Narrative:

This statement concerns the operations of air carrier flight xyz (dfw-hou) on may/xa/99. I was the captain and PIC of that flight. I was assisted in the cockpit by first officer zyz wyyz. We flew ship number abc, an EMB120. The first officer was the PF, though I landed the plane. Prior to landing, WX was reported over hou that required us to hold for over 30 mins. Subsequently, ATC reported that due to the WX, it would be some time before we could land. The ship did not have a great deal of fuel. After contacting dispatch, I advised ATC that we were diverting to iah. During final approach, while I was performing the landing checklist, the first officer as the PF brought the levers back to adjust the power. About this time, I felt the plane yaw to the right, and noticed the right side of the plane sounded less noisy than before. I saw the propeller speed indicator read approximately 44%. The fire warning system did not indicate a fire. I took the controls from the first officer. We performed the engine failure/fire in-flight checklist. We shut down the right engine. I asked the first officer to contact ATC and declare an emergency. Upon landing, the ship was met by emergency personnel. I asked emergency personnel to examine the right engine. They reported to me that there was nothing abnormal. I made an announcement to the passenger. The plane was shut down and tugged to the gate. While at the gate, I conducted a walkaround inspection of the plane. The right engine appeared normal. I then contacted dispatch, which xferred me to maintenance. I informed maintenance personnel of the events that transpired. In an effort to determine whether there was any problems with the engine, I was asked to perform some maintenance checks on the ground. After performing those checks, I did not observe anything abnormal. Subsequently, I informed maintenance of this. They instructed me to complete an information write-up and enter it in the logbook. Following their instructions, I did that. After receiving a dispatch release, I flew the ship to dfw with the first officer and the flight attendant on board. There were no passenger. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the electronic engine control for the right engine was deferred and inoperative. The reporter said when the first officer (who was flying the approach) pulled the throttles back abruptly there was a lag in the engine response, the autofeather logic saw this lag as a power interruption and went to feather. The reporter said this event happened several times in flight training not to the reporter but was known to happen. The reporter said when the electronic engine control is inoperative, the technique is to make smooth throttle movements.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMBRAER 120 ON FINAL APCH AT 1500 FT THE PWR WAS ABRUPTLY PULLED BACK AND THE #2 ENG PROP WENT TO THE FEATHER POS.

Narrative: THIS STATEMENT CONCERNS THE OPS OF ACR FLT XYZ (DFW-HOU) ON MAY/XA/99. I WAS THE CAPT AND PIC OF THAT FLT. I WAS ASSISTED IN THE COCKPIT BY FO ZYZ WYYZ. WE FLEW SHIP NUMBER ABC, AN EMB120. THE FO WAS THE PF, THOUGH I LANDED THE PLANE. PRIOR TO LNDG, WX WAS RPTED OVER HOU THAT REQUIRED US TO HOLD FOR OVER 30 MINS. SUBSEQUENTLY, ATC RPTED THAT DUE TO THE WX, IT WOULD BE SOME TIME BEFORE WE COULD LAND. THE SHIP DID NOT HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF FUEL. AFTER CONTACTING DISPATCH, I ADVISED ATC THAT WE WERE DIVERTING TO IAH. DURING FINAL APCH, WHILE I WAS PERFORMING THE LNDG CHKLIST, THE FO AS THE PF BROUGHT THE LEVERS BACK TO ADJUST THE PWR. ABOUT THIS TIME, I FELT THE PLANE YAW TO THE R, AND NOTICED THE R SIDE OF THE PLANE SOUNDED LESS NOISY THAN BEFORE. I SAW THE PROP SPD INDICATOR READ APPROX 44%. THE FIRE WARNING SYS DID NOT INDICATE A FIRE. I TOOK THE CTLS FROM THE FO. WE PERFORMED THE ENG FAILURE/FIRE INFLT CHKLIST. WE SHUT DOWN THE R ENG. I ASKED THE FO TO CONTACT ATC AND DECLARE AN EMER. UPON LNDG, THE SHIP WAS MET BY EMER PERSONNEL. I ASKED EMER PERSONNEL TO EXAMINE THE R ENG. THEY RPTED TO ME THAT THERE WAS NOTHING ABNORMAL. I MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX. THE PLANE WAS SHUT DOWN AND TUGGED TO THE GATE. WHILE AT THE GATE, I CONDUCTED A WALKAROUND INSPECTION OF THE PLANE. THE R ENG APPEARED NORMAL. I THEN CONTACTED DISPATCH, WHICH XFERRED ME TO MAINT. I INFORMED MAINT PERSONNEL OF THE EVENTS THAT TRANSPIRED. IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY PROBS WITH THE ENG, I WAS ASKED TO PERFORM SOME MAINT CHKS ON THE GND. AFTER PERFORMING THOSE CHKS, I DID NOT OBSERVE ANYTHING ABNORMAL. SUBSEQUENTLY, I INFORMED MAINT OF THIS. THEY INSTRUCTED ME TO COMPLETE AN INFO WRITE-UP AND ENTER IT IN THE LOGBOOK. FOLLOWING THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, I DID THAT. AFTER RECEIVING A DISPATCH RELEASE, I FLEW THE SHIP TO DFW WITH THE FO AND THE FLT ATTENDANT ON BOARD. THERE WERE NO PAX. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ELECTRONIC ENG CTL FOR THE R ENG WAS DEFERRED AND INOP. THE RPTR SAID WHEN THE FO (WHO WAS FLYING THE APCH) PULLED THE THROTTLES BACK ABRUPTLY THERE WAS A LAG IN THE ENG RESPONSE, THE AUTOFEATHER LOGIC SAW THIS LAG AS A PWR INTERRUPTION AND WENT TO FEATHER. THE RPTR SAID THIS EVENT HAPPENED SEVERAL TIMES IN FLT TRAINING NOT TO THE RPTR BUT WAS KNOWN TO HAPPEN. THE RPTR SAID WHEN THE ELECTRONIC ENG CTL IS INOP, THE TECHNIQUE IS TO MAKE SMOOTH THROTTLE MOVEMENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.