Narrative:

We were cleared to descend from altitude (about FL330) to cross lamma intersection south of omn at 12000 ft, 250 KIAS (bitho arrival into mco). The captain, a highly experienced pilot, was working the CDU to program the descent. We started down about 50 or 60 mi prior to the intersection. The FMS was commanding a rather slow descent because as I recollect we had a cross at or below intermediate altitude. The captain was trying to get the FMS to respond and I did not call for speed brakes early enough. About 10 mi after passing omn, with around 7 mi to go to reach lamma, I pointed out we weren't going to make lamma at 12000 ft, 250 KTS since we were going through about 16000 ft or 17000 ft still at about 320 KIAS. The captain told me to inform center and ask for a vector. Center, of course, became irritated because we had waited so long to identify the problem. The captain commanded the FMS to fly basically a straight-in to runway 23 since we were heading generally southwest. The FMS flew a perfect visual. The gso controller asked us what center had cleared us to fly, ie, what heading. Neither the captain nor I remembered any specific heading or clearance. We just let the FMS do its magic. CRM didn't work too well. The controller did not get upset, agreeing that the setup for the visual by the FMS was a work of art. What's the solution? I don't know. Concerning CRM, I've taught it off and on since 1985. The concept is great, but unfortunately it doesn't always work. I'm not saying we should throw it out. Quite the contrary. But there are no cure-alls for mistakes. We have to keep trying. As for FMS's I'm low on experience with only about 150-200 hours in 2 types over about 5 yrs, both as first officer. But what I've seen and read about FMS, GPS and similar equipment reinforces that the basics of navigation and situational awareness can't be overemphasized. Crews spend a lot of time punching in numbers and letters into the CDU. When it works, it works well. But programming the system is so labor intensive.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 FLC HAD DIFFICULTY PROGRAMMING THE FMS FOR DSCNT INTO MCO.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO DSND FROM ALT (ABOUT FL330) TO CROSS LAMMA INTXN S OF OMN AT 12000 FT, 250 KIAS (BITHO ARR INTO MCO). THE CAPT, A HIGHLY EXPERIENCED PLT, WAS WORKING THE CDU TO PROGRAM THE DSCNT. WE STARTED DOWN ABOUT 50 OR 60 MI PRIOR TO THE INTXN. THE FMS WAS COMMANDING A RATHER SLOW DSCNT BECAUSE AS I RECOLLECT WE HAD A CROSS AT OR BELOW INTERMEDIATE ALT. THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO GET THE FMS TO RESPOND AND I DID NOT CALL FOR SPD BRAKES EARLY ENOUGH. ABOUT 10 MI AFTER PASSING OMN, WITH AROUND 7 MI TO GO TO REACH LAMMA, I POINTED OUT WE WEREN'T GOING TO MAKE LAMMA AT 12000 FT, 250 KTS SINCE WE WERE GOING THROUGH ABOUT 16000 FT OR 17000 FT STILL AT ABOUT 320 KIAS. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO INFORM CTR AND ASK FOR A VECTOR. CTR, OF COURSE, BECAME IRRITATED BECAUSE WE HAD WAITED SO LONG TO IDENT THE PROB. THE CAPT COMMANDED THE FMS TO FLY BASICALLY A STRAIGHT-IN TO RWY 23 SINCE WE WERE HDG GENERALLY SW. THE FMS FLEW A PERFECT VISUAL. THE GSO CTLR ASKED US WHAT CTR HAD CLRED US TO FLY, IE, WHAT HDG. NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I REMEMBERED ANY SPECIFIC HDG OR CLRNC. WE JUST LET THE FMS DO ITS MAGIC. CRM DIDN'T WORK TOO WELL. THE CTLR DID NOT GET UPSET, AGREEING THAT THE SETUP FOR THE VISUAL BY THE FMS WAS A WORK OF ART. WHAT'S THE SOLUTION? I DON'T KNOW. CONCERNING CRM, I'VE TAUGHT IT OFF AND ON SINCE 1985. THE CONCEPT IS GREAT, BUT UNFORTUNATELY IT DOESN'T ALWAYS WORK. I'M NOT SAYING WE SHOULD THROW IT OUT. QUITE THE CONTRARY. BUT THERE ARE NO CURE-ALLS FOR MISTAKES. WE HAVE TO KEEP TRYING. AS FOR FMS'S I'M LOW ON EXPERIENCE WITH ONLY ABOUT 150-200 HRS IN 2 TYPES OVER ABOUT 5 YRS, BOTH AS FO. BUT WHAT I'VE SEEN AND READ ABOUT FMS, GPS AND SIMILAR EQUIP REINFORCES THAT THE BASICS OF NAV AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CAN'T BE OVEREMPHASIZED. CREWS SPEND A LOT OF TIME PUNCHING IN NUMBERS AND LETTERS INTO THE CDU. WHEN IT WORKS, IT WORKS WELL. BUT PROGRAMMING THE SYS IS SO LABOR INTENSIVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.