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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 441225 |
Time | |
Date | 199905 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : crl.vortac |
State Reference | MI |
Altitude | msl single value : 10000 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : lan.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Xingu EMB-121 All Series |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | climbout : vacating altitude |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : approach |
Qualification | controller : radar pilot : atp |
Experience | controller non radar : 4 controller radar : 3 controller time certified in position1 : 2.3 |
ASRS Report | 441225 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Inter Facility Coordination Failure Operational Deviation |
Narrative:
Air carrier abc departed lan for cle. I was working the south/north radar position combined. I climbed the aircraft to 10000 ft, gave him direct psi VOR, and initiated an automated handoff to ZOB. Climbing out of 6000 ft, I switched the aircraft to lan sector of ZOB, although the handoff had not yet been accepted. I called ZOB several times to get the aircraft back or verify the handoff. ZOB did not answer any of the landline calls. The aircraft continued climbing, and exited my airspace vertically. Since I had only issued 10000 ft, I knew that the aircraft was being controled by ZOB. After 5 mins, I gave up trying to call ZOB. The aircraft was still flashing on my scope, so I recalled the handoff, and dropped data on the aircraft. (The aircraft was out of 14000 ft and outside the horizontal limits of my airspace.) here's the problem: when I recalled the handoff, the full data tag on the ZOB controller's scope disappeared and was replaced with only a limited data block. The ZOB controller forgot about the aircraft and let him enter another controller's airspace without approval, an operational deviation. I found out about the deviation a week later. In the course of the investigation, it was discovered that ZOB does not have data on departure until a handoff is initiated. Calling back the handoff removes the data displayed on the ZOB scope. No one at lan knew this, as our ARTS always displays full data on any aircraft projected to enter our airspace. I have spoken with controllers at approach controls all over the country - not one was aware of this difference in the way that our radar displays work. Why would any of us assume that dropping a tag from our scope would affect the display at the center? On the FLIP side, the center controllers were unaware that we always had full data tags (unless we manually drop data). As a solution to this problem, the quality assurance department at lan has decided to retrain me on proper handoffs -- even though it is clear from the recording that I was aware of my mistake and attempted to correct it (no answer from the receiving controller). This accomplished nothing. I submitted an employee suggestion that all approach controllers need to be aware of the differences in how the radar displays information. I requested that we be trained in this and that SOP's be changed to ensure that this does not happen in the future. My suggestion was denied. I feel that this is an unsafe situation. This type of problem could happen at any airport in the NAS, and next time it might not just be airspace that is hit.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RPTR STATES ACFT X WAS GIVEN ZOB FREQ BEFORE HDOF WAS COMPLETED. FOR WHATEVER REASON, IT APPEARS ZOB NEVER TOOK THE HDOF. RPTR TRIED CONTACTING ZOB CTLR, BUT THEN OBSERVED ACFT X WAS CLBING. RPTR RECALLED HDOF. DATA TAG ON ZOB'S RADAR CHANGED TO LIMITED TAG. ZOB CTLR FORGOT ABOUT ACFT X, AND ACFT VENTURED INTO ANOTHER SECTOR WITHOUT COORD. RESULTED IN AN OPDEV.
Narrative: ACR ABC DEPARTED LAN FOR CLE. I WAS WORKING THE S/N RADAR POS COMBINED. I CLBED THE ACFT TO 10000 FT, GAVE HIM DIRECT PSI VOR, AND INITIATED AN AUTOMATED HDOF TO ZOB. CLBING OUT OF 6000 FT, I SWITCHED THE ACFT TO LAN SECTOR OF ZOB, ALTHOUGH THE HDOF HAD NOT YET BEEN ACCEPTED. I CALLED ZOB SEVERAL TIMES TO GET THE ACFT BACK OR VERIFY THE HDOF. ZOB DID NOT ANSWER ANY OF THE LANDLINE CALLS. THE ACFT CONTINUED CLBING, AND EXITED MY AIRSPACE VERTLY. SINCE I HAD ONLY ISSUED 10000 FT, I KNEW THAT THE ACFT WAS BEING CTLED BY ZOB. AFTER 5 MINS, I GAVE UP TRYING TO CALL ZOB. THE ACFT WAS STILL FLASHING ON MY SCOPE, SO I RECALLED THE HDOF, AND DROPPED DATA ON THE ACFT. (THE ACFT WAS OUT OF 14000 FT AND OUTSIDE THE HORIZ LIMITS OF MY AIRSPACE.) HERE'S THE PROB: WHEN I RECALLED THE HDOF, THE FULL DATA TAG ON THE ZOB CTLR'S SCOPE DISAPPEARED AND WAS REPLACED WITH ONLY A LIMITED DATA BLOCK. THE ZOB CTLR FORGOT ABOUT THE ACFT AND LET HIM ENTER ANOTHER CTLR'S AIRSPACE WITHOUT APPROVAL, AN OPDEV. I FOUND OUT ABOUT THE DEV A WK LATER. IN THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ZOB DOES NOT HAVE DATA ON DEP UNTIL A HDOF IS INITIATED. CALLING BACK THE HDOF REMOVES THE DATA DISPLAYED ON THE ZOB SCOPE. NO ONE AT LAN KNEW THIS, AS OUR ARTS ALWAYS DISPLAYS FULL DATA ON ANY ACFT PROJECTED TO ENTER OUR AIRSPACE. I HAVE SPOKEN WITH CTLRS AT APCH CTLS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY - NOT ONE WAS AWARE OF THIS DIFFERENCE IN THE WAY THAT OUR RADAR DISPLAYS WORK. WHY WOULD ANY OF US ASSUME THAT DROPPING A TAG FROM OUR SCOPE WOULD AFFECT THE DISPLAY AT THE CTR? ON THE FLIP SIDE, THE CTR CTLRS WERE UNAWARE THAT WE ALWAYS HAD FULL DATA TAGS (UNLESS WE MANUALLY DROP DATA). AS A SOLUTION TO THIS PROB, THE QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPT AT LAN HAS DECIDED TO RETRAIN ME ON PROPER HDOFS -- EVEN THOUGH IT IS CLR FROM THE RECORDING THAT I WAS AWARE OF MY MISTAKE AND ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT IT (NO ANSWER FROM THE RECEIVING CTLR). THIS ACCOMPLISHED NOTHING. I SUBMITTED AN EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION THAT ALL APCH CTLRS NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE DIFFERENCES IN HOW THE RADAR DISPLAYS INFO. I REQUESTED THAT WE BE TRAINED IN THIS AND THAT SOP'S BE CHANGED TO ENSURE THAT THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE. MY SUGGESTION WAS DENIED. I FEEL THAT THIS IS AN UNSAFE SIT. THIS TYPE OF PROB COULD HAPPEN AT ANY ARPT IN THE NAS, AND NEXT TIME IT MIGHT NOT JUST BE AIRSPACE THAT IS HIT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.