Narrative:

I was the captain of air carrier ATR72 service from roc to ewr. The first officer was the PF on this leg and I was the PNF. On arrival, ATC cleared our flight for the ILS runway 22L approach to ewr. WX at ewr was VFR (generally clear) and winds at the surface were from the northwest at approximately 15 KTS. A gulfstream was well ahead of us on the approach and was circling to runway 29 at the time approach control switched us to tower frequency. When I first checked in with ewr tower we received clearance to land on runway 22L. We were #1 for landing after the gulfstream. As our flight crossed the OM on the approach to runway 22L, tower offered us a circle to runway 29. My evaluation of the situation was that either runway at this point was suitable for landing: winds favored runway 29 and this approach is offered to our company aircraft routinely. Since the first officer was the PF, I asked him for his preference. He preferred landing on runway 29 and I explained to tower that we would accept a circle to runway 29. The first officer began the circle maneuver at approximately 1100 ft MSL and circled to the east to establish our aircraft on final for runway 29. The airplane was in the landing confign at the time we began the circle and we completed the landing checklist during the first few moments of the maneuver. When we rolled onto final (550- 600 ft MSL) we noticed an air carrier B737 on its straight-in approach to runway 22L and it became clear to us as a crew that spacing was not adequate. A quick review of ewr airport shows that the thresholds for runway 22L and runway 29 are positioned in such a way that 2 aircraft cannot land at the same time on the respective runways without colliding -- an inevitable consequence as we viewed the developing situation. At the same time we recognized the problem, the air carrier B737 stated over the frequency, 'this isn't going to work, is it?' the ewr tower immediately responded, 'it'll work.' since air carrier B737 did not use their call sign when making the transmission, it was probably unclr to tower which aircraft made the comment. I was stunned at the tower's response, which led me to believe that perhaps they had a perspective that I did not have and that our spacing was adequate. The stun factor led us as a crew to continue the approach for another 5 seconds, after which we clearly realized that if we continued, both aircraft would collide crossing their respective thresholds. Even though we were technically #1 for landing, we elected to go around since it did not appear that the air carrier B737 was going to make an attempt to do so. We began the go around at about 400 ft MSL. Through 700 ft MSL we both looked right at and saw the air carrier B737 executing their go around. The first officer did an excellent job of making a very prompt but smooth left turn to avoid conflicting flight paths and the air carrier jet turned right for the same purpose. Our aircraft was on an approximately heading of 220 degrees climbing through 1200-1300 ft before tower intervened with any instructions. We were then told to maintain 2000 ft, heading of 190 degrees and contact departure. We do not recall tower making any comments to either aircraft as we 'self-controled' our respective gars. I made a PA to the passenger explaining that we elected to go around since spacing on the approach was inadequate and that we would be landing in about 15 mins. I also spoke with the flight attendants to ascertain if any passenger appeared noticeably startled and they informed me that none were. We touched down in ewr approximately 15 mins later on runway 22L. We debriefed the event as a crew after parking at the gate and securing the airplane. My first officer and I believed that we handled the situation in accordance with our company's SOP's, and we agreed on the factors that contributed to this event. Like myself, the first officer was stunned at the controller's response that 'it'll work.' it was obvious that 2 experienced flcs recognized that spacing was inadequate but were implicitly asked to re-evaluate a situation by a dismissive response from the tower. In reviewing the position of the 2 airplanes on approach, we also concluded the following: as we turned final for runway 29, it was our first opportunity to visually observe the air carrier B737. We were not unaware that this aircraft was following us on the approach, but did not consider its position to be a factor since we were not assigned a 'short approach' by tower or asked to 'widen out' our pattern. Again, the first officer did an excellent job of flying a precise circle maneuver to runway 29. Our first glance at the B737 revealed that we were at a slightly lower altitude than it was. However, at the time we executed our go around, the B737 was slightly below our altitude, indicating that its speed on the approach was higher than ours was. Winds aloft were very strong out of the northwest and this provided a quartering tailwind on the approach for straight-in traffic to runway 22L. When our aircraft turned final for runway 29, our ground speed decreased at least 15 KTS since we were now positioned to land into the wind. These factors were not included in the tower controller's assessment of the situation, nor were they fully appreciated by the B737 crew since they had an opportunity to observe our position throughout the entire approach and make an early decision on the feasibility of continuing the approach. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter's comments are quite consistent with the narrative. He states that within a few mins after landing, he went to chief pilot office and that the chief pilot already knew of the situation. The air carrier flight crew had called both the tower facility and the reporter company to discuss the tower operator's technique of controling and radio communication. The evident result was that the tower controller was relieved of duty at that time and probably received some degree of training in his duties and responsibilities. The reporter states that a circle to land runway 29 from a runway 22 approach is a common practice and that he continues to accept such a clearance without the above mentioned difficulties. He also states that he filled out a company irregularity report at the time of the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF ATR72 RECLRED FOR VISUAL CIRCLE TO LAND APCH AT EWR INITIATES GAR AS CONFLICT ACFT CONTINUES FOR INTERSECTING RWY. BOTH ACFT GO AROUND.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF ACR ATR72 SVC FROM ROC TO EWR. THE FO WAS THE PF ON THIS LEG AND I WAS THE PNF. ON ARR, ATC CLRED OUR FLT FOR THE ILS RWY 22L APCH TO EWR. WX AT EWR WAS VFR (GENERALLY CLR) AND WINDS AT THE SURFACE WERE FROM THE NW AT APPROX 15 KTS. A GULFSTREAM WAS WELL AHEAD OF US ON THE APCH AND WAS CIRCLING TO RWY 29 AT THE TIME APCH CTL SWITCHED US TO TWR FREQ. WHEN I FIRST CHKED IN WITH EWR TWR WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY 22L. WE WERE #1 FOR LNDG AFTER THE GULFSTREAM. AS OUR FLT CROSSED THE OM ON THE APCH TO RWY 22L, TWR OFFERED US A CIRCLE TO RWY 29. MY EVALUATION OF THE SIT WAS THAT EITHER RWY AT THIS POINT WAS SUITABLE FOR LNDG: WINDS FAVORED RWY 29 AND THIS APCH IS OFFERED TO OUR COMPANY ACFT ROUTINELY. SINCE THE FO WAS THE PF, I ASKED HIM FOR HIS PREFERENCE. HE PREFERRED LNDG ON RWY 29 AND I EXPLAINED TO TWR THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT A CIRCLE TO RWY 29. THE FO BEGAN THE CIRCLE MANEUVER AT APPROX 1100 FT MSL AND CIRCLED TO THE E TO ESTABLISH OUR ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 29. THE AIRPLANE WAS IN THE LNDG CONFIGN AT THE TIME WE BEGAN THE CIRCLE AND WE COMPLETED THE LNDG CHKLIST DURING THE FIRST FEW MOMENTS OF THE MANEUVER. WHEN WE ROLLED ONTO FINAL (550- 600 FT MSL) WE NOTICED AN ACR B737 ON ITS STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 22L AND IT BECAME CLR TO US AS A CREW THAT SPACING WAS NOT ADEQUATE. A QUICK REVIEW OF EWR ARPT SHOWS THAT THE THRESHOLDS FOR RWY 22L AND RWY 29 ARE POSITIONED IN SUCH A WAY THAT 2 ACFT CANNOT LAND AT THE SAME TIME ON THE RESPECTIVE RWYS WITHOUT COLLIDING -- AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE AS WE VIEWED THE DEVELOPING SIT. AT THE SAME TIME WE RECOGNIZED THE PROB, THE ACR B737 STATED OVER THE FREQ, 'THIS ISN'T GOING TO WORK, IS IT?' THE EWR TWR IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED, 'IT'LL WORK.' SINCE ACR B737 DID NOT USE THEIR CALL SIGN WHEN MAKING THE XMISSION, IT WAS PROBABLY UNCLR TO TWR WHICH ACFT MADE THE COMMENT. I WAS STUNNED AT THE TWR'S RESPONSE, WHICH LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT PERHAPS THEY HAD A PERSPECTIVE THAT I DID NOT HAVE AND THAT OUR SPACING WAS ADEQUATE. THE STUN FACTOR LED US AS A CREW TO CONTINUE THE APCH FOR ANOTHER 5 SECONDS, AFTER WHICH WE CLRLY REALIZED THAT IF WE CONTINUED, BOTH ACFT WOULD COLLIDE XING THEIR RESPECTIVE THRESHOLDS. EVEN THOUGH WE WERE TECHNICALLY #1 FOR LNDG, WE ELECTED TO GO AROUND SINCE IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT THE ACR B737 WAS GOING TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT TO DO SO. WE BEGAN THE GAR AT ABOUT 400 FT MSL. THROUGH 700 FT MSL WE BOTH LOOKED RIGHT AT AND SAW THE ACR B737 EXECUTING THEIR GAR. THE FO DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF MAKING A VERY PROMPT BUT SMOOTH L TURN TO AVOID CONFLICTING FLT PATHS AND THE ACR JET TURNED R FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. OUR ACFT WAS ON AN APPROX HDG OF 220 DEGS CLBING THROUGH 1200-1300 FT BEFORE TWR INTERVENED WITH ANY INSTRUCTIONS. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO MAINTAIN 2000 FT, HDG OF 190 DEGS AND CONTACT DEP. WE DO NOT RECALL TWR MAKING ANY COMMENTS TO EITHER ACFT AS WE 'SELF-CTLED' OUR RESPECTIVE GARS. I MADE A PA TO THE PAX EXPLAINING THAT WE ELECTED TO GO AROUND SINCE SPACING ON THE APCH WAS INADEQUATE AND THAT WE WOULD BE LNDG IN ABOUT 15 MINS. I ALSO SPOKE WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO ASCERTAIN IF ANY PAX APPEARED NOTICEABLY STARTLED AND THEY INFORMED ME THAT NONE WERE. WE TOUCHED DOWN IN EWR APPROX 15 MINS LATER ON RWY 22L. WE DEBRIEFED THE EVENT AS A CREW AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE AND SECURING THE AIRPLANE. MY FO AND I BELIEVED THAT WE HANDLED THE SIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR COMPANY'S SOP'S, AND WE AGREED ON THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. LIKE MYSELF, THE FO WAS STUNNED AT THE CTLR'S RESPONSE THAT 'IT'LL WORK.' IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT 2 EXPERIENCED FLCS RECOGNIZED THAT SPACING WAS INADEQUATE BUT WERE IMPLICITLY ASKED TO RE-EVALUATE A SIT BY A DISMISSIVE RESPONSE FROM THE TWR. IN REVIEWING THE POS OF THE 2 AIRPLANES ON APCH, WE ALSO CONCLUDED THE FOLLOWING: AS WE TURNED FINAL FOR RWY 29, IT WAS OUR FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO VISUALLY OBSERVE THE ACR B737. WE WERE NOT UNAWARE THAT THIS ACFT WAS FOLLOWING US ON THE APCH, BUT DID NOT CONSIDER ITS POS TO BE A FACTOR SINCE WE WERE NOT ASSIGNED A 'SHORT APCH' BY TWR OR ASKED TO 'WIDEN OUT' OUR PATTERN. AGAIN, THE FO DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF FLYING A PRECISE CIRCLE MANEUVER TO RWY 29. OUR FIRST GLANCE AT THE B737 REVEALED THAT WE WERE AT A SLIGHTLY LOWER ALT THAN IT WAS. HOWEVER, AT THE TIME WE EXECUTED OUR GAR, THE B737 WAS SLIGHTLY BELOW OUR ALT, INDICATING THAT ITS SPD ON THE APCH WAS HIGHER THAN OURS WAS. WINDS ALOFT WERE VERY STRONG OUT OF THE NW AND THIS PROVIDED A QUARTERING TAILWIND ON THE APCH FOR STRAIGHT-IN TFC TO RWY 22L. WHEN OUR ACFT TURNED FINAL FOR RWY 29, OUR GND SPD DECREASED AT LEAST 15 KTS SINCE WE WERE NOW POSITIONED TO LAND INTO THE WIND. THESE FACTORS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE TWR CTLR'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SIT, NOR WERE THEY FULLY APPRECIATED BY THE B737 CREW SINCE THEY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE OUR POS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE APCH AND MAKE AN EARLY DECISION ON THE FEASIBILITY OF CONTINUING THE APCH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR'S COMMENTS ARE QUITE CONSISTENT WITH THE NARRATIVE. HE STATES THAT WITHIN A FEW MINS AFTER LNDG, HE WENT TO CHIEF PLT OFFICE AND THAT THE CHIEF PLT ALREADY KNEW OF THE SIT. THE ACR FLC HAD CALLED BOTH THE TWR FACILITY AND THE RPTR COMPANY TO DISCUSS THE TWR OPERATOR'S TECHNIQUE OF CTLING AND RADIO COM. THE EVIDENT RESULT WAS THAT THE TWR CTLR WAS RELIEVED OF DUTY AT THAT TIME AND PROBABLY RECEIVED SOME DEGREE OF TRAINING IN HIS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. THE RPTR STATES THAT A CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 29 FROM A RWY 22 APCH IS A COMMON PRACTICE AND THAT HE CONTINUES TO ACCEPT SUCH A CLRNC WITHOUT THE ABOVE MENTIONED DIFFICULTIES. HE ALSO STATES THAT HE FILLED OUT A COMPANY IRREGULARITY RPT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.