Narrative:

Approximately 18 mi southwest of the airport, we were at 12000 ft and slowed to 250 KIAS (anticipating descent). ATC asked our speed. I said 250 KTS. ATC replied 'I don't need that, accelerate to 270 KTS.' we did. 12 mi from the airport, ATC told us to descend to 8000 ft and slow to 230 KTS. Approaching 8000 ft (with clearance to 6000 ft) ATC said to slow to 210 KTS. We did. Approaching 7000 ft ATC said to increase rate of descent. I responded 'unable' since we were already at maximum rate of descent for that speed. ATC turned us 90 degrees (out of pattern) and told us to contact another controller and say when we could 'get it down.' I tried to explain that we had been kept high and were told to go 270 KTS from the previous controller just 18 mi from the airport. Next controller said to maintain 7000 ft and he vectored us back around into the pattern again. We were handed back to the controller who took us out of the pattern. We were given vectors around for the ILS runway 21R that took us out approximately 20 mi. 17 mi out on final, we were told to maintain 170 KTS and 3000 ft until established, and were cleared for the ILS runway 21R. Upon acceptance of the clearance, we were handed off to tower who, at 15 mi out, cleared us to land on runway 21R. We noted on TCASII how close we were to the aircraft in front of us. Verified by the tower, just 2 mi ahead! We also noted traffic (on TCASII and visually) approximately 2000 ft at our 10 O'clock position (same altitude) lined up for runway 21L. As we approached GS intercept, tower called out our 10 O'clock traffic and asked if we could see the runway. I said we had the traffic, but not the runway. Tower responded by saying he wanted us to do a visual to runway 21C as soon as we could see the airport. First officer captured GS and configured the aircraft for landing, which is company procedure. We slowed to 140 KTS. At approximately 5 mi the tower asked us our speed. I responded '140 KTS.' tower told us to level off at 3000 ft and turn right 20 degrees and told us we were to maintain 170 KTS. I said we had to slow to configure the aircraft for landing. Tower said we should have told in advance. Tower then asked us several times if we still had the airport. I responded we never had the airport visually. We were then vectored around for another approach, which was successful. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain said that the visibility was 4 NM, in haze, and he was looking into the sun trying to find the airport to accommodate the controllers. He attempted to explain that he could not see the airport nor could he make the aircraft do everything that the various controllers wanted immediately. He thinks that there is a lot of pressure on the controllers here to handle too much traffic. He commented that this approach control and tower seem to be always on edge. He has been there several times in the recent past and felt that reduced spacing and numerous speed changes have become the normal operation at dtw. The flight crew were not contacted by the FAA after landing. The captain did discuss the situation with a chief pilot, but has heard nothing further.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B737-300 FLC WAS GIVEN SEVERAL ALT AND SPD CHANGES THAT THE FLC ATTEMPTED TO ACCOMPLISH, WITHIN THE NORMAL OPERATING LIMITS OF THE ACFT, BUT THE CTLRS WERE FORCED TO TURN THEM OUT OF THE PATTERN TWICE BECAUSE OF TFC CONFLICTS.

Narrative: APPROX 18 MI SW OF THE ARPT, WE WERE AT 12000 FT AND SLOWED TO 250 KIAS (ANTICIPATING DSCNT). ATC ASKED OUR SPD. I SAID 250 KTS. ATC REPLIED 'I DON'T NEED THAT, ACCELERATE TO 270 KTS.' WE DID. 12 MI FROM THE ARPT, ATC TOLD US TO DSND TO 8000 FT AND SLOW TO 230 KTS. APCHING 8000 FT (WITH CLRNC TO 6000 FT) ATC SAID TO SLOW TO 210 KTS. WE DID. APCHING 7000 FT ATC SAID TO INCREASE RATE OF DSCNT. I RESPONDED 'UNABLE' SINCE WE WERE ALREADY AT MAX RATE OF DSCNT FOR THAT SPD. ATC TURNED US 90 DEGS (OUT OF PATTERN) AND TOLD US TO CONTACT ANOTHER CTLR AND SAY WHEN WE COULD 'GET IT DOWN.' I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THAT WE HAD BEEN KEPT HIGH AND WERE TOLD TO GO 270 KTS FROM THE PREVIOUS CTLR JUST 18 MI FROM THE ARPT. NEXT CTLR SAID TO MAINTAIN 7000 FT AND HE VECTORED US BACK AROUND INTO THE PATTERN AGAIN. WE WERE HANDED BACK TO THE CTLR WHO TOOK US OUT OF THE PATTERN. WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS AROUND FOR THE ILS RWY 21R THAT TOOK US OUT APPROX 20 MI. 17 MI OUT ON FINAL, WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS AND 3000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, AND WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 21R. UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THE CLRNC, WE WERE HANDED OFF TO TWR WHO, AT 15 MI OUT, CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 21R. WE NOTED ON TCASII HOW CLOSE WE WERE TO THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US. VERIFIED BY THE TWR, JUST 2 MI AHEAD! WE ALSO NOTED TFC (ON TCASII AND VISUALLY) APPROX 2000 FT AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS (SAME ALT) LINED UP FOR RWY 21L. AS WE APCHED GS INTERCEPT, TWR CALLED OUT OUR 10 O'CLOCK TFC AND ASKED IF WE COULD SEE THE RWY. I SAID WE HAD THE TFC, BUT NOT THE RWY. TWR RESPONDED BY SAYING HE WANTED US TO DO A VISUAL TO RWY 21C AS SOON AS WE COULD SEE THE ARPT. FO CAPTURED GS AND CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR LNDG, WHICH IS COMPANY PROC. WE SLOWED TO 140 KTS. AT APPROX 5 MI THE TWR ASKED US OUR SPD. I RESPONDED '140 KTS.' TWR TOLD US TO LEVEL OFF AT 3000 FT AND TURN R 20 DEGS AND TOLD US WE WERE TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS. I SAID WE HAD TO SLOW TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR LNDG. TWR SAID WE SHOULD HAVE TOLD IN ADVANCE. TWR THEN ASKED US SEVERAL TIMES IF WE STILL HAD THE ARPT. I RESPONDED WE NEVER HAD THE ARPT VISUALLY. WE WERE THEN VECTORED AROUND FOR ANOTHER APCH, WHICH WAS SUCCESSFUL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT SAID THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS 4 NM, IN HAZE, AND HE WAS LOOKING INTO THE SUN TRYING TO FIND THE ARPT TO ACCOMMODATE THE CTLRS. HE ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THAT HE COULD NOT SEE THE ARPT NOR COULD HE MAKE THE ACFT DO EVERYTHING THAT THE VARIOUS CTLRS WANTED IMMEDIATELY. HE THINKS THAT THERE IS A LOT OF PRESSURE ON THE CTLRS HERE TO HANDLE TOO MUCH TFC. HE COMMENTED THAT THIS APCH CTL AND TWR SEEM TO BE ALWAYS ON EDGE. HE HAS BEEN THERE SEVERAL TIMES IN THE RECENT PAST AND FELT THAT REDUCED SPACING AND NUMEROUS SPD CHANGES HAVE BECOME THE NORMAL OP AT DTW. THE FLC WERE NOT CONTACTED BY THE FAA AFTER LNDG. THE CAPT DID DISCUSS THE SIT WITH A CHIEF PLT, BUT HAS HEARD NOTHING FURTHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.