Narrative:

Crew descended below established IAF altitude because of poor controller handling, issued wrong approach to proper runway, then crew was rushed into rebriefing and confused by what may have been an incorrect DME indication. Crew maintained VFR conditions with the runway insight throughout the approach. Crew monitored ATIS but there was no approach information given, nor any mention of the ILS approach facility being inoperative. Preparations required for arrival, including briefings for arrival procedure, ILS to both runways, including missed approach and holds. Crew had the airport in sight the entire time since the aircraft left IAF altitude. Last min confusion in extracting the approach plate by the rest of the crew prompted me to stay 'heads up' while we tried to rebriefed. Had we been in IFR conditions, we would have aborted the approach. The VASI was used to fly the latter stages of the visual approach. The controller's inquiry of altitude and airspeed on the approach came after our discovery of a possible altitude deviation from published approach procedure. Our descent was already arrested and a discussion of the situation underway. Task saturation was experienced by late notification of the proper approach procedure aggravated by conflicting traffic on the final, difficulty in understanding the controller, and being new to the aircraft (first trip after my IOE) and my first trip to this airport. A much greater application is now realized for the need to examine international NOTAMS, not rely on ATIS for approach information, and to expect very little or no approach facility information from international controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 CREW BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD DSNDED BELOW THE IAF PUBLISHED ALT DURING APCH TO RWY 25L AT EDDF.

Narrative: CREW DSNDED BELOW ESTABLISHED IAF ALT BECAUSE OF POOR CTLR HANDLING, ISSUED WRONG APCH TO PROPER RWY, THEN CREW WAS RUSHED INTO REBRIEFING AND CONFUSED BY WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN AN INCORRECT DME INDICATION. CREW MAINTAINED VFR CONDITIONS WITH THE RWY INSIGHT THROUGHOUT THE APCH. CREW MONITORED ATIS BUT THERE WAS NO APCH INFO GIVEN, NOR ANY MENTION OF THE ILS APCH FACILITY BEING INOP. PREPARATIONS REQUIRED FOR ARR, INCLUDING BRIEFINGS FOR ARR PROC, ILS TO BOTH RWYS, INCLUDING MISSED APCH AND HOLDS. CREW HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT THE ENTIRE TIME SINCE THE ACFT LEFT IAF ALT. LAST MIN CONFUSION IN EXTRACTING THE APCH PLATE BY THE REST OF THE CREW PROMPTED ME TO STAY 'HEADS UP' WHILE WE TRIED TO REBRIEFED. HAD WE BEEN IN IFR CONDITIONS, WE WOULD HAVE ABORTED THE APCH. THE VASI WAS USED TO FLY THE LATTER STAGES OF THE VISUAL APCH. THE CTLR'S INQUIRY OF ALT AND AIRSPD ON THE APCH CAME AFTER OUR DISCOVERY OF A POSSIBLE ALTDEV FROM PUBLISHED APCH PROC. OUR DSCNT WAS ALREADY ARRESTED AND A DISCUSSION OF THE SIT UNDERWAY. TASK SATURATION WAS EXPERIENCED BY LATE NOTIFICATION OF THE PROPER APCH PROC AGGRAVATED BY CONFLICTING TFC ON THE FINAL, DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING THE CTLR, AND BEING NEW TO THE ACFT (FIRST TRIP AFTER MY IOE) AND MY FIRST TRIP TO THIS ARPT. A MUCH GREATER APPLICATION IS NOW REALIZED FOR THE NEED TO EXAMINE INTL NOTAMS, NOT RELY ON ATIS FOR APCH INFO, AND TO EXPECT VERY LITTLE OR NO APCH FACILITY INFO FROM INTL CTLRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.