Narrative:

Date of occurrence mar/xa/99. Location: chiang kai shek international, taipei, taiwan. Second leg of 2 leg day. I was the first officer for this trip. First leg was from subic bay, philippines to taipei, second leg was taipei to narita international, tokyo, japan. All normal operations until taxi for takeoff and receipt of ATC clearance. Prior to push, we reviewed our expected departure routing and transition to our route of flight to narita. We expected to be cleared for takeoff on runway 5L to depart via airway A1 to 36 NM APU/ap. That's not what happened! How the problem arose: from the time we blocked out, we had been having trouble understanding ground control taxi directions due to language differences and quality of the transmission (static). We had not received our clearance before blockout and queried clearance several times en route to runway 5L. We finally received our clearance on the clearance frequency at the same time we were on the ground frequency (had to monitor 2 frequencys simultaneously during taxi). We were given our clearance during the final portion of our taxi to runway 5L. We were also trying to make an assigned not later than takeoff time. Here's where I, as the first officer, 'dropped the ball.' I'm responsible for copying and understanding the clearance. I did not do that and the result was us attempting to fly the wrong departure transition to our route of flight. With the language difficulties and marginal radio xmissions quality, it took several xmissions between clearance and us before we got what I thought was our clearance. The clearance I read back after several corrections was confirmed by clearance as readback correct, but my readback was not correct. No one caught it! The clearance we were supposed to fly was anpu 2 (AP2) departure, kikit transition A1. What I understood, and had firmly planted in my mind, was that we were cleared via airway A1 to 36 NM APU/ap. It gets worse before it gets better! We received our takeoff clearance and departed. After takeoff we contacted departure control and they told us they were not receiving our transponder, so we made sure it was on and recycled the system. They still were not picking us up. Meanwhile, I'm doing my best to fly the initial part of the departure out ot 17 NM tia which was correct, then transition over to a 080 degree heading to intercept the 052 degree radial off APU on out A-1 which was not correct (not the kikit transition)! Departure was still not picking up our transponder and now to compound our situation, our 2 vors would not pick up APU. We then advised departure that we could not pick up APU VOR to intercept the 052 degree outbound which should have been the 072 degree outbound off of APU had we been flying the way we were supposed to be flying (kikit transition). Fortunately, I selected the collocated ADF frequency as a backup and xchk during the departure. Since our vors were not cooperating I continued the departure flying off the ADF while the other crew members worked the transponder and vors. Departure questioned us on our position and heading as we worked with the transponder and vors. When departure told us to turn right to 080 degrees then 090 degrees initially, I knew then that we were not flying what or where we were cleared. Departure further cleared us direct to kikit but we could not understand her, so after several tries to understand her, we were cleared direct to rusar, which we did understand. We went INS direct to rusar. We did get the transponder working and the vors did not pick up APU until we were about 100 NM out of APU. We wrote up the transponder and checked the vors en route and they worked ok for the rest of the flight. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. We reviewed what happened, lessons learned and how to avoid it occurring again. First, as the first officer, I help pace the crew and can't allow us to be rushed by a not later than takeoff time. Secondly, have the controllers phonetically spell the clearance if there is any doubt or misunderstanding because the controllers also have difficulty understanding us. Language difficulties go both ways! Third, make sure I review and am familiar with all possible scenarios for the planned departure runway. Finally, do not lock into one departure procedure because odds are it will change.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC10-30 CREW FLEW INCORRECT SID DEPARTING RCTP.

Narrative: DATE OF OCCURRENCE MAR/XA/99. LOCATION: CHIANG KAI SHEK INTL, TAIPEI, TAIWAN. SECOND LEG OF 2 LEG DAY. I WAS THE FO FOR THIS TRIP. FIRST LEG WAS FROM SUBIC BAY, PHILIPPINES TO TAIPEI, SECOND LEG WAS TAIPEI TO NARITA INTL, TOKYO, JAPAN. ALL NORMAL OPS UNTIL TAXI FOR TKOF AND RECEIPT OF ATC CLRNC. PRIOR TO PUSH, WE REVIEWED OUR EXPECTED DEP ROUTING AND TRANSITION TO OUR RTE OF FLT TO NARITA. WE EXPECTED TO BE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 5L TO DEPART VIA AIRWAY A1 TO 36 NM APU/AP. THAT'S NOT WHAT HAPPENED! HOW THE PROB AROSE: FROM THE TIME WE BLOCKED OUT, WE HAD BEEN HAVING TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING GND CTL TAXI DIRECTIONS DUE TO LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES AND QUALITY OF THE XMISSION (STATIC). WE HAD NOT RECEIVED OUR CLRNC BEFORE BLOCKOUT AND QUERIED CLRNC SEVERAL TIMES ENRTE TO RWY 5L. WE FINALLY RECEIVED OUR CLRNC ON THE CLRNC FREQ AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE ON THE GND FREQ (HAD TO MONITOR 2 FREQS SIMULTANEOUSLY DURING TAXI). WE WERE GIVEN OUR CLRNC DURING THE FINAL PORTION OF OUR TAXI TO RWY 5L. WE WERE ALSO TRYING TO MAKE AN ASSIGNED NOT LATER THAN TKOF TIME. HERE'S WHERE I, AS THE FO, 'DROPPED THE BALL.' I'M RESPONSIBLE FOR COPYING AND UNDERSTANDING THE CLRNC. I DID NOT DO THAT AND THE RESULT WAS US ATTEMPTING TO FLY THE WRONG DEP TRANSITION TO OUR RTE OF FLT. WITH THE LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES AND MARGINAL RADIO XMISSIONS QUALITY, IT TOOK SEVERAL XMISSIONS BTWN CLRNC AND US BEFORE WE GOT WHAT I THOUGHT WAS OUR CLRNC. THE CLRNC I READ BACK AFTER SEVERAL CORRECTIONS WAS CONFIRMED BY CLRNC AS READBACK CORRECT, BUT MY READBACK WAS NOT CORRECT. NO ONE CAUGHT IT! THE CLRNC WE WERE SUPPOSED TO FLY WAS ANPU 2 (AP2) DEP, KIKIT TRANSITION A1. WHAT I UNDERSTOOD, AND HAD FIRMLY PLANTED IN MY MIND, WAS THAT WE WERE CLRED VIA AIRWAY A1 TO 36 NM APU/AP. IT GETS WORSE BEFORE IT GETS BETTER! WE RECEIVED OUR TKOF CLRNC AND DEPARTED. AFTER TKOF WE CONTACTED DEP CTL AND THEY TOLD US THEY WERE NOT RECEIVING OUR XPONDER, SO WE MADE SURE IT WAS ON AND RECYCLED THE SYS. THEY STILL WERE NOT PICKING US UP. MEANWHILE, I'M DOING MY BEST TO FLY THE INITIAL PART OF THE DEP OUT OT 17 NM TIA WHICH WAS CORRECT, THEN TRANSITION OVER TO A 080 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT THE 052 DEG RADIAL OFF APU ON OUT A-1 WHICH WAS NOT CORRECT (NOT THE KIKIT TRANSITION)! DEP WAS STILL NOT PICKING UP OUR XPONDER AND NOW TO COMPOUND OUR SIT, OUR 2 VORS WOULD NOT PICK UP APU. WE THEN ADVISED DEP THAT WE COULD NOT PICK UP APU VOR TO INTERCEPT THE 052 DEG OUTBOUND WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE 072 DEG OUTBOUND OFF OF APU HAD WE BEEN FLYING THE WAY WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE FLYING (KIKIT TRANSITION). FORTUNATELY, I SELECTED THE COLLOCATED ADF FREQ AS A BACKUP AND XCHK DURING THE DEP. SINCE OUR VORS WERE NOT COOPERATING I CONTINUED THE DEP FLYING OFF THE ADF WHILE THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS WORKED THE XPONDER AND VORS. DEP QUESTIONED US ON OUR POS AND HDG AS WE WORKED WITH THE XPONDER AND VORS. WHEN DEP TOLD US TO TURN R TO 080 DEGS THEN 090 DEGS INITIALLY, I KNEW THEN THAT WE WERE NOT FLYING WHAT OR WHERE WE WERE CLRED. DEP FURTHER CLRED US DIRECT TO KIKIT BUT WE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HER, SO AFTER SEVERAL TRIES TO UNDERSTAND HER, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO RUSAR, WHICH WE DID UNDERSTAND. WE WENT INS DIRECT TO RUSAR. WE DID GET THE XPONDER WORKING AND THE VORS DID NOT PICK UP APU UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 100 NM OUT OF APU. WE WROTE UP THE XPONDER AND CHKED THE VORS ENRTE AND THEY WORKED OK FOR THE REST OF THE FLT. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE REVIEWED WHAT HAPPENED, LESSONS LEARNED AND HOW TO AVOID IT OCCURRING AGAIN. FIRST, AS THE FO, I HELP PACE THE CREW AND CAN'T ALLOW US TO BE RUSHED BY A NOT LATER THAN TKOF TIME. SECONDLY, HAVE THE CTLRS PHONETICALLY SPELL THE CLRNC IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT OR MISUNDERSTANDING BECAUSE THE CTLRS ALSO HAVE DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING US. LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES GO BOTH WAYS! THIRD, MAKE SURE I REVIEW AND AM FAMILIAR WITH ALL POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE PLANNED DEP RWY. FINALLY, DO NOT LOCK INTO ONE DEP PROC BECAUSE ODDS ARE IT WILL CHANGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.