMMEDIATELY WHILE THE CAPT INSTALLS THE RWY 6 VOR APCH. THE CAPT HAS NOT BEEN TO MVD IN SOME TIME. THE VOR 6 IS A PENETRATION REVERSAL FROM THE VOR, HOWEVER CRR MVD OFTEN PURSUES VISUAL APCHS TO AVOID THE LENGTHY OVERHEAD PROC IN VMC. I AM AWARE OF THIS AND BEGIN A PWR OFF AND SPD BRAKES DSCNT TO FL050, OUR CLRED ALT, AS WE ARE BECOMING HIGH AND FAST FOR RWY 6. WE ARE CLRED DIRECT CRR VOR. THE CAPT EXPERIENCES SOME DIFFICULTY PROGRAMMING THE DIRECT CRR AND CONFLICT WITH THE VOR 6 APCH. I DIVERT MY ATTN TO HELP SEVERAL TIMES IN THE DSCNT ALONG WITH DUTIES REQUIRED BY THE APCH CHKLIST. AT THIS POINT APPROX 12 MI OUT AND FL050, WE ARE BOTH RUSHED -- ME WITH THE DSCNT, THE CAPT WITH FMS, CHKLISTS AND SWITCH TO CRR TWR. TWR ASKS IF WE HAVE ARPT IN SIGHT. WE ADVISE AFFIRMATIVELY AND WE ARE CLRED VISUAL RWY 6. THERE IS NO IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS WAY FOR THE CAPT TO GIVE ME ANY FMS GUIDANCE ON THE HSI TO THE RWY. I AM BUSY TRYING TO INTERCEPT A 3:1 VISUAL VERT PATH USING VOR FMS DME AND DIRTY UP TO APCH SPD. AS WE CLOSE ON THE ARPT WITH CHKLIST COMPLETE, MY ATTN IS DIRECTED OUTSIDE FULLY FOR THE FIRST TIME. AS WE DSND BELOW 1000 FT I FEEL UNEASY, BUT HAVE NOT YET IDENTED THE PROB, BUT DO VOICE TO THE CAPT MY CONSIDERATION FOR A GAR. AT THE SAME TIME CRR TWR ADVISES A GAR AS WE ARE LINED UP FOR RWY 10. GAR AND LNDG ON RWY 6 ARE NORMAL. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: OPS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES WITH MINIMAL APCH CAPABILITIES, MINIMAL ENGLISH LANGUAGE SKILLS, LITTLE OR NO RWY IDENT MARKINGS. LCL PROCS AND COMPANY PROCS NOT CONDUCIVE TO SAFE FLYING OPS, IE, LATE DISCOVERY OF NEW DEP PROC NOT IN FMS, NEW COMPANY PROC 'PACKS OFF' COMPLICATED BY LOW LEVELOFF AFTER TKOF. CONSIDER WHAT MUST BE DONE FROM LIFTOFF TO 3000 FT. AS PLTS, NOT SENSING EARLY ENOUGH AN OVERLOADED SIT DEVELOPING. WE ARE BECOMING, AT THE DIRECTION OF OUR COMPANIES I MUST ADD, CHILDREN OF THE FMS PURPLE LINE. A FAILURE TO SIMPLY MATCH RWY TO HDG IN THIS INCIDENT WAS AT BEST EMBARRASSING. ONCE I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT, I COULD HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE CAPT THAT HE ABANDON FMS ENTRIES AND ASSIST ME IN THE VISUAL APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.